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Preface
This book has evolved from ANU College of Law, Centre for International and 
Public Law’s Seventeenth Annual Public Law weekend, held at The Australian 
National University from 20–22 September 2012.
The idea for the conference theme, ‘Law’s Challenge to Democracy/Democracy’s 
Challenge to Law’ was formulated through our discussions with Kim’s ANU 
colleague, Dr Katharine Young, who assisted us in the work associated with 
organising the conference. We thank her for her enthusiastic intellectual 
contribution to the foundations for this book.
In addition to the contributors to this collection, there were other speakers 
who presented at the conference, who we would also like to acknowledge. 
They include, in the order they presented, Michael Kirby, Simon Butt, Phillip 
Tahmindjis, Moeen Cheema, Darren O’Donovan, Rosalind Dixon, Carlos Bernal, 
Svetlana Tyulkina, Louise Parrott, Brendan Lim, Claudia Geiringer, Robyn 
Holder, Paul Kildea, Ron Levy, Tim Gartrell, Shireen Morris, Rowan Mcrae, 
Elizabeth Bowes, Mark Jennings, Tania Voon, and Tom Smyth.
We are grateful for the support of ANU College of Law, including the College 
Outreach and Administrative Support Team (COAST). In addition to organising 
the logistics of the conference, they supported the organisation around 
the Annual Sawer lecture, presented by Professor Adrienne Stone, and the 
Annual Kirby Lecture in International Law, presented by Judge Christopher 
Weeramantry, both held around the 2012 Public Law weekend.
Following the conference, we felt there were valuable ideas that were worth 
developing into a substantial research contribution. We thank each of the 
contributors in this volume for responding to our call of ‘expression of interest’ 
and for taking on this work. We thank Professor Don Anton, Chair of the 
ANU Press Law Editorial Board, for shepherding the publication process, and 
Duncan Beard, who worked as our copy editor to ensure we met ANU Press’s 
requirements.
Finally, we thank each of our families for the love and support they provide us 
in all that we do.
Glenn Patmore, University of Melbourne 




1. Law and Democracy: 
Contemporary Questions
Glenn Patmore1 and Kim Rubenstein2
Constitutional democracy is a contested concept. Caselaw since the early 1990s 
has recognised implied principles of representative and responsible government 
that go well beyond the mere text of the Australian Constitution, providing 
for a ‘direct choice’ of representatives by ‘the people’, and for electoral 
democracy.3 These judicial implications remain contentious to the present 
day.  Moreover, the constitutional conventions that provide accountability for 
responsible government are evolving and subject to challenge. In addition, law’s 
regulation of political and popular culture is becoming increasingly important 
due to changing social circumstances and technological developments. These 
changes create challenges, which this book responds to by asking a number of 
fundamental questions:
• How should the meaning of ‘the people’ in the Australian Constitution be 
defined by the High Court of Australia? 
• How do developing judicial conceptions of democracy define citizenship? 
• What is the legal right to participate in the political community? 
• Should political advisors to Ministers be subject to legal accountability 
mechanisms?
• What challenges do applied law schemes pose to notions of responsible 
government and how can they be best addressed?
• How can the study of the ritual of electoral politics in Australia and other 
common law countries supplement the standard account?
• How might the ritual of the pledge of Australian citizenship limit or enhance 
democratic participation? 
• What is the conflict between legal restrictions of freedom of expression and 
democracy, and the role of social media? 
1 g.patmore@unimelb.edu.au; Glenn Patmore wishes to thank for their assistance, Mr Tom Appleby, Ms 
Candice Parr and Ms Anna Seddon who read material to him and provided research assistance. Their work was 
much appreciated. Special thanks must also be given to the Melbourne Law Research Service.
2 kim.rubenstein@anu.edu.au.
3 Australian Constitution s 7: ‘The Senate shall be composed of senators for each State, directly chosen by 
the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament otherwise provides, as one electorate’; s 24: ‘The House of 
Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, and the 
number of such members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of the senators.’
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Examining the regulation of democracy this book brings together emerging and 
established scholars and practitioners with expertise in public law. It enriches 
public law scholarship, deepening and challenging the current conceptions of 
law’s regulation of popular participation and legal representation. This volume 
is divided into three parts to identify the complexity and nuance of law and 
democracy in its contemporary doctrinal, conventional and socio-legal context.
These are:
• Assumptions and scope of constitutional democracy; 
• The frontiers of accountability and responsible government; and 
• Democracy, law and culture.
The purpose of the book is threefold. First, it raises and addresses a number 
of novel questions regarding law’s regulation of democracy. Second, it aims to 
deepen our understanding of doctrinal scholarship  by exploring its assumptions 
and its scope. Third, the book goes beyond doctrinal scholarship to consider 
important socio-legal questions about law’s regulation of politics and culture. 
By considering a diverse range of topics pertaining to law’s engagement with 
democracy in Australia and elsewhere, we believe the contemporary function 
of law will be better understood in its constitutional, political and cultural 
contexts.
Assumptions and scope of constitutional 
democracy
The modern conception of democracy is representative.4 The Australian 
Constitution establishes representative government by requiring that senators 
and members be ‘directly chosen by the people’.5 In other words, the Parliament 
is regarded as representative since the citizens directly choose members of 
Parliament in regular elections.6 However, very little about the electoral system 
is spelt out in the Australian Constitution.7 The design and function of the 
electoral system was left to Parliament and the political process.8 Moreover, 
4 See Nicholas Aroney, ‘Towards the “best explanation” of the Constitution: Text, Structure, History and 
Principle in Roach v Electoral Commissioner’ (2011) 30(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 145. Anne 
Twomey, ‘Rowe v Electoral Commissioner: Evolution or Creationism?’ (2012) 31(2) University of Queensland 
Law Journal, 181–202; Jennifer Clarke, Patrick Keyzer and James Stellios, Australian Constitutional Law 
Materials and Commentary (Lexisnexis, 9th ed, 2013) 1210–16.
5 See Stephen J in Ex rel McKinlay v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 [20].
6 Suri Ratnapala and Jonathan Crowe, Australian Constitutional Law: Foundations and Theory (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 33.
7 David Clark, David Bamford and Judith Bannister, Principles of Australian Public Law (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 
2010) 175; Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2011) 110.
8 ibid.
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key democratic concepts are not defined in the Australian Constitution, such as 
‘the people’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘political participation’. While the representative 
principle remains strong, there are uncertainties that exist, due to the sparse 
provisions for the establishment of democracy in the Australian Constitution.9 
This uncertainty is reflected in High Court jurisprudence. 
Elisa Arcioni addresses the meaning of the term ‘the people’ in the Constitution, 
highlighting the High Court’s murky and complex treatment of the term. She 
considers cases on the meaning of the terms ‘representative government’ and 
‘alien’, focusing respectively on who is included in, and who is excluded 
from the term ‘the people’. The High Court has resolved the tensions in these 
definitional issues by identifying ‘the people’ through legislative developments, 
which has constitutionalised that membership. Arcioni concludes that whether 
we prefer deferral to the parliamentary choices over time recognised in legislative 
developments, as a new form of constitutional construction, or the judicial 
application of standards seen in other legal sources, depends not on an absolute 
rule regarding constitutional interpretation but rather on classic differences of 
viewpoint regarding the role of judicial review.
Kim Rubenstein and Niamh Lenagh-Maguire explain that there is no expressly 
defined concept of citizenship in the Australian Constitution. Citizenship is 
defined by Commonwealth legislation and in its relationship with the concept 
of representative government. After explaining the significance of citizenship in 
Australia’s democratic structure, they examine the important case of Re MIMIA; 
ex parte Ame, which tied citizenship to voting rights, a ‘thin’ conception of 
citizenship. They argue for the adoption of a ‘thicker’ or broader conception 
of citizenship focusing on rights, political participation and identity. This 
offers the potential for a deeper understanding of citizenship to inform judicial 
development and popular views.
Glenn Patmore examines the right to participate in democratic decision making. 
The modern conception of democracy recognises a right of citizens to elect 
representatives to make legislative and executive decisions on their behalf. 
While this is a relatively limited conception of participation, his chapter 
illustrates how it can usefully define the scope and structure of contemporary 
constitutional democracy.  He examines how this right to participate in collective 
decisions is authorised in the Constitution, legislation, and constitutional 
conventions.  Patmore also enlarges upon the more limited understanding of the 
constitutional protection of the right to vote or to participate in the political life 
of the community referred to by members of the High Court in recent decisions. 
Like others, Patmore argues that the constitutional protection of the right to vote 
9 Suri Ratnapala and Jonathan Crowe, Australian Constitutional Law: Foundations and Theory (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2012).
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may act to entrench democratic rights like the secret ballot that have hitherto 
only been recognised in legislation. He also posits that there is a permeability 
between the norms of the Constitution and legislation in order to help better 
understand the nature and scope of this right. Thus, he conceives the right to 
participate to include the making of legislative and executive decisions, not just 
voting in elections. 
Accountability and responsible government
The grand difficulty in politics is how to make the few accountable to the 
many.  In Australia, formal accountability is provided through the principle of 
representative and responsible government. Representative democracy means 
that representatives are accountable to electors and responsible government 
means that Ministers must be members of Parliament, and accountable to 
it.  Responsible government has been described as a chain of command   or 
responsibility.  According to the ‘chain’ metaphor, the Queen and Governor-
General are accountable to Ministers, who are accountable to the Parliament, 
which is in turn accountable to the people. Thus, officials are either responsible 
for or subject to the control of others.  Only a few of the essential links in this 
chain are expressly recognised in the Constitution, for instance the requirement 
that Ministers must be members of Parliament and heads of government 
departments.  Other conditions are to be found in the constitutional conventions 
of responsible government. According to constitutional convention, public 
servants are accountable to Ministers, who are accountable to the Parliament. 
Two chapters address contemporary challenges to effective accountability 
provided by the system of responsible government. Yee-Fui Ng examines 
the responsibility of ministerial advisers. According to the principle of 
responsible government, Ministers receive advice from ministerial advisers, and 
are answerable for the implementation of that advice. Unlike public servants, 
ministerial advisors are not subject to public accountability mechanisms. 
However, Yee-Fui Ng argues that ministerial advisers are increasingly exercising 
executive power beyond what is allowed in the Statement of Standards for 
Ministerial Staff, and should therefore be subject to legal accountability 
mechanisms. These include appearing before parliamentary committees, as part 
of the concept of responsible government and judicial review under section 
75(v) of the Constitution. She concludes that such measures would generate 
a more nuanced and multi-faceted notion of accountability. While Yee-Fui Ng 
examines the accountability of ministerial advisers, Joe Edwards examines 
accountability under intergovernmental agreements and their effects on the 
efficacy of responsible government. Edwards explains that applied law schemes 
are intergovernmental agreements, in which the various interested jurisdictions 
1 . Law and Democracy
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— either the Commonwealth and the States and Territories, or just the States 
and Territories — agree that a particular area requires regulatory uniformity 
through the adoption of a model law. These schemes can be administered by the 
Commonwealth, by States, by both, or by an independent authority. Edwards 
asks whether applied law schemes might undermine the accountability provided 
by responsible government. This doctrine assumes the voters have sufficient 
information to hold the government to account through elections at the ballot 
box. Given the complexity of applied law schemes, it appears that the chains of 
accountability become blurred and difficult to ascertain for citizens and legal 
advisors. Edwards concludes that while applied law schemes challenge traditional 
conceptions of accountability, ultimately they should be retained given they are 
capable of balancing the aim of regulatory uniformity with the requirement of 
responsible government.
Democracy, law and culture
The laws and institutions we adopt necessarily shape political participation. 
According to participatory theorists of democracy, citizens, through 
participation in democratic practices and institutions, can develop a ‘public-
spirited type of character’ or may become a ‘community-minded individual’. 
This is regarded as the ‘educative effect’ of democracy, which occurs through 
participation, not necessarily formal education.  While this might be regarded as 
an idealised version of democracy, it challenges us to consider how participation 
in democratic institutions can promote self-development. Enhancing self-
development provides an important rationale for contemporary representative 
democracy.  Laws may provide opportunities for enhanced development such 
as through participation in voting, jury service and in small-scale organisations 
such as workplaces and community organisations. 
The function of political participation and law is analysed by three contributors, 
taking us beyond the traditional educative function of democracy, with its 
focus on participation in political decision-making. These chapters examine 
popular forms of civic participation and democratic culture and its impact on 
the individual.
Two contributors address the role of ritual in politics that are authorised by the 
law. Graeme Orr examines the ritual dimensions of electoral law, explaining that 
the way the law structures an election creates a shared experience, patterned 
by norms. Political participation in Election Day creates a communal event — 
a ritual of diverse shared experiences: for some, a chore, a public duty or a 
confessional moment. However, as Orr explains, ‘the ritual is primarily built 
up in the patterned behaviour — what transpires in the internal reflections of 
Law and Democracy: Contemporary Questions
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different individuals is another matter’. One important pattern is based around 
the legal obligation to vote, which occurs on the one day that our secular society 
congregates to renew the mandate of representatives. Appreciating this enables 
us to better understand the social power of Australian electoral law. Orr also 
compares the ritual element of electoral law in Australia with the United States 
and the United Kingdom.
Anne Macduff examines the ritual of the citizenship pledge, and explains how 
it gives meaning to the state’s conception of the ideal citizen. The pledge states:
From this time forward [under God]
I pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people
Whose democratic rights and liberties I respect, and
Whose laws I will uphold and obey.
While the citizenship applicant has the choice not to affirm with the words 
‘under God’, they must make the pledge publicly at a citizenship ceremony. 
Macduff is critical of the public performance of the pledge and its content. She 
makes two key criticisms: 
• The ritual situates the Australian ideal citizen as being obedient, compliant 
and law-abiding; and
• Although the pledge includes words such as ‘democratic beliefs’, ‘rights’ 
and ‘freedoms, these words of the pledge do not clearly convey the active 
agency of Australian citizenship.
By active citizenship, she means ‘more than political participation within the 
existing framework of laws and institutions, and includes critical protests that 
question the founding framework’. However, she notes that once a migrant 
becomes a citizen, ‘they are legally free to engage in Australian democracy as 
they choose and to benefit from the democratic freedoms that other Australian 
citizens have’. Interestingly, while these rights and freedoms are referred to in 
the words of the pledge, she sees the ritual of the pledge as potentially adversely 
influencing future citizens’ active engagement in democratic politics. She argues 
that the submission to legal authority embodied in the ritual of the pledge has 
the capacity to ‘influence the behavior of candidates after they become citizens’.
Stephen Tully examines the political participation of citizens in democratic 
culture through social media. While Orr adopts a socio-legal approach, and 
Macduff adopts a critical legal studies perspective, Tully’s analysis is grounded 
in respect of liberal rights. First, he considers how social media may enhance 
and limit democratic participation. Not only does he consider its opportunities 
and limits but, like Orr and Macduff, his work highlights the importance of 
1 . Law and Democracy
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the experience of democratic participation, in this case through social media. 
Tully provides examples of its use in countries like Egypt and Tunisia, where 
he examines social media’s ability to shape democratic culture. Secondly, he 
highlights how legal restrictions can curtail democratic opportunities. While 
democratic states acknowledge the importance of freedom of expression 
through social media, they have justified some limits to protect national security 
and law enforcement. While some limits are legitimate, others are not. Tully 
argues that, ‘[s]tated at its highest, the use by governments of blocking or 
filtering technology violates the obligation of States to guarantee freedom of 
expression’. The freedom to participate through social media is also threatened 
in non-democratic countries. This includes by removing internet-content 
and by sometimes banning social media altogether. Tully’s analysis highlights 
the tension between the new opportunities provided by social media for 
democratic participation, and resistance by the state through law. Social media 
can be perceived as  a threat to the safety and stability of the state or, more 
contentiously, when it challenges the socio-political status quo.
Conclusion
While constitutional democracy has existed for over a century in Australia, key 
concepts in the field continue to be contested and developed. Some of these 
concepts have not been questioned and examined in sufficient detail. The 
contributions in this volume identify the value of rethinking the assumptions 
and scope of this field. Some contributors argue that the current constitutional 
assumptions need to be broadened in light of contemporary theories of 
democracy. Others propose reforms to accountability mechanisms for responsible 
government.  Some others contend that the discipline needs to respond to new 
cultural and social realities. Thus, this book does not aim to provide a single 
answer; after all the law of democracy is multi-faceted and complex. Rather, 
this book offers a rich selection of new ways of thinking and provides us with 
new approaches to interpreting existing laws as well as understanding law in its 
broader social context.






2. Democracy and the Constitution: 
The People Deciding the Identity of 
‘the people’
Elisa Arcioni1  
Introduction
The phrase ‘the people’ appears at the beginning of the preamble to the 
Australian Constitution, where the people of the colonies are recognised as ‘the 
people’ who ‘agreed to unite in one indissoluble federal Commonwealth’. That 
agreement is a reference to the referenda held in each colony to accept the draft 
Constitution, which had been drafted by predominantly elected delegates to 
the constitutional conventions in the late 1890s.2 Those conventions resulted in 
a Constitution Bill which was taken to the United Kingdom by the Australian 
delegation and, with one significant alteration,3 was passed by the Imperial 
Parliament. 
There had been an earlier attempt, in 1891, to adopt a Constitution. However, 
due to a lack of political will in NSW and a depression, it did not progress 
through the colonial Parliaments as had been planned.4 The second attempt 
involved ‘the people’ both in the political movement for federation, as well as 
in the drafting and acceptance of the Constitution Bill. ‘The people’ played a big 
role in the final successful push for a Constitution.5
1 elisa.arcioni@sydney.edu.au.
2 For the history of the two conventions and the various referenda see John M Williams, The Australian 
Constitution: A Documentary History (Melbourne University Press, 2005). Western Australia is not mentioned 
in the preamble, as its people did not vote in a referendum to accept the draft until after the draft was taken 
to the United Kingdom for passage through the Imperial Parliament. Covering clause 3 refers to the possibility 
of Western Australia being joined in the Commonwealth if the people of Western Australia agreed to the Bill. 
They did so through referendum on 31 July 1900 and the Constitution came into effect from 1 January 1901.
3 Section 74 was amended to retain some appeals to the Privy Council. See J A La Nauze, The Making of the 
Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press, 1972) ch 16. In addition, covering clause 2 was amended 
to remove the statement that ‘This Act shall bind the Crown’ and covering clause 6 was amended to remove 
the definition of ‘colony’.
4 For details on this period, see John M Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History 
(Melbourne University Press, 2005).
5 See Helen Irving, To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia’s Constitution (Cambridge 
University Press, revised ed, 1999) ch 8 ‘The People’. It is particularly interesting to note, for the argument 
later developed, that not all women were fully part of ‘the people’ in terms of voting rights at the time of the 
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The phrase ‘the people’ appears in sections  7 and 24 of the Constitution. 
Section 7 requires that senators be directly chosen by the ‘people of the States’ 
and s  24 requires that members of the House of Representatives be directly 
chosen by ‘the people of the Commonwealth’. Those choices occur by election.6 
Section  128 provides for the electors in the States and Territories to vote in 
referenda, which is the process by which the text of the Constitution can be 
changed.7 There are also a number of other references to ‘the people’ in the 
Constitution,8 or to other categories of persons.9
Read together, these sections reflect the fact that ‘the people’ were involved 
in the making of the Constitution, are involved in making amendments to the 
constitutional text, and are the ones who choose members of Federal Parliament. 
Who are these people? For the purpose of this chapter,10 I begin with the premise 
that what connects the different manifestations of ‘the people’ in the Constitution 
is an idea of the constitutional community. ‘The people’ is a reference to that 
community, which has both legal and symbolic implications. The constitutional 
community is a concept which reflects the fact that every Constitution governs 
a community of people, which exists separate from the document, but whose 
constitutional identity is affected by the Constitution itself. This draws on the 
work of scholars such as Michel Rosenfeld.11
In the Australian context, an understanding of who is included or excluded from 
the constitutional community informs not only the categories of membership, 
‘final successful push for a Constitution’. See Kim Rubenstein and Deborah Cass, ‘Representation/s of Women 
in the Australian Constitutional System’ (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 3 and Helen Irving (ed) A Woman’s 
Constitution?: Gender and History in the Australian Commonwealth (Hale & Iremonger, 1996).
6 See for example the textual indication of this in s 7 ‘voting’, ss 8 and 30 ‘qualification of electors’.
7 The process also necessarily involves the Parliament and the Governor-General.
8 For example, reference to ‘the people’ in s 53.
9 For example, reference to ‘subjects of the Queen’ in s 117.
10 For other work regarding the identity of the constitutional ‘people’, see Elisa Arcioni, ‘Identity at the 
Edge of Constitutional Membership’ in K Rubenstein, M Nolan and F Jenkins (eds), Allegiance and Identity 
in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) addressing the status of the people of the 
Territories; Elisa Arcioni, ‘Excluding Indigenous Australians from “the people”: A Reconsideration of Sections 
25 and 127 of the Constitution’ (2012) 40(3) Federal Law Review 287; as well as a preliminary overview in Elisa 
Arcioni, ‘That Vague but Powerful Abstraction: The Concept of “the people” in the Australian Constitution’ 
(Paper presented at Gilbert + Tobin Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 20 February 2009) http://www.
gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/mdocs/469_ElisaArcioni.pdf.
11 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and 
Community (Routledge, 2010) as developed in Symposium, ‘Comments on Michel Rosenfeld’s The Identity 
of the Constitutional Subject’ (2012) 33(5) Cardozo Law Review 1839. I acknowledge that there is a debate 
regarding the identity and role of the constituent people before a Constitution is formed. It is sufficient 
for the purposes of this chapter to note that there is a theory that the constituent power, which has the 
authority to create the Constitution, becomes the constituted people upon enactment of the Constitution. This 
raises difficult questions regarding precisely who was the constituent authority and on what basis, to what 
extent membership of the constituent authority automatically translates into membership of the constituted 
people, and how to address changes in the composition of the constituted people over time. See, for example, 
Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Constitutional Powermaking of the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations Between 
Constituent Power and the Constitution’ in Michel Rosenfeld (ed), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and 
Legitimacy: Theoretical perspectives (Duke University Press, 1994) 143.
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but also the nature of the constitutional community. However, simply re-naming 
‘the people’ as the community under the Australian Constitution does not get 
us very far in understanding who those people are. Thus I arrive at the focus of 
this chapter. Here I look at the method adopted by the Australian High Court in 
trying to grapple with the meaning of this phrase, ‘the people’.
The jurisprudence of the Court regarding the phrase ‘the people’ is addressed in 
this chapter through an examination of two groups of cases. The first is a series 
of cases concerned with representative government, and most recently focusing 
on the exercise of the federal franchise. The second is a series of cases about 
migration or deportation, centred on the constitutional concept of ‘alien’. 
By looking to the text of the Constitution, it is obvious why the phrase ‘the 
people’ is of concern in cases relating to the system of representative government. 
Representative government is centred on what has been referred to as the bedrock 
of ‘choice by the people’,12 in the sections to which I have already referred — 
ss 7 and 24 — whereby the people of the States and Commonwealth directly 
choose the members of Federal Parliament. In the representative government 
cases, especially the most recent ones, a majority of the High Court has given 
great weight to that phrase ‘chosen by the people’, to the extent of invalidating 
legislation because the legislation was inconsistent with that mandate.13 Not 
only is there a series of cases referring to ‘the people’, from which to extract 
patterns regarding how we can understand that category, but those cases also 
show how jurisprudentially significant that phrase can be.
The second series of cases, relating to migration or deportation, is not as 
obviously connected to the phrase ‘the people’. As Gleeson CJ stated in the 
case of Singh v Commonwealth: ‘Sometimes the problem of meaning lies, not in 
understanding the concept that a particular word or expression signifies, but 
in understanding the relationship between a number of concepts referred to in 
the Constitution.’14 That is true of the migration cases, in which a number of 
categories intersect to inform the meaning of ‘the people’. 
The migration cases are relevant to understanding the meaning of ‘the people’ 
because they assist in determining boundaries of membership. The cases all turn 
on the status of ‘alien’, referred to in s 51(xix) of the Constitution, which grants 
the Federal Parliament power to make laws with respect to aliens.15 Aliens are 
individuals who fall outside the constitutional community. By understanding 
who is considered to be outside the constitutional community, we get some 
12 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 12 [1] (French CJ), referring to Roach  v Electoral 
Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 198 [82] (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ).
13 ibid.
14 Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 334 [15].
15 It also grants power regarding naturalisation. This aspect becomes relevant in underpinning at least 
aspects of citizenship legislation which affect the reasoning in the second group of cases, addressed below.
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guidance as to the outer limits of that community, an idea of what line forms the 
boundary. Such an understanding assists in determining who falls on the right 
side of the boundary, and therefore within the constitutional ‘people’.
These two groups of cases, regarding representative government and ‘aliens’, 
help us to understand who the constitutional ‘people’ are. The connection I 
make between those groups of cases is a reflection on the method of reasoning 
adopted by a majority of the Court. That connection is in the use of legislative 
indications of membership in determining the meaning of constitutional terms.
My argument in this chapter is that when the Court tries to work out these 
questions, concerning who is included as amongst ‘the people’, or who is 
excluded by being an ‘alien’, a majority of the Court defers to, or uses in some 
form, legislative indications of membership in order to determine the content of 
the constitutional concepts. While the Court starts and ends with a constitutional 
expression, the way it fills the constitutional expression with meaning is to see 
what the legislature has done in the areas of law affected by that phrase, in order 
to decide what the constitutional limits might be. This indicates broader issues 
regarding constitutional interpretation. In the next section, I outline how this 
method of reasoning operates in both groups of cases. I then indicate some of 
the implications of this pattern and how this approach can be understood as the 
Court’s deferring to the people’s indication of their own identity.
The reasoning in the representative 
government cases
Over a series of cases from the 1970s,16 the High Court confirmed that there is a 
system of representative government contained within the Constitution. After 
some changes in approach, the current view is that the constitutional elements 
of that system are those required by the text and structure of the Constitution,17 
not freestanding principles of democracy or politics more generally. 
What is a common element amongst these cases is the requirement of choice by 
‘the people’ as the heart of the system of government, and that constitutional 
implications may arise from that phrase. The most significant implication is 
16 There were earlier mentions of elements of representative government, for example Judd v McKeon (1926) 
38 CLR 380 where the notion of ‘choice’ was at issue.
17 See especially the unanimous statement in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
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the implied freedom of political communication.18 That implied freedom was 
deemed to be necessary in order for the people to make an informed choice as 
required by ss 7, 24 and 128 of the Constitution.
Two of the most recent cases addressing the system of representative government 
under the Constitution are the cases which are the focus here — Roach v Electoral 
Commissioner19 and Rowe v Electoral Commissioner.20 Roach was a challenge 
to the blanket disenfranchisement of prisoners from the federal franchise, on 
the basis that it breached ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution. The majority struck 
down the legislation. The majority reasoned that the power of the Parliament 
to determine the franchise was restricted by the requirement of ss 7 and 24 that 
parliamentarians be ‘directly chosen by the people’. Limited disenfranchisement 
was allowed, but to disenfranchise all prisoners went beyond the justifiable 
limits on the federal franchise.
Rowe was a case which challenged the timing of the closing of the electoral 
rolls prior to the 2010 federal election. Parliament had passed legislation which 
reduced the amount of time within which eligible persons could enrol to vote 
following the calling of an election. The Court, again by majority, struck down 
the legislation as being inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of choice 
by ‘the people’. The detriment caused by the legislation outweighed any 
potential benefits of the early closing of the rolls.
In those two cases, a majority of the Court used the notion of choice by ‘the 
people’ to invalidate the laws in question. In examining the meaning of that 
phrase, and determining who ‘the people’ are, the majority started from the 
position that a universal adult franchise is now protected by the Constitution. 
That is, that all capable adult citizens should have the right to vote. This was the 
baseline against which the Court in Roach determined whether it was justifiable 
to disenfranchise all prisoners, and against which the Court in Rowe determined 
whether the legislature could shorten the timeframe between calling the election 
and closing the electoral roll.
Focusing on how the Court determined that such a broad franchise is protected 
reveals the significance of legislative indications of membership in defining the 
constitutional meaning of ‘the people’. Gleeson CJ is the most explicit in his use 
of legislation. He states that universal adult franchise is protected by ss 7 and 
18 The settled doctrine relating to this freedom was established in a unanimous judgment in Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, as refined in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 
and accepted in recent cases such as Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 
3 and Monis v The Queen; Droudis v the Queen [2013] HCA 4. Lange followed on from earlier cases including 
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills 
(1992) 177 CLR 1.
19 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
20 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1.
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24.21 This is because ‘long established universal adult suffrage’ is ‘an historical 
development of constitutional significance’.22 What this means is that, because 
of changed historical circumstances, ss 7 and 24 ‘have come to be a constitutional 
protection of the right to vote’.23
Significantly, included in those historical circumstances is ‘legislative history’.24 
The relevant legislative history addressed in the case is that relating to the federal 
franchise. Today there is an almost universal adult franchise. Adult citizens 
have a right to vote unless they fall into a number of discrete and non-arbitrary 
categories, and only a small, closed category of adult non-citizens have a right 
to vote.25 The remainder of Gleeson  CJ’s judgment is about what exceptions 
are allowed from that general right to vote, and how they can be justified. The 
conclusion in Roach was that the blanket disenfranchisement went too far, but 
that disenfranchisement of prisoners with a minimum sentence of three years 
was valid.26
The joint majority judgment of Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ displays the 
same method. They approach the question by looking at the central conception 
of representative government. The implied freedom of political communication, 
discussed above, is one aspect of that system. However, these judges say that 
voting is even more central; it is at the heart of the system of representative 
government. In identifying the centrality of voting to the constitutional system 
of government, they state that ‘[g]iven the particular Australian experience with 
the expansion of the franchise in the nineteenth century, well in advance of that 
in the United Kingdom, this hardly could be otherwise’.27 This statement comes 
after their having outlined the details of the legislative changes from colonial 
times to today, with respect to the franchise.
The joint judgment then moves to what was Gleeson CJ’s second step in his 
reasoning, stating: ‘The question with respect to legislative disqualification 
from what otherwise is adult suffrage … thus becomes a not unfamiliar one. Is the 
disqualification for a substantial reason?’28 Thus, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan 
JJ also accept the ‘bedrock’ of universal adult franchise, which has achieved 
that status due to changed legislation over time, and anything abrogating that 
rule must be justified. 
21 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 173–4 [6].
22 ibid 174 [7].
23 ibid.
24 ibid.
25 See current manifestation in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).
26 This suggests something about the normative nature of ‘the people’, in privileging ‘good’ behaviour 
and penalising ‘bad’ behaviour — see the reference to ‘conduct which manifests such a rejection of civic 
responsibility as to warrant temporary withdrawal of a civic right’ in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 
233 CLR 162, 174-5 [8] (Gleeson CJ).
27 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 198 [80]–[81].
28 ibid 199 [85], (emphasis added).
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In the case of Rowe, which followed three years after Roach, the majority once 
again deferred to legislative indications of membership of ‘the people’. Chief 
Justice French was most explicit about this. Early in his judgment, French CJ 
stated: ‘The content of the constitutional concept of “chosen by the people” has 
evolved since 1901 and is now informed by the universal adult-citizen franchise 
which is prescribed by Commonwealth law.’ He continued, stating that the 
constitutional concept of choice by the people has acquired ‘a more democratic 
content than existed at Federation. That content, being constitutional in 
character, although it may be subject to adjustment from time to time, cannot 
now be diminished.’29
French CJ was indicating that the meaning of choice by the people has changed. 
But he goes further and makes it clear that it is the changes in legislation over 
time that have determined the changed constitutional meaning. He refers to 
McTiernan and Jacobs JJ’s judgment in Attorney-General of the Commonwealth; 
ex rel McKinlay v the Commonwealth,30 which Gleeson CJ had referred to in 
Roach. The joint judgment in McKinlay had, in turn, referred to the constitutional 
meaning being linked to the ‘common understanding of the time’.31 French CJ 
states that ‘common understanding’ is not ‘judicial understanding’.32 This seems 
to be a distinction between the views of the community generally (the ‘common 
understanding’), compared with the view of the judiciary. French CJ says that 
‘durable legislative development of the franchise is a more reliable touchstone. 
It reflects a persistent view by the elected representatives of the people of what 
the term “chosen by the people” requires.’33 Then, as in Roach, the remainder 
of his judgment is about whether the law in question breaches that command, 
which in this instance the majority decided was the case.
The joint judgment of Gummow and Bell JJ in Rowe adopts the reasoning 
and conclusion of Gleeson CJ in Roach with respect to the universal adult 
franchise being constitutionalised.34 In her concurring judgment, Crennan 
J also refers to Gleeson CJ in Roach.35 Crennan J reasons that representative 
government must be democratic. Democratic representation is given content by 
the ‘common understanding’, which is to come from legislative development. 
Crennan J then reaches her conclusion that ‘a fully inclusive franchise — that 
is a franchise free of arbitrary exclusions based on class, gender or race’, is now 
constitutionalised.36
29 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 18 [18].
30 Attorney-General of the Commonwealth; ex rel McKinlay v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1.
31 ibid 35–37.
32 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 18 [19].
33 ibid.
34 ibid 48–9 [123].
35 ibid 107 [328].
36 ibid 117 [368].
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Thus, the majority judges, in both of the most recent cases concerned with the 
system of representative government and the phrase ‘chosen by the people’, 
have all used legislative indications of membership to determine ‘the people’ 
who should be doing the choosing. It is the pattern of membership that the 
judges see in legislation which provides the meaning of the phrase ‘chosen by 
the people’, particularly, who are ‘the people’ who should be able to exercise a 
choice through a federal vote.
The reasoning in the ‘alien’ cases
I now turn to the second group of cases, the ‘alien’ cases, to demonstrate that 
in a separate area of constitutional jurisprudence, the Court is using legislative 
indications to determine membership of the constitutional community. Here 
the Court does so by considering who can be excluded from that community 
through characterisation as a constitutional ‘alien’.
The status of ‘alien’ is provided for in 51(ixx) of the Constitution, which the 
Federal Parliament has used to support its migration legislation since the 
1980s.37 Cases arising under that legislation are usually about whether or not 
someone can be deported as an alien. In these cases, as with the cases regarding 
representative government addressed above, a majority of the Court uses 
legislative indications of membership or exclusion from membership, in the 
course of reaching a conclusion about whether someone is a constitutional alien.
The cases are consistent in identifying allegiance as the touchstone of alien 
status. If a person has no allegiance to any state, then that person is an alien. 
This includes stateless people, as seen in Al-Kateb v Godwin.38 If a person has 
allegiance to a foreign nation, then he or she can also be classed as an alien, as 
seen in the example of British subjects since 1986 in the cases of Shaw v Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs39 and Nolan v Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs.40 
Significant for my argument here is how the Court determines a person’s 
allegiance. Members of the majority in these alien cases look to legislation, 
particularly citizenship legislation. There are two ways in which this has 
37 See the Migration Amendment Act 1983 (Cth), which came into effect on 2 April 1984. Prior to that, the 
immigration power in s 51(xxvii) was the foundation for that legislation. The interaction between the two 
powers and the doctrine of absorption is beyond the scope of this chapter, but for noting that absorption 
into the Australian community (which makes someone a non-immigrant) does not necessarily make an alien a 
non-alien and therefore immune from deportation: Genevieve Ebbeck, ‘A Constitutional Concept of Australian 
Citizenship’ (2004) 25(2) Adelaide Law Review 137, 145-153.
38 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562.
39 Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28.
40 Nolan v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178.
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occurred. The first is by considering how alienage was understood at federation 
and concluding that it was a status which was inherently given meaning at that 
time through legislation. When the Court refers or defers to the meaning at 
federation in order to understand the current application of the constitutional 
term, it has adopted the meaning as affected by legislation of that era. The second 
approach is the Court ascribing constitutional significance to legislation in the 
post-federation era, by looking to Australian legislation since the enactment of 
the Constitution, in order to give the meaning of ‘alien’ current content. In this 
part, I address those two approaches, as well as noting a more specific use of an 
individual piece of legislation, to demonstrate the ability of the Parliament to 
determine, at least to some extent, the constitutional meaning of ‘alien’.
Before proceeding, I note the relationship between constitutional ‘alien’ at the 
heart of these cases and the concept of ‘the people’. ‘The people’ is a reference 
to the constitutional community. Aliens are those outside that community. By 
understanding what makes someone an alien, and therefore an outsider, we can 
understand who is not an alien and therefore an insider — one of ‘the people’. 
Using pre-federation legislation
The first way in which the Court uses legislative indications of the constitutional 
meaning of ‘alien’ is when it looks to the meaning of that term at the time of 
the federation of the Australian colonies. It is well-accepted that historical 
materials can be used in interpreting the Australian Constitution.41 Despite the 
many disagreements and nuances regarding the use of such materials,42 some 
regard for historical meaning is common to most exercises of constitutional 
interpretation.43
41 See for example the statement regarding use of convention debates in Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 
360. However, note that there are problems with using such materials, as well as other historical materials. 
See Helen Irving, ‘Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of History’ (2013) 41(1) 
Federal Law Review.
42 See for example the debate regarding originalism, both in Australia and in the US: Philip Bobbitt, 
Constitutional Interpretation (Blackwell, 1991); Greg Craven, ‘Original Intent and Australian Constitution: 
Coming Soon to a Court Near You?’ (1990) 1(2) Public Law Review 166; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in 
Constitutional Interpretation’ (1997) 25(1) Federal Law Review 1; Simon Evans, ‘The Meaning of Constitutional 
Terms: Essential Features, Family Resemblance and Theory-Based Approaches’ (2006) 29(3) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 207.
43 I avoid using the term originalism here, as there is a distinction made in the literature between using 
historical materials for the purpose of establishing an originalist understanding of the Constitution, and 
using materials from the time of enactment to determine the meaning in a textualist sense. See the recent 
debate between Antonin Scalia and Richard Posner, in Antonin Scalia and Bryan A Garner, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/West, 2012) and Richard A Posner, ‘The Incoherence of Antonin 
Scalia’ (2012) New Republic, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-
garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism. My interest in materials from the past is focused on the use of 
legislation, not the competing arguments regarding the different schools of interpretation.
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The argument I make here is that the Court uses pre-federation legislation in 
order to understand the current meaning of ‘alien’. The legislation in question 
is related to the law of nationality and citizenship. The history of that law as it 
now applies in Australia extends back to common law doctrines in Britain. The 
doctrine relating to subject and alien status in the United Kingdom developed 
over time into a statutory creature, with legislative incursions into the common 
law principles in Britain, in the Australian colonies prior to federation and then 
in Commonwealth law post-federation.44 
The joint judgment of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Singh v Commonwealth45 
provides an example of the use of pre-federation legislation. That judgment 
focused on the development of nationality laws in the UK prior to federation, 
in order to conclude that the meaning of ‘alien’ was not fixed by the common 
law. In that case, Tania Singh, a girl born in Australia of non-citizen parents, 
was resisting characterisation as an alien. The joint judgment in that case said 
that history shows that legislative changes had affected the meaning of ‘alien’ 
as understood at federation. That led to the majority in that case coming to the 
conclusion that Tanya Singh could be considered an alien, despite her birth in 
Australia.46 
The relevance of pre-federation legislation is seen in the majority’s view that the 
law of British subject status was in flux, with significant legislative incursions 
into the common law principles. They therefore rejected the idea that birth 
within the realm necessarily made someone a subject,47 who could not be an 
alien, because legislation had interfered with that principle.
Using post-federation legislation
It is not only pre-federation legislation which has an impact on the Court’s 
understanding of constitutional alienage. Australian legislation post-federation 
was a factor in determining the status of British subjects who were not Australian 
citizens, with the conclusion that they are now aliens. This is seen most clearly 
in the judgment in Nolan,48 which concerned Therrence Nolan’s challenge to the 
federal government’s attempt to deport him. Nolan was a British subject but not 
an Australian citizen. The government argued he was an alien for the purpose of 
44 For an overview, see Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context (Lawbook Co, 2002).
45 (2004) 222 CLR 322.
46 McHugh J, in dissent, concluded that the rule he saw in the British history and later developments was 
that birth in the realm meant a person could not be an alien. The distinction between McHugh J’s reasoning 
and that of the majority highlights the possibility of different interpretations of the same legal materials. See 
McHugh J’s summary in Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 342-3.
47 See the discussion of this principle in David A Wishart, ‘Allegiance and Citizenship as Concepts in 
Constitutional Law’ (1986) 15 Melbourne University Law Review 662.
48 Nolan v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178.
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the Constitution, and was therefore subject to deportation. Nolan resisted that 
characterisation by claiming that he owed a relevant allegiance and therefore 
could not be deported. 
In determining whether he was a constitutional alien, the majority in Nolan 
focused on the legislative introduction of Australian citizenship from 1948.49 
From that time, Australians retained their earlier status as British subjects, 
which had applied as common law since the British imposed their law on this 
continent. However, a new status under legislation began to exist alongside that 
— the status of Australian citizenship. Over four decades, legislation reduced 
the significance of British subject status, until it disappeared as a reference to 
legal status in the mid-1980s.50 The majority in the case of Nolan, relying on 
that legislative change and development, therefore concluded that the concept 
of ‘alien’ could, from 1986 at the latest, apply to British subjects who were non-
citizens.51
Another specific example of legislation 
affecting constitutional status
The cases of Singh and Nolan show that legislative incursions into the law of 
nationality have affected the constitutional meaning of ‘alien’. The majority of 
the Court in each case used legislation to interpret the current meaning of ‘alien’. 
The status of ‘alien’ marks the boundary of the constitutional people, whereby 
aliens can be deported while ‘the people’ are the members of the constitutional 
community and are protected from removal.52 In using legislative indications to 
understand constitutional aliens, the Court is also providing guidance as to the 
meaning of ‘the people’. 
The cases above reveal the use of legislation in the sense of indicating a pattern 
of development in status. There is one further example, which indicates the 
ability of one legislative enactment to affect constitutional membership, again 
by reference to the concept of ‘alien’. The example is the case of Re Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Ame.53 Amos 
49 See Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth), which came into effect on 26 January 1949.
50 The only significant reference now is in provisions of Commonwealth electoral legislation allowing some 
British subjects who are not Australian citizens to retain their federal vote. See Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1918 (Cth) s 93(1)(b)(ii).
51 Note that in an earlier case, the Court had concluded that the United Kingdom is now a ‘foreign power’ 
for the purpose of s 44(i), even though it could not have been so considered at federation: Sue v Hill (1999) 
199 CLR 462.
52 See Helen Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home: The Constitution and the Citizen’s Right of Abode’ (2008) 30 
Sydney Law Review 133, note here I am equating ‘the people’ as understood in this chapter with constitutional 
citizenship discussed in that article.
53 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439.
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Ame was born in Papua while it was an Australian territory.54 In 1975, Papua 
and New Guinea were unified and became an independent country, Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). In the process of becoming independent, PNG had to determine 
its citizenship laws and decided against allowing dual nationality. This became 
a political difficulty because Ame, and others, were Australian citizens under 
Australian law, although they did not have an automatic right to enter the 
Australian mainland. After independence, Ame entered the Australian mainland 
with a visa and sought to stay. The Australian government sought to deport him 
as an alien once his visa had expired.
In that case, the Commonwealth successfully argued that Ame was an alien, 
because the federal executive had passed a regulation stating that all persons 
who were Australian citizens but who became citizens of the independent state 
of PNG on Independence Day, ceased to be Australian citizens on that day.55 The 
Court upheld the validity of that regulation and found that, in applying the idea 
of allegiance, Ame was an alien because he owed no allegiance to Australia; he 
was no longer a citizen, rather he owed allegiance to a foreign power because 
Australian legislation said he was a foreign citizen. Once again, the majority 
of the Court determined that legislation56 led to his status as an alien — a 
constitutional status.
Despite several statements by the Court to the effect that the legislature cannot 
treat someone who is not truly an alien as an alien, that is, that the legislature 
cannot determine conclusively who is a constitutional alien, the majority of the 
Court has adopted what the legislature has said about citizenship as the basis for 
determining the meaning of constitutional ‘alien’.57
I have outlined how the Court is going about its work in this area: it is relying, 
at least in part, on legislative indications of the meaning of constitutional 
expressions regarding membership of the constitutional people — either as 
electors in a system of representative government referred to in ss 7 and 24 — 
or as those excluded by being constitutional aliens. In the following section, I 
54 For the history of Papua, as compared to New Guinea, see Alan Kerr, A Federation in These Seas: An 
Account of the Acquisition by Australia of its External territories, With Selected Documents (Attorney General’s 
Department, 2009).
55 See Papua New Guinea Independence (Australian Citizenship) Regulations 1975 (Cth) reg 4.
56 The focus of the reasoning was the validity of the Australian law at issue, but factually and politically it 
interacted with PNG legislation and policy. See the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
1975 s 64 regarding dual citizenship. 
57 On this occasion, the Court emphasised the relevance of s  122 of the Constitution, the ‘territories’ 
power, which is understood as a broad power of the federal Parliament. Just as the Parliament can accept 
new territories under that power, so it can also divest itself of former ones. The consequence of doing so is 
that the Parliament can therefore affect the status of the people of those territories. The Court sought to limit 
its conclusions in this case to only some territories. See Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, 457 [28], [30] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, 
Callinan, Heydon JJ).
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address the implications of this form of reasoning by considering the objections 
to this method. I then turn to a more positive reading of the way in which the 
Court is interpreting membership of the constitutional community.
The implications: Objections and a positive 
reading
The reasoning discussed above indicates the process by which the High Court 
is using legislative indications of membership or exclusion in determining 
the constitutional meaning of ‘the people’. The objections to this form of 
reasoning are obvious. First, by using legislative indications of constitutional 
membership, it appears that the Court is allowing the Parliament to define a 
constitutional term for itself, which appears to breach the separation of the roles 
of the legislature and the judiciary. The Parliament makes the laws; the judiciary 
should determine the validity of those laws.58
One response to this objection is that it is not any one legislative enactment 
which determines constitutional meaning. Parliament cannot identify the 
constitutional content of a term within one piece of legislation and then enact 
law upon that basis. Instead, it is a series of enactments which, over time, are 
interpreted by the Court as indicating a development in constitutional meaning, 
according to an identifiable pattern.59
However, this leads to questioning of how the development is identified by the 
Court, to what extent exceptions and anomalous aspects of the legislation affect 
the identification of a pattern, and at what point something becomes a well-
established pattern or principle through legislation. The legislative development 
of the franchise at the federal level, as well as at the State and earlier colonial 
levels, is complex and filled with discrepancies, temporary inclusions and 
exclusions.60 The development of nationality and citizenship laws is likewise 
58 This was outlined most clearly in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.
59 The Ame case does not necessarily constitute an exception to this. That case can be understood as the 
High Court applying the meaning of alien which is equivalent to non-citizen, derived from the earlier cases 
which focused on the legislative incursions on the common law status of subject. In this instance, the Court is 
upholding the executive’s power to withdraw the status of citizen, and therefore the consequent constitutional 
implication that the person becomes an alien and therefore subject to deportation. That power of removal of 
legislated status which affects constitutional status requires closer interrogation, but that was not done in the 
Ame case, nor is it addressed in this chapter.
60 See for example Anne Twomey, ‘The Federal Constitutional Right to Vote in Australia’ (2000) 28 Federal 
Law Review 125 and for an indication of the complexity, see Murray Goot, ‘The Aboriginal Franchise and its 
Consequences’ (2006) 52(4) Australian Journal of Politics and History 517.
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not a simple coherent trajectory regarding membership.61 How the legislative 
developments in either area are understood and characterised in terms of an 
identifiable pattern is open to debate.
Further, the focus on a pattern of legislative development as indicating 
constitutional meaning may have the problem of ‘ratcheting’.62 This allows a 
cumulative erosion of the sovereignty of Parliament, which operates as follows: 
the Court has constitutionalised the universal adult franchise and stated that 
reintroduction of disqualifications on the basis of religion, race, gender and 
property, amongst others, would likely be invalid because of their inconsistency 
with the mandate of ‘choice by the people’.63 What that does is limit the ability 
of the Parliament to determine the franchise from time to time, by not allowing 
a return to a more restrictive franchise. This means the franchise must forever 
expand, it cannot contract — this is the ‘ratcheting’ problem. By establishing this 
rule of a universal adult franchise on the basis of a consideration of a legislative 
pattern discerned by the Court, Parliaments in the past have, therefore, through 
a cumulative effect of a number of pieces of legislation, bound Parliaments into 
the future — this is the parliamentary sovereignty problem.
However, there is an interpretation of this method of reasoning which is more 
positive and indicates that the Court is allowing ‘the people’ to determine their 
own constitutional identity. First, a reminder that the primary textual indications 
of ‘the people’ in the Constitution connect to the system of representative 
government — ss 7 and 24. ‘The people’ choose the Parliament, the Parliament 
therefore represents ‘the people’ and its legislation is deemed to be the will of 
‘the people’ through that representative system. Choice by the people has been 
referred to as the constitutional ‘bedrock’ of representative government.
Considered in this way, the legislation of Federal Parliament is the voice of the 
people. Thus, the Court, by adopting, deferring to, or reflecting legislative 
choices regarding membership of the constitutional people, is picking up on 
the people’s own view of themselves. The Court is adopting the people’s view of 
who they want to be included in the constitutional community and who they 
want excluded. The method of reasoning of the Court therefore has a measure 
of democratic legitimacy, by reflecting the constitutive power of the people 
to establish their own identity, through their representative institution, the 
Federal Parliament. 
61 See further discussion of this in Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context (Lawbook Co, 2002).
62 ‘Ratcheting’ applies to the reasoning in the representative government cases. Different problems arise 
from the reasoning in the ‘aliens’ cases, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
63 See in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 and Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 
CLR 1.
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The Court is seeking the meaning of constitutional terms, and acknowledges 
that the meaning of those terms may change, and that their application may 
change over time, due to national and international social, political and legal 
developments. What could the Court look to in order to determine the changed 
meaning over time? A majority is using legislation. While not completely 
satisfactory, at least legislation is identifiable, and can be seen as a reflection of 
the Australian polity’s view of themselves.
Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the High Court’s method of reasoning in addressing 
the meaning of the constitutional ‘people’. I have identified that a majority 
of the Court, in two areas of constitutional jurisprudence, is using legislative 
indications of membership in order to define ‘the people’ who exercise the 
federal vote, and constitutional ‘aliens’ who are excluded from membership of 
‘the people’. This method of reasoning is surprising in that it seems to give the 
legislature the power, through cumulative indications, of defining the meaning 
of constitutional expressions. However, this method can also be understood as 
the Court giving ‘the people’ some indirect power of self-definition. 
Whether we prefer deferral to Parliamentary choices over time or the judicial 
application of standards seen in some other external source, depends not on 
an absolute rule regarding constitutional interpretation but rather on classic 
differences of viewpoint regarding the role of judicial review. In the context 
of determining the meaning of the constitutional people, it comes down to 
figuring out to what extent we, the people, want to be playing a part in that 
determination.
The outstanding questions are then: what are the limits beyond which the Court 
will not allow the Parliament to go, and what alternatives exist for the Court in 
making these kinds of judgments regarding membership of the constitutional 
community? These are questions that go beyond the scope of this chapter, but 
that indicate that deferral to ‘the people’, while democratically legitimate, does 
not resolve the difficult questions regarding the division of power between the 
Legislature and the Court. The ongoing dialogue between those institutions will 
determine the meaning of ‘the people’ from time to time.
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3. Thick and Thin Citizenship as 
Measures of Australian Democracy
Kim Rubenstein1 and Niamh Lenagh-Maguire2
The importance of Australian citizenship can be obscured by its relatively 
sparse legal foundations, and by the omission of an expressly defined concept 
of citizenship from the Australian Constitution. However, one of the ways in 
which the legal status of citizenship is elevated beyond an empty label and 
given substance is the linking of citizenship with the structures of Australian 
democracy. This connection between a statutory label and Australia’s 
constitutionally-mandated system of representative government also lends 
citizenship an important constitutional dimension that otherwise might be 
lacking. With limited exceptions, it is citizens who vote to elect governments 
at local, state and federal level, and in that sense these fundamental democratic 
mechanisms depend on a legal distinction between citizens and non-citizens. 
In turn, the connection between citizenship and the franchise adds critically 
important substance to the otherwise fairly bare notion of Australian citizenship 
as a legal category.
This chapter begins by examining the place of citizenship in Australia’s 
democratic structure before moving on to examine the important High Court 
decision in Re MIMIA; ex parte Ame (‘Ame’).3 We argue that the Court’s approach 
to citizenship in that case reflects a narrow or ‘thin’ conception of democratic 
citizenship, tied predominantly to voting rights. Drawing upon the scholarship 
of US academic Linda Bosniak, this chapter outlines a fuller conception of 
citizenship, considering notions of rights, political participation and identity 
to argue that there is potential for Australians to hold a ‘thicker’ understanding 
of citizenship and providing an opportunity to expand the narrower judicial 
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What kind of citizenship? Big ‘C’ or small ‘c’, 
thick or thin?
A distinction is commonly drawn between the formal side of citizenship and its 
content or consequences (what Peter Schuck has described as ‘what citizenship 
really means’4). Understanding and accounting for the various dimensions 
of citizenship besides its formal, status-based element has been a consuming 
project for contemporary citizenship theory, particularly in the 60 years since 
the publication of TH Marshall’s influential essay Citizenship and Social Class.5 
Marshall identified three ‘elements’ of citizenship — the civil, political and 
social:
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual 
freedom — liberty of the person; freedom of speech, thought and faith; 
the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts; and the right 
to justice … By the political element I mean the right to participate in 
the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with 
political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body … By 
the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum 
of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the 
social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being …6
In Marshall’s account, these elements had at one point been held simultaneously, 
but were ‘unbundled’ from citizenship during the Middle Ages and were only 
re-integrated into the concept gradually, beginning with civil rights in the 17th 
century, followed by political rights in the 18th century, and social rights in the 
20th century.
The citizenship literature is replete with taxonomies of citizenship’s substantive 
content, many of which owe an explicit debt to Marshall’s pioneering 
categorisation of the elements of citizenship. Prominent examples include Joseph 
Carens’s description of three dimensions of citizenship — legal, psychological 
and political — which he suggests are incompatible with a conception of the 
nation-state as a ‘culturally homogenous form of political community in which 
citizenship is treated primarily as a legal status that is universal, equal and 
democratic’.7 Linda Bosniak‘s influential paper, ‘Citizenship Denationalized’,8 
describes four types of citizenship — citizenship as legal status, citizenship as 
4 Peter Schuck, ‘Citizenship in Federal Systems’ (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 393.
5 TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class: Class, Citizenship, and Social Development (New York, 1965).
6 ibid 75.
7 Joseph Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness 
(2000) 161.
8 Linda Bosniak, ‘Citizenship Denationalized’ (2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447.
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rights (following Marshall), citizenship as political participation, and citizenship 
as identity or solidarity, that is, ‘the quality of belonging, the felt aspects of 
community membership’.9 Changes in the composition of national communities 
and the relationship between individual citizens and the nation-state have also 
prompted further re-examinations of what it means to be a ‘citizen’ in a diverse, 
multicultural society such as Australia. This re-examination has occurred both 
in terms of the liberal democratic challenges described influentially by Will 
Kymlicka,10 and in the narrower sense of citizenship as a legal status that needs 
to adapt to the changing needs of those who hold it.11
As Kim Rubenstein explains, normative conceptions of citizenship are ‘not 
only concerned with legal citizens, but with people and the way people should 
act and be treated as members of a community’.12 The Australian Citizenship 
Council distinguished between ‘large-C’ and ‘small-c’ citizenship, to reflect this 
distinction between citizenship as a legal concept and its political, philosophical 
and social meanings.13  The latter conceptions of ‘citizenship as desirable 
activity’14 tend to be based on membership and participation in a community, 
rather than legal status — the citizen is seen as ‘a member of a political 
community, entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever 
responsibilities are attached to membership’.15
It is also important to recognise that there are connections between the legal and 
normative dimensions of citizenship. The status of the (large-C) Citizen is not 
simply a formality; citizenship carries with it a range of rights and obligations 
to participate in the life of the state that are denied to those who are not citizens. 
The legal status of Australian citizen is, in this respect, a ‘gate-keeping’ or 
exclusionary mechanism. Access to formal citizenship can determine whether a 
person can remain present in the Australian community and the extent to which 
a person can participate fully in Australian society.16
9 ibid 479.
10 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, 1995).
11 See for example Peter Spiro’s work on citizenship in the context of global movement: Peter Spiro, ‘Dual 
Citizenship as Human Right’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 111; Peter Spiro, ‘Embracing 
Dual Nationality’ in Randall Hansen and Patrick Weill (eds), Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal 
Citizenship in the US and Europe: the Reinvention of Citizenship (2001). For further discussion of the changing 
significance of Australian citizenship see Kim Rubenstein and Niamh Lenagh-Maguire, ‘More or Less Secure?: 
Nationality Questions, Deportation and Dual Nationality’ (Cambridge University Press, 2014) Kim Rubenstein 
and Niamh Lenagh-Maguire, ‘Citizenship and the Boundaries of the Constitution’ in Rosalind Dixon and Tom 
Ginsburg (eds), The Research Handbook in Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2011).
12 Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context (Lawbook, 2002) 6.
13 Australian Citizenship Council, ‘Australian Citizenship for a New Century’ (Report, Australian Citizenship 
Council, 2000) 7.
14 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship 
Theory’ (1994) 104 Ethics 352, 353.
15 Michael Walzer, ‘Citizenship’ in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell Hanson (eds), Political Innovation 
and Conceptual Change (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 211.
16 See Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 14, 198.
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Looking beyond the technicalities of citizenship as a legal status can also be an 
attempt to develop a ‘thick description’ of what citizenship means as a social 
phenomenon, a political dynamic and, importantly, as a personal experience. 
The language of ‘thick description’ is in part an extrapolation from the approach 
to ethnography advocated by Clifford Geertz.17 Geertz describes ethnography 
as ‘an elaborate venture in … “thick description”’.18 Borrowing an example 
from Gilbert Ryle, from whom he also draws the language of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
description, Geertz describes some of the different ways in which a seemingly 
simple act of constricting one eyelid, whether involuntarily or deliberately, so 
as to ‘wink’, carries social meaning: 
[B]etween … the ‘thin description’ of what the rehearse (parodist, 
winker, twitcher …) is doing (‘rapidly contracting his right eyelids’) and 
the ‘thick description’ of what he is doing (‘practicing a burlesque of a 
friend faking a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking a conspiracy 
is in motion’) lies the object of ethnography: a stratified hierarchy of 
meaningful structures …19
In a very different disciplinary setting, we argue that a focus on the formal 
aspects of citizenship, in particular on the allocation of the statutory label of 
‘citizen’ and on the distribution of formal political rights like voting, generates 
a fairly thin or superficial understanding of what it means to be a citizen. While 
those legal and structural aspects of citizenship are critically important, they are 
not the whole story of a person’s experience as a citizen. 
Australian citizenship as a legal status
‘Australian citizenship’ is, on its face, a statutory rather than constitutional 
status. As we argue later in this chapter, the fact that so much of the legal 
architecture of Australian citizenship rests on an inherently malleable statutory 
foundation may contribute to its relative ‘thinness’ as a legal concept. As Kirby 
J explained in DJL v Central Authority:
The Australian Constitution does not refer to the status of ‘citizen’ in 
relation to native born or naturalized people of the Commonwealth. The 
‘people’ are referred to in several places. Elsewhere the people who are 
17 Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ in Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973) 3.
18 ibid 6.
19 ibid 7.
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entitled to vote are described as ‘electors’. In harmony with the notions 
of the time, the Constitution refers to the national status of Australians 
as that of ‘a subject of the Queen’.20
The word ‘citizen’ appears only once in the Australian Constitution, in a 
provision dealing with the disqualification of a ‘citizen of a foreign power’ 
from being elected to the Federal Parliament.21 While the Constitution does not 
include a definition of Australian citizenship, it does classify people according 
to other statuses — as ‘subjects of the Queen’,22 ‘residents of a state’ (reflecting 
the federal structure of the Commonwealth of Australia)23 and ‘aliens’.24 
Prior to the creation of a statutory form of Australian citizenship in 1948, ‘the 
major distinction of membership in Australia … was between British subjects 
and aliens’.25 A person born or naturalised in Australia was a British subject.26 
Relying on its power to make laws with respect to ‘naturalisation and aliens’ 
(the aliens power), in 1948 the Federal Parliament enacted a statutory form 
of Australian citizenship.27 The Parliament has also relied on the aliens power 
to make laws dealing with the terms on which ‘non-citizens’ may enter and 
remain in Australia and the removal of ‘unlawful non-citizens’.28 The Australian 
Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (the Citizenship Act) currently determines who is 
entitled to Australian citizenship, including provisions for citizenship by 
descent and by naturalisation, but that Act is silent as to the rights and duties 
that flow from the status of ‘Australian citizen’. 
The substance of citizenship in Australia: 
Democracy and voting rights
The Australian Citizenship Act creates and confers the bare legal status of 
Australian citizenship. The Constitution, and other laws of the Commonwealth 
20 (2000) 201 CLR 226, 277 (Kirby J).
21 Australian Constitution s 44.
22 ibid ss 34, 117.
23 ibid ss 25, 75, 117.
24 ibid s 51(xix).
25 Rubenstein, above n 12, 47.
26 ibid 47–9.
27 See Naturalisation Act 1903–1920 (Cth); Nationality Act 1920 (Cth); Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth); 
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth).
28 For an overview of migration legislation in Australia post-Federation, see Mary Crock, Immigration and 
Refugee Law in Australia (Federation Press, 1998); John Vrachnas, Kim Boyd et al., Migration and Refugee Law: 
Principles and Practice in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2005) ch 2.
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and the States and Territories, give that status its legal substance.29 In this 
chapter we focus on the relationship between the status of citizen and Australia’s 
democratic system of government. 
Notwithstanding its omission from the Constitution, Australian citizenship 
has a constitutional dimension. In Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, 
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs,30 Gaudron J recognised that the statutory 
concept of citizenship is both constitutionally unnecessary and constitutionally 
useful:
Citizenship, so far as this country is concerned, is a concept which 
is entirely statutory, originating as recently as 1948. It is a concept 
which is and can be pressed into service for a number of constitutional 
purposes. But it is not a concept which is constitutionally necessary, 
which is immutable or which has some immutable core element ensuring 
its lasting relevance for constitutional purposes …31
As we explain in this chapter, one of the ways in which the concept of citizenship 
is ‘pressed into service’ in a constitutional context is in determining who is 
entitled to take part in Australian democracy as an ‘elector’. 
Statutory framework: The relationship between 
citizenship and the franchise
The Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws dealing 
with the qualification of electors. ‘That Australia came to have universal adult 
suffrage was the result of legislative action.’32 That legislative choice now has a 
constitutional dimension; as the High Court made clear most recently in Rowe 
v Electoral Commissioner,33 the Parliament is not free to abandon universal 
suffrage. Subject to limited exceptions, Australian citizens are required to enrol 
as electors on the federal electoral roll and to cast votes at federal elections.34 
This legislative choice reveals something of the connection between citizenship 
and the exercise of political rights in Australia, in particular the idea that a 
certain kind of connection with the Australian nation beyond, for example, 
mere presence in the community, is required before a person should be allowed 
to elect a national or sub-national government, and that citizenship carries with 
it important obligations to take an active part in the democratic process. In this 
29 Rubenstein, above n 12, ch 5.
30 (1992) 176 CLR 1.
31  ibid 54.
32 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at 173 (Gleeson CJ).
33 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1.
34 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 93.
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way, the statutory status of citizen elevates a person’s standing in the community 
above that of a long-term resident in a way that is not the case in many other 
areas of public life (taxation or employment rights, for example). 
While the rule that an elector needs to be a citizen, and that a citizen is entitled 
to be an elector, tells us something about the substantive content of citizenship 
as a legal status, the exceptions to that rule also shed light on what it means 
to be a citizen. Here, we focus on two such exceptions — a category of non-
citizens who are entitled to vote, and a category of citizens who are not. Turning 
to the first special category of exceptions, British subjects who were on the 
electoral roll immediately before 26 January 1984 continue to be entitled to 
enrolment under the Commonwealth Electoral Act.35 This is a class of long-term 
residents of the Australian community who do not possess statutory citizenship 
but who had been entitled to vote on the basis of their British subject status and 
satisfaction of a minimum six-month residence criterion. Australia’s growing 
constitutional independence from the United Kingdom has meant that British 
subjecthood is legally and constitutionally distinct from Australian citizenship, 
so a British subject who settled in Australia after 1984 would not be entitled 
to vote (and, indeed, would be subject to laws made under the aliens power).36 
The Parliament’s choice to adopt citizenship as an essential criterion for the 
federal franchise and effectively to abandon qualification for non-citizens on 
the basis of a minimum period of residence, elevates the possession of formal 
citizenship over even very long-term membership of the Australian community. 
Something more than a long period of residence in Australia is required before 
a person should be entitled to vote; rather, this fundamental political right is 
reserved for those with a deeper, or at least more formal, connection with the 
Australian community. Maintaining a ‘grandfathered’ entitlement for British 
subjects resident in Australia before 1984 can be seen simply as a matter of 
fairness — having at one stage enjoyed one of the central rights of citizenship 
it would arguably be unfair to deprive this class of person of their right to vote. 
These arrangements can also be seen as a recognition of the particular historical 
resonance of ‘British subject’ status in Australia and a reminder of a time when 
‘British subject’ status was worth as much as, if not more than, the status of 
‘Australian citizen’. 
Of course it is also possible for an Australian citizen to lose the right to vote: if 
they are incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment 
and voting, are convicted of treason or treachery or, more controversially, if 
35  ibid.
36 Shaw v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28; Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor 
(2001) 207 CLR 391; Nolan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178.
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they are serving a sentence of imprisonment for three years or longer. There 
has seemingly been little argument about the first two of these grounds of 
disqualification. As Gleeson CJ put it in Roach v Electoral Commissioner,37 
The rationale for excluding persons of unsound mind is obvious, 
although the application of the criterion of exclusion may be imprecise, 
and could be contentious in some cases. The rationale is related to the 
capacity to exercise choice. People who engage in acts of treason may be 
regarded as having no just claim to participate in the community’s self-
governance.38
The question whether prisoners ought to be allowed to vote has attracted more 
critical attention, and was considered by the High Court in 2007 in Roach. In 
that case, which Elisa Arcioni has considered in greater detail in this volume, 
the Court was asked to decide whether a law disenfranchising a person serving a 
prison sentence, irrespective of the length of their sentence, was constitutionally 
valid. The judgments in this case shed light on what it means to deprive a 
citizen of their right to vote, and on the critical importance of voting as one of 
the indicia of full civic membership. In considering the possible justifications of 
such a law, Gleeson CJ held that 
the rationale for the exclusion must be that serious offending represents 
such a form of civic irresponsibility that it is appropriate for Parliament to 
mark such behaviour as anti-social and to direct that physical separation 
from the community will be accompanied by symbolic separation in the 
form of loss of a fundamental political right … Serious offending may 
warrant temporary suspension of one of the rights of membership, that 
is, the right to vote. 
His Honour had earlier reasoned:
It is consistent with our constitutional concept of choice by the people 
for Parliament to treat those who have been imprisoned for serious 
criminal offences as having suffered a temporary suspension of their 
connection with the community, reflected at the physical level in 
incarceration, and reflected also in temporary deprivation of the right 
to participate by voting in the political life of the community. It is also 
for Parliament, consistently with the rationale for exclusion, to decide 
the basis upon which to identify incarcerated offenders whose serious 
criminal wrongdoing warrants temporary suspension of a right of 
citizenship.
37 Roach (2007) 233 CLR 162, 182 (Gleeson CJ).
38 ibid, 179 (Gleeson CJ).
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The seriousness of a person’s wrongdoing was a central consideration in the 
reasoning of the majority judges in Roach, who held invalid the blanket ban 
on prisoners voting but accepted that it would be valid to exclude prisoners 
serving sentences of at least three years. As the joint majority judgment of 
Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ observed:
[I]n the federal system established and maintained by the Constitution, 
the exercise of the franchise is the means by which those living under 
that system of government participate in the selection of both legislative 
chambers, as one of the people of the relevant State and as one of the 
people of the Commonwealth. In this way, the existence and exercise 
of the franchise reflects notions of citizenship and membership of the 
Australian federal body politic.
Such notions are not extinguished by the mere fact of imprisonment. 
Prisoners who are citizens and members of the Australian community 
remain so. Their interest in, and duty to, their society and its governance 
survives incarceration. Indeed, upon one view, the Constitution 
envisages their ongoing obligations to the body politic to which, in due 
course, the overwhelming majority of them will be returned following 
completion of their sentence.39
A test case: Can ‘real’ citizenship exist without 
voting rights?
In 2005, the High Court held in Ame40 that Australian citizens born in Papua, 
who had held the legal status of citizen under the Australian Citizenship Act 
from the Act’s inception in 194841 until 1975, could have that status unilaterally 
stripped from them by regulations because that citizenship was not ‘real’42 was 
only a ‘technical’ status43, was ‘largely nominal’44 was ‘not in fact or law full 
39 ibid 199 (Gummow, Kirby, Crennan JJ).
40 (2005) 222 CLR 439. 
41 Before that time Papuans were British subjects under the authority of the Commonwealth of Australian 
by Letters Patent and accepted as the Territory of Papua by s 5 of the Papua Act 1905 (Cth).
42 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, 
449 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid, 470 (Kirby J).
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or real citizenship’,45 was a ‘veneer of Australian citizenship’,46 was a ‘flawed 
citizenship’,47 was of a ‘fragile and strictly limited character’,48 and was more 
like a ‘shadow… of mere appearances and title’.49
Background: Papuan independence and loss of 
citizenship
Papua was an Australian territory from 1906–1975.50 Until the introduction of 
a statutory Australian citizenship, both Australians and Papuans were formally 
British subjects.51 Under the Citizenship Act, ‘Australia’ was defined to include 
Norfolk Island and the Territory of Papua. A person born in Papua after the 
passage of the Citizenship Act was therefore born in Australia for the purposes of 
the Act and acquired the status of ‘Australian citizen’.52 However, the substantive 
rights attached to Papuans’ citizenship were not equivalent to those enjoyed by 
other Australian citizens. Papua was not part of Australia for the purposes of 
the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Migration Act’),53 and its inhabitants were 
required to obtain a permit before entering mainland Australia, in contrast to 
the free right of entry enjoyed by most other Australian citizens.54
In 1975, Papua became part of the newly independent Papua New Guinea 
(PNG). The Papua New Guinea Constitution did not permit dual citizenship, and 
provided that a person who was ‘a real foreign citizen’ at the time that PNG 
became independent would not acquire citizenship of PNG.55 A person who 
held Australian citizenship but had no right to enter and reside in Australia 
did not have ‘real foreign citizenship’ for this purpose.56 In response, the Papua 
New Guinea Independence (Australian Citizenship) Regulations 1975 (Cth) (‘the 
Independence Regulations’) stripped Australian citizenship from anyone who 
became a PNG citizen at the date of PNG’s independence (16 September 1975).57 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid, 474 (Kirby J). 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid 483 (Kirby J). 
49 ibid.
50 Papua Act 1905 (Cth). Prior to Federation, the Colony of Queensland had attempted to annex Papua in 
order to provide a ‘buffer’ between it and German-controlled New Guinea: Richard Herr, ‘Australia, Security 
and the Pacific Islands: From Empire to Commonwealth’(2006) 95 The Round Table 705, 707.
51 Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, 467. 
52 Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) s 10. 
53 See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 17.
54 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 6–7. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the requirement that Papuans 
obtain an entry permit was based on a desire to exclude non-white inhabitants of Australian territory from 
the mainland: Transcript of Proceedings, Re MIMIA; Ex parte Ame (High Court of Australia, K Rubenstein, 
3 March 2005). 
55 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, ss 64-5.
56 ibid.
57 Papua New Guinea Independence (Australian Citizenship) Regulations 1975 (Cth).
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Thus, Papuans who had not obtained residence rights in Australia became PNG 
nationals under that country’s new Constitution, and upon acquiring that status 
lost their Australian citizenship. 
Ame’s case: What makes a ‘real’ citizen?
A Papuan man, Amos Bode Ame, argued in the High Court in 2005 that the 
regulations which purported to take away his Australian citizenship could not 
validly apply to him, nor could the Migration Act restrict his right to enter 
and remain on the Australian mainland.58 Mr Ame challenged the distinction 
between ‘real’ citizens and the residents of external territories, and asserted that 
the Commonwealth could not treat him as an immigrant or an alien when he 
sought to enter Australia, and could not unilaterally withdraw his citizenship. 
The High Court held that Papuans had held a form of citizenship that was 
qualitatively different from other forms of Australian citizenship: 
[I]t was no more than nominal citizenship, applicable for limited purposes 
… It conferred few rights and specifically no rights freely to enter the 
States and internal territories of Australia, as other Australian citizens 
might do. Nor did it permit its holders to enjoy permanent residence in 
the States and internal territories …59
Mr Ame’s contention that he was a ‘real’ Australian citizen failed, on the basis 
that his was a ‘hollow’ form of citizenship which did not equate to the rights 
held by inhabitants of mainland Australia. The Court acknowledged the clear 
intention on the part of the Federal Parliament to restrict the rights afforded to 
Papuan-born Australian citizens, and held that
[t]he Constitution does not require that all inhabitants of all external 
territories acquired by Australia should have an unfettered right of 
entry into, and residence in, mainland Australia. There is no reason why 
Parliament cannot treat such an inhabitant as an immigrant.60
The High Court upheld the Commonwealth legislation that stripped Papuan 
Australians of their citizenship on the basis that the laws were validly made under 
the territories power. Section 122 of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth 
power to legislate ‘for the government’ of a Territory ‘placed by the Queen 
under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth’, of which Papua 
58 Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, 441–2.
59 ibid 471.
60 ibid 458 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
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was an example. The High Court confirmed that the territories power allowed 
the Commonwealth to confer citizenship on the inhabitants of a territory, and 
conversely allowed that citizenship to be withdrawn:
Parliament is not obliged to confer Australian citizenship upon all 
inhabitants of all external territories. Furthermore, the powers under 
which it may legislate to confer such citizenship when a Territory is 
acquired enable Parliament to legislate to withdraw such citizenship 
when rights of sovereignty or rights of administration in respect of such 
Territory come to an end.61
As a consequence, Mr Ame could be deprived of his citizenship and thereafter 
treated as a non-citizen under the Migration Act.62
The Court felt compelled to use these characterisations devaluing the status 
of citizenship held by those Papuans because Papuan Australian citizens did 
not have a right to enter the mainland of Australia,63 or reside in mainland 
Australia,64 and Ame, ‘[a]lthough a citizen, had no right (still less a duty) to 
vote in Australian elections and referenda. He could perform no jury or other 
civic service in Australia’.65 Indeed, despite his status of a citizen, he and his 
fellow country-men and women were, to all intents and purposes ‘treated as … 
foreigner[s]’.66
The language of the Court’s decision strikingly resembles an infamous United 
States Supreme Court decision of almost 150 years earlier. In Dred Scott v 
Sanford67 the Supreme Court held that an emancipated former slave was not a 
‘citizen of a State’ entitled to invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 
Article III of the US Constitution. The Court held that African slaves and their 
descendants, whether or not they had been emancipated, 
are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the 
word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the 
rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures 
to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time 
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been 
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid 459. 
63 ibid 449 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
64 ibid 470 (Kirby J).
65 ibid 481 (Kirby J).
66 ibid.
67 60 US 393 (1857).
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remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but 
such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to 
grant them.68
In part, the Court reached this conclusion because it was understood that citizens 
of a state were free to move about the country and enjoyed certain fundamental 
rights when in another state — a situation that simply did not apply as a matter 
of law to ‘those persons who are the descendants of Africans who were imported 
into this country and sold as slaves’.69
In Ame’s case, the practical disjuncture between rights and status effectively 
enabled the High Court to affirm that as a matter of law someone could hold the 
legal status of citizen, without any claim to rights associated with that status. The 
High Court was able to deny Mr Ame’s claim to Australian citizenship because 
the kind of citizenship he had once held was flimsy and lacking in many of the 
aspects of citizenship that typically lend it meaning and value. It was important 
to all of the judges that Papuans had held a form of Australian citizenship that 
was deficient in many formal, legal respects. Whilst the scope of the Federal 
Parliament’s power with respect to external territories would, on its face, have 
remained the same, we can speculate that had Mr Ame and his compatriots been 
full and active citizens of Australia with the same rights of entry and residence 
as other Australians, or had they enjoyed rights of democratic participation in 
Australia, the Court might have been less willing to uphold the Parliament’s 
effort to strip them of those rights. 
When citizenship lacks substance/depth
In this final section, we consider Ame’s case through the prism of Linda Bosniak’s 
analysis of citizenship as a legal status, as a source of rights, as a form of political 
activity, and as an identity. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
there are different ways in which citizenship is ‘pressed into service’70 and 
these differences reflect the different ends to which the concept of citizenship 
is invoked. As Bosniak explains so thoughtfully in her article, ‘Citizenship 
Denationalised’,71 there are four different ways in which scholars write about 
citizenship. The first is ‘citizenship as legal status’,72 the second is ‘citizenship 
68 ibid 404–5.
69 ibid 403.
70 This is the term used above by Justice Gaudron in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 54.
71 Linda Bosniak, ‘Citizenship Denationalized’ (2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447. 
72 ibid 456–63.
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as rights’,73 the third is ‘citizenship as political activity’,74 and finally there is 
writing about ‘citizenship as identity’.75 Of course, some of the scholarship uses 
these terms in overlapping ways, but her distinctions are helpful in thinking 
through the way in which legal status sits with other conceptions of citizenship 
as rights, as political activity and as identity.
Citizenship as ‘legal status’ is what is important to the nation state. The legal 
status represents legal recognition of membership of an ‘organized political 
community’.76 The nation state determines who has that legal status, and debates 
— including those about automatic citizenship, acquisition of citizenship, 
rights to citizenship by descent, and indeed rights associated with change of 
territory and citizenship — revolve around this legal status. For the nation state, 
citizenship has been primarily about legal status. In Australia, the legal status 
of ‘citizen’ did not exist until 1949 and its scope has changed as Parliament so 
desired, through legislative amendment over time. Returning to Justice Gaudron’s 
earlier cited statement in Lim, there has been no ‘immutable core element[s] 
ensuring its lasting relevance for constitutional purposes’.77 In contrast, for the 
new state of Papua New Guinea, there was a desire, from the experience of the 
shallow, formal status of the statutory version of their Australian citizenship to 
bestow upon the Papua New Guinea citizenship a status of constitutional value. 
There was a commitment to give citizenship ‘real’ meaning. Connected with 
this was a belief in Papua New Guinea that citizenship had to be singular. Both 
the joint judgment and Kirby J’s separate opinion in Ame refer to the figurative 
language used in the Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee which 
was considering the preparation of the new PNG constitution: ‘no man, it is 
said, can stand in more than one canoe’.78 Accordingly, dual citizenship was 
constitutionally prohibited. If a person was a Papua New Guinean citizen, then 
they could not also be an Australian citizen.
For Mr Ame, and those like him born in Australian territory, that legal status at 
birth was significant. Holding that legal status meant something to them. They 
held a belief that there would be rights associated with that status. Indeed, this 
leads us to Bosniak’s second characterization of ‘citizenship as rights’. Echoing 
the work of TH Marshall referred to earlier in this chapter, Bosniak argues: 
In twentieth century social theory, the notion of citizenship has been 
most closely associated with the enjoyment of certain important rights 
and entitlements. In this conception of citizenship, the enjoyment of 




77 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 54.
78 Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, 448 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ), 464 
(Kirby J).
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rights is the defining feature of societal membership: citizenship requires 
the possession of rights, and those who possess the rights are usually 
presumed thereby to enjoy citizenship.79 
However, this approach to citizenship highlights exclusion and second-class 
citizenship, ‘and the ways that racial subordination has painfully distorted 
formally egalitarian polities’.80 This is indeed what happened in Australia, both 
in relation to its own Indigenous peoples81 and in the experience of Papuan 
citizens upon PNG independence. Australia did not create an equal or egalitarian 
status of Australian citizen — different citizens had different rights and the 
Papuan Australian citizens felt the legacy of that profoundly. So much so that in 
creating a new Papua New Guinea state, there was an overt desire to distinguish 
itself from Australia to ensure a full and equal Papua New Guinean status of 
citizen.82
Moreover, it was the fact that different ‘rights’ were accorded to some Australian 
citizens as opposed to others that became relevant to the High Court’s decision 
to deny the claim to Australian citizenship status by Mr Ame. Indeed, it is 
the next category of citizenship that Bosniak refers to that was fatal to Mr 
Ame’s claim. Bosniak separates ‘citizenship as political activity’ from rights in 
her categorization. In doing this she is highlighting the large political theory 
literature that uses the term ‘citizenship’ to denote ‘active engagement in the 
life of the political community’,83 and she links it to civic republican theory and 
participatory democratic principles about an active, engaged citizenship. This 
idea revolves around the ideal political society where all citizens are encouraged 
to be ‘good citizens’. It views political involvement in a polity as a positive 
normative ideal. However, in order to be an active citizen, one needs to have the 
political rights to do so, and this is where Mr Ame and his colleagues fell down 
in their claim to Australian citizenship.
The fact that the Australian Parliament denied the political rights normally 
linked to citizenship from Papuans — such as voting, jury service, and freedom 
of movement in and out of the mainland — meant that the High Court could 
determine they did not hold a ‘real citizenship’. This largely tautological 
framing of citizenship (those who have citizenship rights are citizens and those 
who don’t are not) gives enormous power to the state to manipulate membership 
of the community.
79 Linda Bosniak, ‘Citizenship Denationalized’ (2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447, 463–464.
80 ibid 465.
81 As stated earlier, there is another story that parallels the PNG–Australia story that is closer to home: that 
of indigenous Australians and their claims to citizenship. See John Chesterman and Brian Galligan, Citizens 
Without Rights: Aborigines and Australian Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
82    See Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, 470 (Kirby J).
83 Linda Bosniak, ‘Citizenship Denationalized’ (2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447, 470.
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For Papua New Guinea, the fact that Australia had narrowed the meaning of 
citizenship to enable it as a state to discriminate between Papuan Australian 
citizens and mainland Australian citizens was one of the drivers to be explicit 
about making citizenship more meaningful and ‘equal’ in the new state of Papua 
New Guinea. This resolve to use the term ‘real citizenship’ became a further 
reason for the High Court of Australia to deny Mr Ame and those like him any 
force to their claim of citizenship and any rights flowing from it. 
For Mr Ame and those like him, any sense of connection to Australia from 
birth in Australian territory or sense of Australian identity from growing 
up in Australian territory, was not relevant to the High Court’s conceptual 
framework. Bosniak’s fourth categorization of citizenship as ‘identity/solidarity’ 
had no voice or outlet in this legal story. This understanding of citizenship 
is often referred to as the ‘psychological dimension, that part of citizenship 
that describes the affective ties of identification and solidarity that we maintain 
with groups of other people around the world’.84 This is where those Papuans 
born in Australian territory, with Australian birth certificates, had a feeling of 
citizenship that was not fully recognized by the state,85 even though the state 
had put out legal markers such as legal status and other attributes of citizenship 
to assist in creating that feeling and sense of connection.
The joint judgment of the majority in Ame does not take account of this aspect of 
citizenship — the fact that at least some Papuan Australians personally identified 
as Australian citizens. Perhaps this is because identity is too malleable, too fluid, 
too non-determinant, non-concrete and non-fixed as a concept for law, in this 
instance, to take hold of and use for assisting in the determination of disputes. 
Why did the fact that these Papuans were given no choice in determining their 
own citizenship identity, with the change over of sovereignty, not gain currency? 
And how does that sit with the fact that the legal status is also malleable, in that 
there is little to claim with it, that it can be easily changed and modified, while 
at the same time it has the potential for great aspirational value? While Kirby J 
in his separate opinion recognized some of the normative force of the applicant’s 
claim, His Honour was swayed by the international context of the impugned 
law. The fact that similar measures had been part of other countries’ experience 
of decolonisation assisted him in making his decision. Morevoer, the force of 
what the people of Papua New Guinea had been seeking to achieve when they 
84 ibid 479.
85 This point is also made out strongly in another Papuan–Australian citizenship matter involving Susan 
Walsh that led to a special leave application in the High Court of Australia, prior to the Ame matter. See Kim 
Rubenstein, ‘The Lottery of Citizenship: The Changing Significance of Birthplace, Territory and Residence to 
the Australian Membership Prize’ (2005) 22(2) Law in Context 45.
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substituted full and effective citizenship of the newly unified and independent 
state for the clearly inferior citizenship that Australia had previously offered to 
Papuans were persuasive, in his view, against the applicant’s case.86 
This final point brings us back to the idea of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ descriptions 
of citizenship. Conceiving of Australian citizenship solely as a matter of legal 
status results in a very ‘thin’, superficial account of what it means to be a citizen. 
Concentrating on the legal status of citizenship, and its legal incidents such as 
voting rights and rights of entry and residence, is clearly the method preferred 
by lawyers and courts called upon to determine whether a person is entitled 
to call themself an Australian citizen. However, the rules governing access to 
citizenship and likewise to the franchise or to rights of entry into Australia do 
not explain all of what it means, at a personal level, to be a citizen. Neither do 
they provide a complete explanation of the social significance of citizenship as 
a label denoting full and effective membership of a community. In general, a 
citizen is a person who is entitled to various social and political rights, including 
the right to vote and to enter and remain in Australia. So much is clear from the 
cases and statutes. However, for many people citizenship also connotes a sense 
of belonging, of identifying as a citizen of a particular nation (or of several 
nations), or as Bosniak puts it, a sense of ‘solidarity’ with a national community. 
Incorporating these facets of citizenship ‘thickens’ our description of a complex 
social, political and personal phenomenon. 
Conclusion
Ame is an instance in which the High Court recognized what citizenship theorists 
have long argued — that citizenship can mean different things, and that to say 
that a person holds the formal legal status of citizen is only the beginning of 
an explanation of what their citizenship means. In that case, the Court inferred 
from the fact that Papuan-born Australian citizens did not possess the same 
political rights as Australian citizens in the States and internal Territories that 
their statutory citizenship was not real. It was taken to be so thin as to be 
defeasible. While the High Court was at pains to emphasise that what happened 
to Mr Ame and his fellow Papuans could not so easily happen to Australian 
citizens who do not live in an external Territory, this reasoning is premised on 
an understanding that for most of them, Australian citizenship carries with it a 
set of political and social rights that cannot easily be stripped away. 
86 Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, 473–5 (Kirby J).
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4. The Right to Participate: Revisiting 
Roach and Rowe 
Glenn Patmore1
As is well known, the Constitution does not refer to the words ‘democracy’, 
‘representative democracy’, ‘representative government’ or ‘referendum 
democracy’. Nonetheless the High Court has been willing to imply recognition 
of these foundational principles. Most of the cases have considered the implied 
freedom of political communication. More recently, the High Court recognised a 
constitutional protection of a right to vote and to participate in membership of 
the political community.2
This is a significant development in the jurisprudence of the High Court, but 
it remains a relatively limited conception of the right to participate.3 This 
chapter outlines a broader conception — the right to participate in collective 
decision-making. The chapter therefore examines and expands upon the High 
Court’s more confined approach. It explains how this latter right is protected 
by the Constitution and legislation, how it operates in practice, and how it is 
recognised in political traditions.
For citizens to make collective decisions there must be a set of political institutions 
and rules which determine ‘who is authorised to make’ those decisions and 
‘which procedures ought to be applied’.4 Insofar as that power ‘is authorized 
by the basic law of the constitution, [it] becomes a right’ for all qualified 
citizens.5 Thus the capacity to exercise the power to make political decisions is 
an entitlement recognised as a basic norm of the Constitution. There can be little 
doubt that the legal authorisation of participation in collective decision-making 
is an entitlement recognised in law. The view that the Constitution confers 
1 g.patmore@unimelb.edu.au. I wish to thank for their assistance, Mr Tom Appleby, Mr Benjamin Hine and 
Ms Candice Parr who read material to me and provided research assistance. Their work was much appreciated. 
A special debt is owed to Ms Sarah Shrubb who read the paper and offered comments. Special thanks must 
also be given to the Melbourne Law Research Service.
2 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162; Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1. For a 
similar view in the US, see Louis Fisher and Katy J Harriger, ‘Political Participation’ in American Constitutional 
Law (Carolina Academic Press, 8th ed, 2009) 949.
3 This is perhaps inevitable given the judicial duty only to decide matters brought before the court.
4 Norberto Bobbio, The Future of Democracy (Roger Griffin trans, University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 24.
5 ibid.
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rights on all the people has also been recently recognised. In Rowe, French CJ 
noted that the requirement of a direct choice in ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution 
‘confers rights on “the people of the Commonwealth”6 as a whole’.7
This chapter has two parts. The first part explains the legal rules and political 
practices that provide for participation by citizens in collective decision-making. 
Drawing upon the democratic literature, the chapter identifies the basic legal 
rules necessary for democracy to function.8 It also briefly refers to the history 
of the democratisation of Westminster government and highlights some judicial 
opinion that has provided support for a broad understanding of constitutional 
democracy. Secondly, the chapter examines how these legal rules and political 
practices are and may be better recognised in the law, including in the Australian 
Constitution, constitutional conventions and legislation. It also considers the 
recent High Court decisions referring to the constitutional protection of the 
right to vote and to participate in the political life of the community.
Rights and freedoms to make collective 
decisions
Right to participate
Since the late 18th century, citizens have been regarded as having a ‘right to 
participate in the determination of the collective will through the medium of 
elected representatives’.9 By the end of the 19th century, citizens were regarded 
as having a right to participate in referendums and plebiscites. Today, the right 
to participate can be expressed as three principles, which provide the procedure 
for making the most important collective decisions and find expression in the 
Australian Constitution. The first principle is that electors directly choose 
representatives in periodic elections. This principle is recognised in the 
Australian Constitution, as the High Court explained in Lange:
6 Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302, 343 per McHugh J.
7 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 12.
8 My analysis of the Australian Constitution and electoral legislation draws upon elite theories of democracy 
which are well known to political scientists. While this form of democracy has been criticised as limited, 
it is nonetheless useful in providing a focus on collective decision-making recognised by the law. See for 
example Henry Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (Oxford University Press, 1960) and David Held 
‘Competitive Elitism and the Technocratic Vision’ in Models of Democracy (Polity, 3rd ed, 2006) 125.
9     Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship (Polity, 1989) 144; David Held, Models of Democracy (Polity, 
3rd ed, 2006) 94.
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Sections  7 and 24 of the Constitution, read in context, require the 
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives to be directly 
chosen at periodic elections by the people of the States and of the 
Commonwealth respectively.10
This principle is seen as the one indispensable requirement of modern 
democracies,11 because a direct choice provides for popular control of 
representatives. As Gummow J explained in McGinty: ‘What is necessary is the 
broadly identified requirement of ultimate control by the people, exercised by 
representatives who are elected periodically’.12
Second, once elected, representatives alone make legislative13 and executive14 
decisions15 on behalf of citizens.16 In Westminster systems like Australia’s, 
Ministers of State exercise executive power, which is the final power of political 
decision. In other words, they make public policy decisions. They must also be 
members of Parliament, and are accountable to it.17 As Mayo pointed out many 
years ago:
On the whole, no democratic system operates on the principle that voters 
directly decide public policies at elections. The control over policy is 
much more indirect — through the representatives.18
Of course Ministers are responsive to the views of electors, since ‘popular 
influence over policy occurs day in day out’.19 This influence may take different 
forms, such as through the popular media, community and interest groups, 
elites, and even state parliamentarians. Indeed the effect of popular influence 
and control is contemplated by the very system of responsible government. 
This principle, amongst other things, requires that members of the executive 
are responsible to Parliament and ultimately to the people, at an election. As 
10 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557.
11 Mayo, above n 8; Bobbio, above n 4.
12 McGinty v Western Australia (1990) 186 CLR 140, 285.
13 Legislative power most obviously refers to the power of a Parliament to enact legislation. Members and 
senators for instance have the power to vote on legislation and participate in the process and procedures of 
the legislature. See, for example, the Australian Constitution ss 23 and 40.
14 Executive power refers to the power of the executive to administer the law and to manage the government, 
especially government departments. Ministers administer government departments and make collective 
decisions in cabinet. See, for example, Australian Constitution ss 61 and 64.
15 These powers are conferred solely on office holders, such as senators, members and ministers. The 
Queen and Governor-General, as members of the executive, do not make political decisions according to 
constitutional conventions.
16 See Suri Ratnapala and Jonathan Crowe, Australian Constitutional Law: Foundations and Theory (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 37.
17 The principle of responsible government inter alia requires that members of the executive are responsible 
to Parliament and ultimately to the people at an election. The executive includes Ministers, who must sit in 
Parliament. See the Australian Constitution ss 61 and 64.
18 Mayo, above n 8, 61.
19 ibid.
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the court in Lange explained, ‘the attitudes of electors to the conduct of the 
Executive may be a significant determinant of the contemporary practice of 
responsible government’.20
The third principle is that electors directly make policy decisions through the 
occasional use of referenda and plebiscites. In plebiscites, the electors are asked 
to vote on a question of national importance, whereas in a referendum to amend 
the Australian Constitution,21 electors are asked to vote on a law that is referred 
to them for their final approval.22 When voting in referendums to change the 
Constitution, electors make a policy choice; they exert control over the final 
decision whether or not to alter the Constitution. Even though the question is 
framed by the Federal Parliament through a referendum bill, it is not simply 
a choice offered to the people, but one in which they are typically engaged 
throughout the entire process of change. The Prime Minister and Cabinet usually 
initiate the constitutional change, the question to be asked is formulated and 
approved by the Parliament, opportunities for participation and discussion are 
created and, ultimately, the people are given their say. While the third principle 
is regarded as an exception to the second principle of participation, it is, as we 
have seen, more complex. There is a vital intersection between representative 
and referendum democracy. The Parliament proposes and the electors decide.
The right to participate, expressed as three principles, helps us understand 
that the Constitution provides legal entitlements to participate in collective 
decisions. There are also more specific rights and limitations recognised in the 
Constitution and legislation. 
The democratic rights
The so-called democratic rights or the ‘rights of representatives’23 were 
developed through struggles over several centuries, but crystallised in the 19th 
century, in the well-known Chartist movement in the United Kingdom.24 Their 
Charter had six basic points that were included in petitions to the UK Parliament 
20 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559.
21 Australian Constitution s 128.
22 As Professor Orr notes: ‘Terminology is often loosely used in this area.’ Orr defines a referendum as ‘a 
binding poll: one that is a necessary part of some legislative or constitutional process’. Conversely, he employs 
the term plebiscite ‘for a poll that is essentially indicative only’. See Orr, ‘The Conduct of Referenda and 
Plebiscites in Australia: A Legal Perspective’ (2000) 11 Public Law Review 117.
23 Some of these rights are also explicitly recognised in other Constitutions such as the Canadian Constitution 
(1982): Canada Act 1982 (UK) (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’).
24 ‘Chartism’, in John Cannon (ed), Oxford Companion to British History (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
193; Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists (Temple Smith, 1984).
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in 1839, 1842 and 1848. Five of those points evolved into five rules: universal 
adult suffrage, the secret ballot,25 no property qualification to vote or to sit in 
Parliament,26 payment of members of Parliament,27 and equal electorate sizes.28
The sixth point of the Charter, demanding annual elections to Parliament, was 
never implemented in the United Kingdom; nor has it been implemented in 
Australia. But the requirement for periodic elections has endured and reflects 
the view that representatives should be regularly accountable to the electorate.
The Chartist movement influenced the development of colonial democracy 
in Australia and the British Empire. As Justice Crennan explained in an 
extrajudicial speech, the struggle for ‘full and fair representation’, especially 
relating to manhood suffrage, became what is known as the ‘imperial framework’ 
and ‘reveals the values which lie behind, and are expressed in the Constitution, 
in the phrase “directly chosen by the people”’.29
As noted, the first five points demanded by the Chartists are now included in 
either Australian electoral legislation or the Australian Constitution, and in UK 
electoral legislation. They are concerned with the authorisation of those who 
are to make collective decisions, providing who shall choose and be chosen as 
representatives (according to the universal franchise), how they shall be chosen 
(through a secret ballot from electorates of equal size), and with removing limits 
on that choice based on property and wealth qualifications. Overall, the law 
authorises the whole people to participate in making collective decisions and 
confers legal rights ‘to participate directly or indirectly in the making’ of those 
decisions.30 But more is required for democracy to function.
Fundamental freedoms
There is a third condition necessary for collective decisions to be made: electors 
and representatives must be offered real alternatives, and have the freedom 
to choose between them.31 This condition is guaranteed by the fundamental 
25 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 323.
26 Various property qualifications lowered or repealed from 1851 onwards. No longer applicable under 
federal law.
27 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) s 48.
28 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 56.
29 Justice Susan Crennan, ‘Reflections on Sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution’ (Speech delivered at Gilbert 
& Tobin Centre of Public Law, Constitutional Law Dinner, New South Wales, 8 February 2008). In the later 
decision of Rowe, her Honour, echoing some of her earlier views in this speech, acknowledged that ‘“choice 
by the people” of parliamentary representatives is a constitutional notion signifying individual citizens 
having a share in political power through a democratic franchise’. This view was expressly agreed with by 
Gummow and Bell JJ in that case, Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 48.
30 Bobbio, above n 4, 25.
31 ibid.
Law and Democracy: Contemporary Questions
50
freedoms of speech, association and assembly.32 These freedoms draw on the 
philosophical tradition of the inviolable rights of the individual, as expressed 
in the French and American revolutions and in contemporary human rights 
movements. Whatever be their philosophical justifications, though, these 
freedoms are regarded as the necessary preconditions for the predominantly 
procedural rules of democracy to function effectively.33 These freedoms form 
the basis not only of the liberal state, but also of the democratic state, and when 
‘political liberties and the legitimate opposition are gone, so, too, is democracy’.34
In sum, these procedural rules are regarded as the preconditions for the game, 
not the game itself.35 What, then, is the game? The game is the elite competition 
for power which occurs in Western representative democracies. The competition 
takes place not only during elections, of course, but through the whole term 
of the Parliament. Representative democracy is by definition elite, confined to 
only the small number of individuals who are elected as representatives. The 
game itself also imposes responsibilities for representatives in a democracy.
Responsibilities of representatives
Mayo recognises three responsibilities as forming the rules of the game for 
representatives.36 First, the government, formed by the majority of representatives, 
makes its policy decisions subject to the existence of the fundamental freedoms. 
These freedoms limit the capacity of the government to silence the opposition, 
the critics and those who dissent. It is axiomatic that in Western democracy 
there is a government and there is an opposition. Political liberties may not 
be removed by the government within or outside Parliament. This does not 
mean that governments may not coerce the opposition into obedience to law, 
nor ill-treat their opponents. Rather, the fundamental freedoms guarantee the 
opportunity for the opposition and the dissenters to be heard, to protest and to 
organise.37 Thus this rule is an inhibition on majority rule.
Second, the opposition will obey the law, even though it might be difficult 
because the law is disliked.38 While obeying the law, oppositions habitually 
work to change the policy and ultimately to change the government and become 
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 Mayo, above n 8, 68.
35 Bobbio, above n 4, 25.
36 Mayo, above n 8, 68.
37 ibid.
38 This is subject to circumstances when there are opportunities for civil disobedience. Opportunities for 
civil disobedience raise controversial and complex issues of legal obligation. See Lord Lloyd of Hampstead 
and MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Law Book Co Ltd, 5th ed, 1985); Ronald Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978) ch 7–8; MR Macguigan, ‘Obligation and Obedience’ 
in Pennock and Chapman (eds), Political and Legal Obligations (Nomos XII, 1970).
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a majority — but only by peaceful means.39 Third, when there is a change of 
government the new government is subject to the same fundamental freedoms 
and the new opposition is bound by the same obligations.40 As Mayo explains, 
‘[t]he minority also agrees beforehand that they, too, will extend the same 
political freedoms and follow the same rules of the game should they arrive 
in the seats of office’.41 The game continues again, with new actors and office 
holders, according to these rules.
These responsibilities are regarded as necessary for the continuity of democracy. 
There are of course other social conditions necessary for the peaceful transfer 
of power and functioning of democracy.42 However, as Mayo says, these three 
rules represent the ‘formal conditions’ necessary to be met ‘for majorities and 
minorities in the legislature if democracy is to work at all’.43 Mayo regards 
these rules respectively as an inhibition, an obligation and an agreement. In 
constitutional discourse they would be regarded as constitutional practices 
or traditions. These responsibilities can also be implied from the express 
constitutional provisions authorising representatives to make legislative and 
executive decisions. As these responsibilities may be implied from the text of 
the Constitution, each may be regarded as a constitutional obligation.44
Recognition in law of the rules for collective 
decision-making
I have examined the right to participate in collective decision-making by 
explaining the key legal rules, principles and norms upon which the right rests. 
These provide who is authorised to make collective decisions and the procedures 
to be applied. But how, you might ask, are these rules recognised in law? In 
passing, I have already briefly indicated how these rules are acknowledged in 
law, but some further explanation is required. I address this topic in two ways: 
first, by briefly analysing how the rules for making collective decisions are 
recognised in traditional sources of law such as the Constitution, constitutional 
conventions and legislation; and second, by examining how legislative rights 
are recognised and may become protected by the Constitution.





44 Mayo identifies a problem here, where a minority party uses political freedom to abolish democracy itself. 
This problem is addressed in contemporary literature. See for example S Issacharoff, ‘Fragile Democracies’ 
(2007) 120(6) Harvard Law Review 1406–23 
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Recognition in traditional sources of law of the rules 
for collective decision-making
Democratic rights and freedoms are protected by the juridical state. This is the 
state which is governed not only sub lege — or under law — but also according 
to constitutional limits.45 The right to participate and the ‘democratic rights’ 
of representatives may be inferred from express provisions in the Constitution. 
Some are imposed as institutional obligations on the legislature: ‘There shall be 
a session of the Parliament once at least in every year’, for example.46 Others 
are expressed as rights of representatives: ‘each member and senator … shall 
receive an allowance of’,47 and each member and senator ‘shall have one vote’, 
and ‘questions arising … shall be determined by a majority of votes’ in the 
respective houses of Parliament.48 Some are expressed as individual rights and 
freedoms. The fundamental freedoms are typically recognised in constitutional 
bills of rights and statutory charters.
The rule that legislation must be passed subject to the fundamental freedoms 
receives explicit recognition where there is a statutory or constitutional bill of 
rights.49 In Australia, at the federal level, where there is no constitutional bill 
of rights, freedom of political communication has now been recognised as an 
implied limit under the Constitution. The freedom confers an immunity from 
the operation of legislative and executive power.50 Other fundamental freedoms 
may also be recognised by the High Court.51
The responsibilities for representatives have for a long time been regarded as 
rules of political practice, and might be regarded as constitutional conventions. 
These are traditions, not rules of law.52 They enable the words of the Constitution 
to be understood in the context of rules induced from political practice. The 
conventions are principally concerned with the relationship between the Prime 
Minister, the Ministers and the Governor-General.53 The responsibilities for 
45 Bobbio, above n 4, 25.
46 Australian Constitution s 6.
47 ibid s 48.
48 ibid s 23.
49 See for example Victorian Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) pt 2; those in the US 
Constitutional Amendment I; and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s 2.
50 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
51 McGinty v the State of WA (1996) 186 CLR 140, 202; ACTV v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 231–32; 
Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 229; Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230.
52 They are non-justiciable (that is, they are not capable of being settled by a court of law) and are often 
described as constitutional conventions. James Clarke, Patrick Keyzer and James Stellios, Hank’s Constitutional 
Law: Materials and Commentary (LexisNexis, 2009) 1046-47. Breach of these rules may have real consequences 
for political actors, the Crown, the Ministers and the Parliament, who have responsibility for administering 
them. Clarke et al., Hank’s Constitutional Law (LexisNexis, 2009) 1046.
53 Glenn Patmore, ‘The Head of State Debate: A Response to Sir David Smith and Professor David Flint’ 
(2012) 58(2) Australian Journal of History and Politics 251.
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representatives have not been expressly recognised as conventions in Australia.54 
Nonetheless, they might be acknowledged as conventions in the same way that 
conventions were recognised by Gibbs CJ in FAI Insurance Ltd v Winneke.55 In 
this case the question was whether or not the rules of natural justice applied 
to the Governor in Council. Gibbs CJ relied on the constitutional convention 
of responsible government to apply the rules of natural justice. His argument 
ran this way: the Governor in Council must act on the advice of Ministers, who 
are subject to the rules of natural justice. Therefore the rules of natural justice 
apply to the Governor in Council in exercising a statutory function. There was 
also no reason why the Governor in Council should not be subject to the rules 
of natural justice.56
Similarly, the principle of responsible government requires that the government 
be formed by the party which has the confidence of a majority of members in 
the lower house of Parliament. If there is to be a new majority or the majority 
is to be tested, the government must respect the conditions which allow a new 
majority to be formed. Accordingly, members of Parliament are subject to the 
responsibilities of representatives to obey the law and make decisions subject to 
the fundamental freedoms.57
Constitutional conventions are political practices or traditions subject only 
to political pressure. There is a difference in attitude towards conventions 
in Australia and Britain. For example, Marshall notes that ‘the most obvious 
and undisputed convention of the British constitutional system is that 
Parliament does not use its unlimited powers of legislation in an oppressive and 
tyrannical way’.58 In this way conventions act as an inhibition on the conduct 
of representatives in the United Kingdom. By contrast, in Australia such a 
convention has not always been followed. Conventions may be overridden by 
legislation, as they are not principles of law. Laws which have sought to restrict 
freedom of association have been passed at both the Commonwealth and State 
levels. Examples include the Menzies legislation banning the Communist Party59 
and recent NSW legislation to control union payment of membership dues to 
political parties.60
54 See for example the Resolutions Adopted at the Australian Constitutional Convention, Parliament House, 
Brisbane, 29 July to 1 August 1985, 312.
55 (1982) 151 CLR 342.
56 FAI Insurance Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, 349. There was also precedent supporting the 
application of the rules of natural justice to the Governor in Council, see Roebuck v Borough of Geelong West 
(1876) 2 VLR (L) 189; Shire of Kowree v Shire of Lowan (1897) 19 ALT 143.
57 The responsibilities for representatives may also meet the test of conventions as propounded by authors 
such as Marshall. See Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions (Clarendon Press, 1984).
58 ibid 9.
59 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.
60 See the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 div 2A, 4A, ss 87, 95E, 96D–E; Unions 
NSW v NSW [2013] HCA 58. 
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Whether or not Mayo’s responsibilities of representatives are now recognised 
as conventions, some judges have recognised elements of the responsibilities of 
representation, though not the responsibilities themselves. Their Honours have 
focused on the words in ss 7 and 24 that require a direct choice by the people 
of senators and members (respectively) as imposing limits on the legislature and 
the government. Accordingly, the legislature and government may not limit a 
free choice among the available candidates in an election, nor the freedom of 
political communication. 
Several High Court decisions illustrate the scope of these limits. In describing 
the constitutional system of representative government, the High Court in 
Lange observed that ‘the elections to [the Parliament] must be free, with all that 
this implies in the way of freedom of speech and political organisation’.61 In 
Mulholland, Gleeson CJ maintained
that the choice required by the Constitution is a true choice with ‘an 
opportunity to gain an appre ciation of the available alternatives’ and that 
a ballot paper that discriminated in favour of a government candidate 
‘might so distort the process of choice as to fail to satisfy the test’ laid 
down in the Constitution.62
In Langer, the High Court upheld the system of full preferential voting,63 where 
voters number their ballot paper sequentially in accordance with their preference 
for candidates. Brennan CJ affirmed the validity of preferential voting on the 
grounds that it provided ‘a method of freely choosing members of the House of 
Representatives’ from amongst the available alternatives and ‘permits a voter to 
make a discriminating choice among the candidates for election to the House of 
Representatives’.64 In sum, the rules for making collective decisions are to be 
found in a variety of legal sources, including the Constitution and legislation. 
Some political practices have not yet been recognised as constitutional 
conventions, whilst other legal rules have not been fully developed.
Legislative rights recognised and protected as 
constitutional rights
I now turn to my second issue: how legislative rights may be recognised and 
entrenched by the Constitution. The so-called democratic rights which draw 
upon the Chartist movement in the United Kingdom, and that movement’s 
legacy in countries such as Australia, have been expressly recognised in either 
61 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559 (quoting Birch).
62 Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 191–2.
63 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 240.
64 Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302, 317.
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the Australian Constitution or in electoral legislation. There is contention over 
whether the rights are merely recognised in legislation, or may also now be 
protected by the Constitution.
This issue arose in relation to the Commonwealth Electoral Act’s regulation of 
electorate sizes. The argument that ss  7 and 24 requiring a direct choice by 
the people requires equal electoral sizes in Commonwealth legislation was 
rejected by a majority of the High Court in McKinlay.65 At best, some judges 
in McKinlay and McGinty66 made obiter dicta statements that these provisions 
prohibit gross disparities in electorate size or other forms of electoral inequality. 
At some point such disparities could not be regarded as a direct choice by the 
people. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Electoral Act now requires equality of 
electorate sizes, plus or minus ten per cent.67
More recently, members of the High Court have referred to a constitutional 
protection of the right to vote and participate in the political life of the 
community. The constitutional protection of the right to vote has been 
controversial. Professor Twomey, relying on Kiefel J in Rowe, has argued that 
ss 7 and 24 do not give rise to a personal right to vote.68 Professors Blackshield 
and Williams maintain that the requirement for a direct choice of representatives 
by the people in ss 7 and 24 arguably supports an implied right to vote.69 In 
this part, I briefly address two questions in relation to this controversy. First, 
what form of constitutional protection has been accorded to the right to vote 
by a majority of the High Court? Second, what is the relationship between the 
constitutional protection and legislation?
The Federal Parliament has enacted the franchise, which refers to a statutory 
right to vote. The Parliament has a plenary constitutional power to enact laws 
for elections and for the qualifications of electors.70 The first federal electoral act 
provided a franchise for all adult male and female persons qualified to vote.71 
However, it excluded, on the basis of race, Aboriginal people, Torres Straight 
Islanders and persons of African and Asian descent.72 These disqualifications 
65 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1.
66 McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140.
67 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 59(10).
68 Anne Twomey, ‘Rowe v Electoral Commissioner — Evolution or Creationism?’ (2012) 31(2) University of 
Queensland Law Review 181, 196.
69 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (Federation Press, 5th 
ed, 2010) 375.
70 Australian Constitution ss 8, 10, 29, 30, 31, and 51(xxxvi).
71 Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth) s 3.
72 ibid s 4 provided: ‘No aboriginal native of Australia Asia Africa or the Islands of the Pacific except New 
Zealand shall be entitled to have his name placed on an Electoral Roll unless so entitled under section forty-
one of the Constitution.’ This was replaced by the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 39(5).
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were not removed until the early 1960s.73 The universal franchise now means 
that the legislative right to vote is conferred without restrictions based on race, 
gender and property. It was not until the 21st century that the High Court 
decided whether or not the Constitution protected the universal franchise.
The recognition of constitutional protection of the right to vote was accepted by 
Gleeson CJ in Roach74 and French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ in Rowe. 
In Roach the High Court considered a challenge to legislation that banned all 
prisoners voting.
In Roach, the Chief Justice concluded ‘that ... the words of ss 7 and 24, because 
of changed historical circumstances including legislative history, have come to 
be a constitutional protection of the right to vote’.75
His Honour drew on the philosophy of the universal franchise to define the 
meaning of the right to participate in the political life of the community:76
Because the franchise is critical to representative government, and lies at 
the centre of our concept of participation in the life of the community, 
and of citizenship, disenfranchisement of any group of adult citizens on 
a basis that does not constitute a substantial reason for exclusion from 
such participation would not be consistent with choice by the people.
He accepted that a substantial reason required ‘a rational connection with the 
identification of community membership or with the capacity to exercise free 
choice’.77 In this case, his Honour concluded that the legislative ban on all 
prisoners voting was arbitrary because it did not distinguish non-serious from 
serious offences; only serious offences would warrant disenfranchisement.78 
He noted that the rationale for ‘the exclusion from the franchise’ must be ‘related 
to the right to participate in political membership of the community’.79 Chief 
Justice Gleeson expressly referred to this right, defined broadly, regarding it as 
protecting the right to vote, which is one of the political rights of citizenship, 
which in turn provides for full membership of the community. His focus in the 
73 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1961 (Cth) s 4 repealed s 39(5) of the 1918 Act; Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1962 (Cth) s 2 removed s 39(6) a provision which restricted enrolment by Aboriginal people.
74 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
75 ibid 174.
76 ibid. Interestingly, in addressing the legislative ban on all prisoners voting in this case his honour said: 
‘Since what is involved is not an additional form of punishment, and since deprivation of the franchise takes 
away a right associated with citizenship, that is, with full membership of the community, the rationale for the 
exclusion must be that serious offending represents such a form of civic irresponsibility that it is appropriate 
for Parliament (177) to mark such behaviour as anti-social and to direct that physical separation from the 
community will be accompanied by symbolic separation in the form of loss of a fundamental political right.’ 
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judgment, though, was on the right to participate as protecting the right to 
vote, which he regarded as a fundamental right. However, the Chief Justice’s 
acceptance of the constitutional protection of the right to vote was not adopted 
by the other judges in Roach.
In Rowe, the existence of the right to vote was again considered by the High 
Court. In dissent, Kiefel J argued that ss 7 and 24 did not give rise to a personal 
right to vote. Her Honour construed the view of Gleeson CJ as a reference to 
‘an incident of universal adult suffrage, rather than an individualised view of 
“the franchise”’.80 However, none of the majority judgments in Rowe adopted 
her approach. In fact, Chief Justice Gleeson’s reference to the ‘Constitutional 
protection of the right to vote’ was quoted with approval by four judges — 
French CJ, Crennan, Gummow and Bell JJ.81 Moreover, each advanced their own 
distinct understanding of the constitutional protection of the right.
French CJ recognised that ss 7 and 24 conferred rights on the whole people of 
the Commonwealth. This is because the right to vote was of concern to all the 
people82 and individual voting rights and duties to enrol are made in aid of a 
direct choice, required by ss 7 and 24.83 Chief Justice French quoted Gleeson 
CJ’s views to justify the irreversible evolution of ‘chosen by the people’ as 
protecting the universal adult-citizen franchise. Justices Gummow and Bell 
noted that
legislative development always was to be overseen by the imperative of 
popular choice found in ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution … One result 
is explained in the following passage from the reasons of Gleeson CJ in 
Roach v Electoral Commissioner: … [That] the words of ss 7 and 24 … 
have come to be a constitutional protection of the right to vote.
Justice Crennan expressly recognised that ‘the relevant words of ss 7 and 24 
have always constrained Parliament’84 and, in Gleeson CJ’s words, ‘have come to 
be a constitutional protection of the right to vote’.85 This, she said,
mandates a franchise which will result in a democratic representative 
government … that is, a franchise free of arbitrary exclusions based on 
class, gender or race. To recognise that ss 7 and 24 mandate a democratic 
80 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 127.
81 Gleeson CJ, Crennan, Gummow and Bell JJ.
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franchise, for the purposes of the popular elections which they prescribe, 
is to recognise the embedding of the right to vote in the constitutional 
imperative of choice by the people of parliamentary representatives.86 
In sum, each judge in the majority referred to the constitutional protection 
of the right to vote, rather than a requirement or incident of representative 
government. In a recent review of Roach and Rowe, the Federal Court in 
Holmdahl v Australian Electoral Commission (No. 2)87 held that the Constitution 
conferred a public right to vote, not a personal right to vote.88 Justice Gray 
quoted with approval Justice McHugh’s view in Langer:89
The ‘rights’ conferred by the section are given to ‘the people of the 
Commonwealth’ — not individuals, although by necessary implication 
a member of the public may bring an action to declare void legislation 
that is contrary to the terms of s 24 or what is necessarily implied by 
it. Whether or not a member has been ‘chosen by the people’ depends 
on a judgment, based on the common understanding of the time, as 
to whether the people as a class have elected the member. It does not 
depend on the concrete wishes or desires of individual electors.
Thus a person has a legal entitlement to enforce the public right. Presumably they 
are acting as representatives of the people of the Commonwealth. However, the 
right to vote is only conferred on individual persons as members of ‘the people’. 
It is only a right exercised by the people as a class. Due to this complexity the 
distinction between personal and public right may prove difficult to discern 
in theory and application. While Justice Gray provided a persuasive opinion, 
he omitted to quote directly from Chief Justice Gleeson in Roach. His honour 
preferred Justice Kiefel’s characterisation in Rowe of the Chief Justice’s approach. 
Thus Gleeson CJ’s justifications relied on by the majority in Rowe were not fully 
explored in Holmdahl.90 The precise nature of the constitutional protection of 
the right to vote remains contentious. But there is now, at least, clear judicial 
support for a constitutional protection of the right to vote.
The judgments of the majority in Rowe are of significance to the emergence of an 
interpretive relationship between the Constitution and longstanding legislation. 
The High Court’s discussion of the relationship is of particular importance 
to an understanding of the regulatory limits of the Constitution. The aspects 
of that relationship that will be considered are the effect of the Constitution 
on legislation and the effect of legislation upon the Constitution. Special 
86 ibid 117 (emphasis added).
87 Holmdahl v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2) [2012] SASCFC 110.
88 ibid, 125 Kourakis CJ and Sulan J concurred with Grey J.
89 Langer v The Commonwealth (1995) 186 CLR 302, 342-43; see also, Langer v The Commonwealth (1995) 
186 CLR 302, 349 (Gummow J).
90 Leave to appeal to the High Court from the Federal Court in Holmdahl was denied on 12 April 2013.
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attention will be given to the idea of ‘permeability’ between the Constitution 
and legislation: the use of constitutional principles as interpretive tools for the 
direct or indirect protection of rights under legislation and the applicability of 
legislative provisions as normative principles to enhance the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative and responsible government.91
My inquiry will focus upon the openness and potential flow of normative 
principles between the Constitution and legislation. It is important to note that 
while there is a permeability between these two instruments, the Constitution is 
supreme law and is not in any way dependent for its authority upon legislation. 
The possibility for an interpretation that strengthens the right to vote will be 
emphasised.
A legislative limit on the implied right to participate was at issue in Rowe, 
where the Court considered an amendment to the enrolment procedures.92 Since 
1983, Commonwealth legislation provided that after the election was called, 
there would be a grace period of seven days to enrol for the first time, or to 
transfer enrolment if a person had changed their address. In 2006, legislation 
removed the grace period for new enrolments entirely, and reduced the period 
to three days for transfer of enrolments.93 The Electoral Commission estimated 
that reinstatement of the seven day grace period might affect approximately 
100,000 people who lodged claims in the seven day period after the writs were 
issued. A majority in Rowe held that the amendment was invalid.
Effect of the Constitution on legislation
Four justices94 accepted that the right to vote was protected by the Constitution 
and regarded it as a limit on the legislative power of the Commonwealth. Chief 
Justice French held that the Australian Electoral Act provisions for grace periods 
of seven days for enrolment and 3 days for transfer of enrolment could not be 
restricted due to the ‘collateral damage to the extent of participation by qualified 
persons’.95 Even though some people failed to fulfil their duties under the Act, 
limiting their own opportunities, the damage was still a detriment ‘of concern to 
91 This definition is derived from the definition advanced by Craig Scott in an article in which he puts 
forward his definition of permeability as ‘one means of giving practical legal effect to the abstract doctrine of 
interdependence which has, thus far in its lifespan, existed as little more than a rhetorical slogan’. Craig Scott, 
‘The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: With Special Reference to the International 
Covenants on Human Rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769, 771.
92 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1.
93 See Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) see especially s 102 (4AA) which were amendments made 
by the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006 (Cth). See also 
ss 101, 102(4) and 115 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).
94 French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ, and Crennan J.
95 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 22.
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the whole Commonwealth’.96 In sum, he saw the legal effect of the amendment 
as diminishing the opportunities for enrolment and transfer of enrolment that 
existed prior to their enactment.
Justices Gummow and Bell believed the method of choice adopted by the 
legislative amendment failed as a means to what should be the end; that is, 
making elections as expressive of popular choice as practical considerations 
properly permit — popular choice being guaranteed by ss  7 and 24.97 They 
maintained that ‘[t]he position then is reached that the 2006 Act has the practical 
operation of effecting a legislative disqualification from what otherwise is the 
popular choice mandated by the Constitution.’98 Their Honours also adopted 
a substantive view of the right, rejecting the argument of the Commonwealth 
that enrolment was merely a procedure, because it affected the rights of electors.
Justice Crennan accepted that ‘the centrality of the franchise, to a citizen’s 
participation in the life of the community and membership of the Australian 
body politic, was recognised in Roach’.99 Her Honour also maintained that 
‘persons’ had a ‘right to participate in choosing parliamentary representatives’, 
against which her Honour assessed the challenged legislation.100 She said:
It can be accepted that the impugned provisions … operate to disentitle 
or exclude persons (otherwise legally eligible) from the right to vote and 
the right to participate in choosing parliamentary representatives for 
the State and Subdivision in which they reside. It can also be accepted 
that achieving and maintaining Electoral Rolls of integrity is a purpose 
which is compatible with ss 7 and 24.
Her Honour held that the Amendment Act was not appropriate or necessary to 
protect the integrity of the Electoral Rolls. Moreover, ‘to seek to discourage a 
surge of late claims for enrolment by disentitling or excluding those making them 
[under the Amendment Act] constitutes a failure to recognise the centrality of 
the franchise to a citizen’s participation in the political life of the community’.101
Thus their Honours recognise three different norms protecting participation 
and voting. The franchise may not be limited in a way that is detrimental 
or damaging to participation by ‘qualified persons’,102 or by ‘disqualifying’, 
‘disentitling’ or ‘excluding’ of citizens, and should enhance the popular choice 





100 Twomey, above n 68, 192.
101 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 120.
102 ibid 22.
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Effect of legislation on the Constitution
Significantly, it appears that the meaning of the constitutional text is in part 
defined by reference to legislation. In Rowe, French CJ explained that the 
universal franchise had become part of the content of the constitutional concept 
of ‘chosen by the people’ in ss 7 and 24. He maintained that this constitutional 
content was developed according to the common understandings of the time, 
which his Honour said was best expressed in ‘durable legislative development[s]’. 
Justices Gummow and Bell maintained that legislative objectives may give effect 
to constitutional requirements: ‘Section 245(1) states that it “shall be the duty of 
every elector to vote at each election”. This legislatively stated duty furthers the 
constitutional system of representative government by popular choice.’103 Thus 
legislative rights to participate may augment or permeate into the meaning of a 
direct choice by the people in ss 7 and 24. In Rowe, this occurred in two ways: 
first, the recognition of the right to a seven day grace period for enrolment and 
a 3 day transfer of enrolment after the election was called; and second, a right 
to a grace period for failure to enrol or transfer enrolment at a later time. The 
first grace period became constitutionally entrenched, and the second justified 
that entrenchment. Chief Justice French, Gummow and Bell JJ referred to s 101 
of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which imposes an obligation to 
enrol and transfer enrolment.104 If a person fails to comply, a criminal sanction 
is imposed, except where a person sends or delivers a late claim for enrolment 
or transfer to the Electoral Commissioner. Chief Justice French noted that the 
penalty provisions ‘are designed not to punish, but to encourage maximum 
participation by persons qualified to vote’.105 Justices Gummow and Bell 
believed that the provision was designed to encourage maximum enrolment.106 
The legislation encouraging maximum participation or enrolment was in the 
context of grace periods. It followed, in French CJ’s words, that these durable 
legislative developments were a declaration of the common understanding of 
the right to vote and to participate in the political decisions of the community.107
The permeability of norms between the Constitution and legislation has 
significance for other legislative rights and freedoms mentioned in this chapter 
but not currently recognised as protected by the Constitution. Significantly, the 
so-called democratic rights or the ‘rights of representatives’ which give effect 
to a choice by the people have endured in legislation. The majority judgments 
103 ibid 50.
104 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 101.
105 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 29.
106 ibid 58.
107 Justice Crennan’s consideration of the effect of legislation on the Constitution was different to the 
other majority judges. Her Honour refers to the history of the franchise more generally, rather than focusing 
on legislative developments. The colonial franchises by federation, she noted, were designed to produce 
democratic lower houses, providing the genesis for the understanding of the constitutional protection given 
to the right to vote.
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in Rowe offer approaches that may see further democratic legislative rights 
protected. However, it is notable that the protection given by the majority to the 
right to vote pertained to the denial of individuals’ opportunities to participate 
in an election. Not all voting methods may attract such protection: compulsory 
or preferential voting, which are concerned with Parliament’s choice of electoral 
system, are one example.108
Conclusion
The High Court has now recognised a constitutional protection of the right to 
vote and participate in the political life of the community. The permeability 
of norms between the Constitution and legislation helps us better understand 
the nature and scope of that right. However, it has been argued that there is a 
broader conception of the right to participate in collective decisions which is 
recognised in constitutional principles, augmented by legislation and possibly 
constitutional conventions. This includes participation in legislative and 
executive decisions, not just voting in elections. Whether or not this broader 
right is recognised by the courts, it will remain of the utmost significance to the 
practice and proper functioning of Australian constitutional democracy.
108 The view that compulsory voting was required by the Constitution was expressly rejected in Rowe 
by Hayne and Kiefel JJ: Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 75, 131; see also Heydon at [313]. 
Moreover, it may be inferred from Brennan’s judgment in Langer that preferential voting is constitutional, 
though not necessarily required. See also Holmdahl v Australian Electoral Commission (2012) 277 FLR 101.




5. Ministerial Advisers: Democracy 
and Accountability
Yee-Fui Ng1
Ministerial advisers, personally appointed by Ministers, and working out of 
their private offices, have become an integral part of the political landscape over 
the last 40 years. 
At federation, the very idea of ministerial advisers would have been denigrated, 
as the framers of the Constitution did not believe in ‘making room for political 
friends’.2 They believed that it would lead to the ‘spoils system’ in the United 
States, where high and low official positions were used to reward friends and 
offer incentives to work for the political party, resulting in a system that was 
corrupt and inefficient.
Despite this, the role of ministerial advisers is now deeply entrenched in the 
political system. It all started with the informal ‘kitchen cabinets’, where a 
small group of trusted friends and advisers of the Minister gathered around the 
kitchen table to discuss political strategies. This has since become formalised 
and institutionalised into the role of the partisan ministerial adviser, as distinct 
from the impartial public service. The number of ministerial staff increased 
from 155 in April 1972 to 407 in June 2011; an increase of 163 per cent.3 
There has been a distinct shift from federation, where the idea of ministerial 
advisers would have been derided, to a situation where ministerial advisers 
are now an integral and institutionalised aspect of governing the nation. 
Their position has been legislatively recognised and their salaries have been 
appropriated from public funds since 1980.4
There are questions about the democratic accountability of ministerial advisers. 
Ministerial advisers are not elected and are often derived from political party 
ranks and arguably do not enhance a participatory form of democracy. As such, a 
closer analysis of the democratic accountability of ministerial advisers is central 
to the theme of how law and democracy can interrelate to face new challenges.
1 Law Lecturer, RMIT. yeefui@gmail.com.
2 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 19 April 1897, 916–7.
3 Anne Tiernan, Power Without Responsibility: Ministerial Staffers in Australian Governments from Whitlam 
to Howard (UNSW Press, 2007) 244; Australian Government Department of Finance and Deregulation, 
Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 Annual Report 2010–11, http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/
mops_annual_reports/2010-2011/docs/MOPS_Annual_Report.pdf.
4 Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth). See Appropriation Act (No 1) 2012-13 (Cth) Schedule 1; 
Appropriation Act (No 1) 1980-81 (Cth).
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In this chapter, I will first examine the issues that ministerial advisers pose to 
democracy. I then consider how relevant legal accountability mechanisms can 
be extended to ministerial advisers. 
I argue that ministerial advisers are increasingly exercising executive power 
beyond what is allowed in the Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff5 and 
should therefore be subject to legal accountability mechanisms such as appearing 
before parliamentary committees and judicial review under section 75(v) of the 
Constitution.
Ministerial advisers and democracy
As ministerial advisers are relatively new actors within the operation of the 
executive, it is necessary to examine the democratic issues relating to their role.
It can be argued that ministerial advisers enhance participatory democracy 
in two ways. First, it could be said that the mere existence of the position of 
ministerial adviser increases public participation in political processes. This is 
because members of the public can become ministerial advisers and seek to 
directly influence the political process.
However, ministerial advisers tend to come from a party political background.6 
This means that although a greater number of people are able to influence 
the political process through becoming ministerial advisers, it tends to be 
party participation that predominates, rather than a broader form of public 
participation. In fact, this may exacerbate decision-making on purely political 
grounds, such as ministerial handouts to win marginal seats. 
It may even be argued that there may be questionable actions by ministerial 
advisers that could be seen to indirectly undermine responsible government. 
An example of this is the actions of a United Kingdom special adviser, Damian 
McBride, who collaborated in setting up a blog disseminating fabricated rumours 
about the sex lives of Conservative politicians in order to undermine their 
reputations.7 This kind of purely self-interested, party political activity may be 
seen to indirectly undermine responsible government by distracting political 
debate and parliamentary scrutiny of executive action from substantive policy 
issues towards fabricated issues about politicians’ private lives. 
5 Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff, http://www.smos.gov.au/resources/statement-of-standards.html.
6 Maria Maley, Partisans at the Centre of Government: the Role of Ministerial Advisers in the Keating 
Government 1991–96 (PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, 2002) 211–12; Benito Folino, A 
Government of Advisers: The Role, Influence and Accountability of Ministerial Advisers in the New South Wales 
Political System (PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2010) 120–3.
7 ‘Damian McBride’s Departure Marks the End of a Bumpy Whitehall Career’, Guardian, (United Kingdom) 
13 April 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/apr/13/labour-damian-mcbride-resignation.
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Secondly, ministerial advisers can be seen to benefit democracy because they 
interact with interest groups on behalf of their Minister. This means that there 
are a wider range of interest groups that can lobby the Minister through the 
conduit of ministerial advisers, which may increase participatory democracy. 
However, ministerial advisers also filter information that reaches the Minister. 
Thus, it is unclear whether the presence of ministerial advisers does increase the 
number of interest groups reaching the attention of the Minister.
It is necessary to consider the democratic accountability of ministerial advisers. 
The Australian constitutional system operates within a framework of democratic 
accountability. Democratic accountability can be explained through a vertical 
principal–agent relationship, where the ‘principal’ is ‘the people’ who agree 
to be governed by its ‘agents’ (the elected politicians, executive, judiciary, 
legislature) in exchange for the protection of individual rights (the protection 
of life, liberty and property).8 The principal holds the agents accountable 
through various means, such as elections or legal mechanisms.9 Therefore, the 
sovereign position in a democracy is the public, and accountability focuses on 
the obligation of officials to justify their public decisions and their exercises of 
public power to the people.10 
In addition, there are also horizontal accountability structures, which are a 
system of checks and balances between government agents and institutions,11 
such as ministerial advisers. As ministerial advisers are not elected by the people, 
there is no direct link between the ‘agent’ (ministerial advisers) that should 
respond to the needs of the ‘principal’ (the public). Despite this, ministerial 
advisers operate as significant actors within the executive. Therefore, there have 
to be systems in place ensuring that ministerial advisers are accountable, much 
like the elected representatives.
This chapter will examine the current regulation of ministerial advisers. The 
chapter will also identify accountability gaps and suggest how these can be 
addressed.
8 Christine B Harrington and Z Umut Turem, ‘Accounting for Accountability in Neoliberal Regulatory 
Regimes’ in Michael W Dowdle (ed), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge 
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Accountability of ministerial advisers
There have been concerns about the accountability of ministerial advisers as 
seen by prominent events such as the ‘Children Overboard’ incident.12 
In the ‘Children Overboard’ incident in 2001, Ministers made public statements 
that asylum seekers had thrown their own children overboard. For instance, 
the Prime Minister said, ‘I don’t want people like that in Australia. Genuine 
refugees don’t do that … They hang on to their children.’13 
Within a few days, several public servants found out that the children overboard 
story was false.14 They notified a ministerial adviser of the Defence Minister 
about this.15 Nonetheless, Ministers continued to make public statements about 
asylum seekers throwing children overboard as part of an election campaign. 
When pressed for evidence, the press secretary of the Defence Minister asked a 
public servant to email two photographs to him.16 The photos were actually of 
two brave navy sailors who rescued terrified asylum seekers and their children 
in the open sea when their boat sank. The press secretary was informed soon 
after that the photos were not of the children overboard incident, but of the 
rescue operation.17 
Despite this, the press secretary asked a public servant for another copy of 
the photo. He was insistent that the photo be emailed immediately. ‘I am your 
boss’, he said to the public servant. He refused to hang up until the photos 
were emailed to him. The Ministers released these photographs to the media 
as evidence of children being thrown overboard.18 A Senate Select Committee 
was formed to investigate the ‘Children Overboard’ incident. The government 
refused to allow ministerial advisers to appear before the Senate Committee. 
The Senate Committee was highly critical of this, stating that ‘[s]uch bans and 
refusals are anathema to accountability’.19 Despite this, the Senate Committee 
12 There are other incidents at State level such as the Hotel Windsor incident and the ‘leaked tapes’ 
crisis in Victoria. See Ombudsman Victoria, ‘Ombudsman Investigation into the Probity of the Hotel 
Windsor Redevelopment’ (2011), http://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/resources/documents/Ombudsman_
investigation_into_the_probity_of_The_Hotel_Windsor_redevelopment.pdf; James Campbell, ‘Tony Nutt 
told Police Minister Peter Ryan “to put a sock in it”’, The Herald Sun (Melbourne), 4 March 2013, http://
www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/tony-nutt-told-police-minister-peter-ryan-to-put-a-sock-in-it/story-
e6frf7kx-1226589560123.
13 Christine B Harrington and Z Umut Turem, ‘Accounting for Accountability in Neoliberal Regulatory 
Regimes’ in Michael W Dowdle (ed), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 251.
14 Commonwealth Senate Select Committee, A Certain Maritime Incident (2002) xxxvi.
15 Patrick Weller, Don’t Tell the Prime Minister (Scribe Publications, 2002) 26.
16 David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory (Allen & Unwin, 2nd ed, 2004) 266–7.
17 ibid.
18 ibid 35.
19 Commonwealth Senate Select Committee, A Certain Maritime Incident (2002) xxxiv.
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did not seek to compel the attendance of ministerial advisers, stating that it 
would be unjust to impose a penalty on a ministerial adviser who did not appear 
on the direction of their Minister.20
In 2004, one of these ministerial advisers, Mike Scrafton, wrote an article in a 
newspaper stating that he told the Prime Minister that claims of children being 
thrown overboard were unsubstantiated before the federal election, contrary to 
the Prime Minister’s denials.21 A special Senate inquiry was established to hear 
his evidence. Scrafton passed a polygraph test for his statutory declaration.22 
The report indicated that the ministerial adviser had briefed the Ministers on 
the falsity of the children overboard allegations prior to the elections and the 
Ministers had chosen not to correct the public record.23
This example highlights an accountability gap, making it necessary to examine 
the current regulation of ministerial advisers and how further accountability 
mechanisms can be applied to them.
Current regulation of ministerial advisers
Ministerial advisers are employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 
1984 (Cth).24 The terms and conditions of employment of ministerial advisers 
are subject to the determination of the employing Minister,25 with the Prime 
Minister being able to vary the employment terms and conditions.26
Section 31 of the Act requires the Prime Minister to table a yearly report to 
Parliament setting out the name of each consultant engaged by all Ministers, the 
period of engagement of the consultant, and the tasks specified.27 Ministerial 
advisers are not engaged as consultants and therefore do not fall within the 
scope of this provision. Nevertheless, since 2007–08, the government has tabled 
annual reports providing information about the numbers of ministerial advisers 
employed, their classification levels, and their salaries and benefits.28
Ministerial advisers are also subject to a Statement of Standards, setting out 
the standards that they are expected to meet in performing their duties.29 The 
20 Commonwealth Senate Select Committee, A Certain Maritime Incident (2002) xxxiv-xxxv.
21 Commonwealth Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence, Report (2004) 1–2.
22 ibid 68; Text of Mike Scrafton’s Letter to the Australia of 4 September 2004, Appendix 4 of Commonwealth 
Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence, Report (2004).
23 Commonwealth Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence, Report (2004) 1–2, 48.
24 Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth) s 13 (‘MOPS Act’).
25 ibid s 14(1).
26 ibid s 14(3).
27 ibid s 31.
28 See Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 Annual Reports, http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/
mops_annual_reports/index.html.
29 Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff, http://www.smos.gov.au/resources/statement-of-standards.html.
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Statement of Standards include acknowledgement that ministerial staff do not 
have the power to direct public servants in their own right.30 In addition, it 
recognises that executive decisions are the preserve of Ministers and public 
servants, and not ministerial staff acting in their own right.31 Further, ministerial 
advisers have the duty to facilitate direct and effective communication between 
their Minister’s department and their Minister.32 Implementation and sanctions 
under the Standards are handled internally by the executive through the Prime 
Minister’s Office.33 This means that any breaches of the Standards by ministerial 
advisers such as those in the ‘Children Overboard’ incident would be handled 
behind closed doors, without the scrutiny of Parliament or any external bodies. 
The Statement of Standards seems to suggest that ministerial advisers have a 
very limited role and are merely conduits between the Ministers and the public 
service. Nevertheless, ministerial advisers have increasingly extensive roles, 
including advising on public policy, media, political, parliamentary management 
and party management matters.34 
Tony Nutt, the former Chief of Staff of the Victorian Premier, in the leaked 
conversations to the Herald Sun, sums it up very colourfully:
[A] ministerial adviser deals with the press. A ministerial adviser handles 
the politics. A ministerial adviser talks to the union. All of that happens 
every day of the week, everywhere in Australia all the time. Including 
frankly, the odd bit of, you know, ancient Spanish practices and a bit of 
bastardry on the way through. That’s all the nature of politics.35
Significantly, there are instances where certain ministerial advisers act on behalf 
of their Minister and potentially exercise executive power. Dr Maria Maley 
referred to this as advisers becoming ‘surrogates’ and making minor decisions in 
the Minister’s name,36 while Jack Waterford noted that some Ministers ‘effectively 
delegate parts of their work to individual staffers, expecting them to make 
30 ibid cl 11.
31 ibid cl 12.
32 ibid cl 13.
33 ibid. Implementation of the Standards is the responsibility of the Prime Minister’s Office and the 
Government Staffing Committee. Sanctions imposed under the Standards are determined after consultation 
with the relevant Minister by the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, acting on advice from the Government 
Staffing Committee.
34 The Herald and Weekly Times Pty Limited v The Office of the Premier (General) [2012] VCAT 967 [22].
35 James Campbell, ‘Tony Nutt told Police Minister Peter Ryan “to put a sock in it”’, The Herald Sun 
(Melbourne), 4 March 2013, http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/tony-nutt-told-police-minister-
peter-ryan-to-put-a-sock-in-it/story-e6frf7kx-1226589560123.
36 Maria Maley, Partisans at the Centre of Government: the Role of Ministerial Advisers in the Keating 
Government 1991–96 (PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, 2002) 123. Cited in Commonwealth 
Senate, Finance and Public Administration References Committee, Staff Employed under the Members of 
Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (2003) 16.
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routine decisions and to process approvals without any need for consultation’.37 
Harry Evans, a former Clerk of the Senate, has stated that ministerial advisers 
‘act as de facto assistant ministers and participate in government activities as 
such’.38 Further, the Senate Committee for the ‘Children Overboard’ incident 
found that ‘it can no longer be assumed that [ministerial] advisers act at the 
express direction of ministers and/or with their knowledge and consent. 
Increasingly, advisers are wielding executive power in their own right.’39
In this chapter, I focus on ministerial advisers with the role of acting on behalf 
of the Minister, as this is their most controversial role. I will consider whether 
in some situations ministerial advisers exercise executive power.
Do ministerial advisers exercise executive power?
The constitutional framework for the executive is characterised by large gaps 
and eloquent silences. The content of Commonwealth executive power was 
deliberately not expressly defined by the drafters of the Constitution. Sir Alfred 
Deakin stated in relation to section 61: 
No exhaustive definition is attempted in the Constitution — obviously 
because any such attempt would have involved a risk of undue, and 
perhaps unintentional, limitation of the executive power. Had it been 
intended to limit the scope of the executive power to matters on which 
the Commonwealth Parliament had legislated, nothing would have been 
easier than to say so.40
Therefore, executive power is an elusive and slippery concept defying the 
strictures of precise definition.41 Even the scope of executive power is uncertain, 
with only incremental clarification through case law over the years. 
Technically, according to section 61 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth’s 
executive power is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-
General. However, there is a constitutional convention that the Governor-
37 Jack Waterford, ‘Reining in Political Staff and Outsiders’, Public Sector Informer (Canberra Times) 
December 2001, 6. Cited in Commonwealth Senate, Finance and Public Administration References Committee, 
Staff Employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (2003) 16.
38 Clerk of the Senate, Correspondence to Senator Cook, 22 March 2002, 4.
39 Commonwealth Senate Select Committee, A Certain Maritime Incident (2002) xxxvii.
40 Alfred Deakin, ‘Channel of Communication with Imperial Government: Position of Consuls: Executive 
Power of Commonwealth’, in P Brazil and M Mitchell (eds), Opinions of Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth 
of Australia: Volume 1: 1901–14 (Canberra, AGPS, 1981) 129, 130.
41 In Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 92, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ acknowledged that 
the scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth had ‘often been discussed but never defined’. In 
Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, the judges do not attempt a full discussion on the scope 
of executive power.
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General only exercises executive power on the advice of Ministers.42 Thus, in 
practice, executive power is exercised by Ministers, as the government acts 
through Ministers who administer government departments under section 64 
of the Constitution.43 In addition, Ministers may exercise executive power 
conferred by statute.44 However, it is recognised that efficient government 
administration may require in many circumstances that a Minister act through 
another person.45 As stated by Staughton LJ in R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department; Ex parte Doody:
Parliament frequently confers powers on a minister who is the political 
head of a department. Much less frequently, it confers powers on an 
official of a particular description or grade … But it is absurd to suppose 
that every power which is conferred on the political head of a department 
must be exercised by him and him alone. It is in general sufficient that 
the power is exercised by a junior minister or an official on his behalf.46
Ministers do not have to personally make all decisions themselves. Legislation 
may confer the ability for Ministers to delegate their powers.47 Alternatively, 
legislation may specify that a public servant is to exercise powers under the 
statute.48 Therefore, public servants may exercise executive power by virtue of 
authority granted by statute or power delegated by the Minister. 
The Statement of Standards for ministerial advisers seems to envisage that 
executive power is solely the province of Ministers and public servants, 
not ministerial advisers.49 However, I argue that, in certain circumstances, 
ministerial advisers can and do exercise executive power. In particular, according 
to the Carltona or ‘alter ego’ principle,50 Ministers may have agents who are 
authorised to carry out certain tasks without having a formal delegation to do 
so. According to this principle, constitutionally the agent’s decision is deemed 
42 Ian Killey, Constitutional Conventions in Australia: An Introduction to the Unwritten Rules of Australia’s 
Constitution (Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2nd ed, 2012) 130.
43 Ryder v Foley (1906) 4 CLR 422, 432–3. See P H Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution 
(LBC Information Services, 2nd ed, 1997) 433.
44 P H Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution (LBC Information Services, 2nd ed, 1997) 433.
45 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Doody [1993] QB 157, 194, R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department; Ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, 566. Applied in Australia by Attorney General v 
Foster (1999) 84 FCR 582.
46 [1993] QB 157, 194. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Doody  [1993] QB 157, 
194, adopted on appeal in the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte 
Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, 566. Cited with approval in Attorney General v Foster (1999) 84 FCR 582.
47 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Doody [1993] QB 157, 194.
48 ibid.
49 Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff, http://www.smos.gov.au/resources/statement-of-standards.html.
50 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560, 563. Applied in Australia by O’Reilly v State 
Bank of Victoria Commissioner (1983) 153 CLR 1, 11.
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to be the Minister’s decision.51 The Minister remains responsible and answerable 
to Parliament for anything his/her officials have done under the Minister’s 
authority.52 
This is illustrated by the case of Ozmanian v Minister for Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs.53 In this case, the Minister authorised procedures 
for dealing with the large number of requests for ministerial interventions to 
grant protection visas ‘in the public interest’. A Senior Adviser of the Minister 
would sign a letter on behalf of the Minister about whether the Minister would 
consider the application for a protection visa. This meant that a ministerial 
adviser was in effect signing letters determining substantive issues affecting the 
rights of asylum-seekers. In Ozmanian, although the letter was said to be sent at 
the request of the Minister, the Minister had in fact never seen the letter.54 This 
would be an exercise of executive power if it was held to be valid. 
At first instance, Merkel J held that the Senior Adviser made the decision on 
behalf of the Minister.55 Although the decision was not made by the Minister, 
it was a decision made under the authority of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
(‘Migration Act’) as it was in accordance with the general procedures established 
with the Minister’s authority.56 
Despite this, Merkel J stated that the Migration Act detailed powers of delegation 
making it less likely that the Carltona principle would apply.57 Further, courts 
are reluctant to utilise the Carltona principle where the exercise of that power 
may have drastic consequences upon an individual, such as visa decisions.58 
Hence, the power under the Migration Act had to be exercised by the Minister 
personally or an authorised delegate.59 This means that the decision made by the 
Senior Adviser was invalid.60
Merkel J’s decision was overturned by the Full Federal Court on other grounds. 
The Full Court did not find it necessary to determine the ministerial adviser 
issue.61 Therefore the law in this area is not settled.
Ozmanian is an instance of a ministerial adviser exercising executive power, 
contrary to the Statement of Standards. However, there are no external 
51 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560, 563.
52 ibid.
53 (1996) 41 ALD 293.





59 ibid. This part of the decision was overturned by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Bedlington v Chong (1998) 
87 FCR 75; Raikua v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2007) 158 FCR 510, 523.
60 Ozmanian v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 41 ALD 293, 310.
61 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ozmanian (1996) 71 FCR 1.
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enforcement mechanisms under the Standards, and the Standards are not 
legislatively enshrined. Therefore, courts do not take the Standards into 
account. Nevertheless, the courts have the jurisdiction to police the boundaries 
of executive power. The courts have a few options. First, the courts could decide 
that a particular aspect of executive power is non-delegable to ministerial 
advisers, akin to Merkel J’s judgment. This is more likely in decisions with drastic 
consequences for individuals and where there are existing powers of delegation 
within the legislation. Decisions involving fundamental rights of life and liberty 
should arguably only be exercised by the Minister or an authorised delegate 
due to the potentially significant negative impact on individuals. The power 
of delegation within legislation suggests that delegation should be conducted 
within the legislative framework. Where the court decides that decisions are 
non-delegable, the decisions of ministerial advisers are invalid. 
Alternately, the courts may decide that the Carltona principle may apply 
to ministerial advisers based on statutory interpretation. In this situation, 
ministerial advisers are acting as the informal agent of the Minister and are able 
to make executive decisions on the Minister’s behalf. According to case law, the 
person exercising the power must be an ‘appropriate’ official.62 Mark Campbell 
has found that, in general, courts have accepted that it is for the Minister to 
decide who is an appropriate official to exercise power,63 and the court tends 
to defer to the Minister’s choice. As Carltona indicates, even if the Minister 
gave responsibility to an official who is too junior, it is the Minister who would 
answer for this in Parliament.64 This suggests that courts would not supervise 
the selection of the official, even if the official is junior. 
However, as Professor Mark Freedland argues, Carltona was decided in a legal 
and constitutional environment where ‘extreme importance’ was attached to 
ministerial responsibility.65 Carltona is predicated upon the Minister actually 
taking responsibility in Parliament for the wrong choice of an official. However, 
the application of ministerial responsibility in Australia has been watered down 
significantly.66 Thus it is reasonable to more cautiously apply Carltona in modern 
times and not simply assume that all public officials would be covered by this 
principle. 
62 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works  [1943] 2 All ER 560; Re Golden Chemical Products Ltd [1976] 
2 All ER 543; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Oladehinde [1991] AC 254; R (on the 
application of Chief Constable of West Midlands) v Birmingham Justices [2002] EWHC 1087 [10].
63 Mark Campbell, ‘The Carltona Doctrine’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 251, 261. R v NDT Ventures Ltd 
(2001) 4 Admin LR 110 (4th); Re Golden Chemical Products Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 543.
64 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560, 563.
65 Mark Freedland, ‘The Rule against Delegation and the Carltona Doctrine in an Agency Context’ (1996) 
Public Law 19, 24–5. 
66 See Ian Killey, Constitutional Conventions in Australia: An Introduction to the Unwritten Rules of Australia’s 
Constitution (Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2nd ed, 2012) 87.
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There are limits to the Minister’s choice of agent. The courts are likely to inquire 
into the identity of the Minister’s agent if the Minister’s choice was irrational 
or beyond the Minister’s powers.67 If an Immigration Minister authorised a low 
level administrative assistant from the Department of Tourism to make visa 
decisions, for example, the courts would be likely to intercede, as this decision 
would be illogical and unreasonable: the Minister has qualified staff in his/her 
department to handle visa matters and it does not make sense for an assistant 
in the Department of Tourism without the requisite skills to make migration 
decisions.68
In addition, where the decision affects individual rights and liberties and 
involves coercive powers, the courts may also look more closely at the Minister’s 
choice of agent. This is because executive and statutory decisions depriving 
an individual of rights and liberties are grave and should not be entrusted to 
unqualified individuals. For instance, if an Immigration Minister authorised a 
low-ranking administrative assistant to make deportation decisions, which have 
grave consequences for individuals, this activity would not be upheld by the 
courts. However, if the Immigration Minister granted the same power to a senior 
ministerial adviser, the courts would tend not to question the choice of the 
adviser. 
In short, Ozmanian demonstrates that there are instances where ministerial 
advisers in effect exercise executive power. Where ministerial advisers exercise 
executive power, they are operating as part of the executive. Therefore, they 
should be subject to appropriate accountability mechanisms. I will now briefly 
outline two possible options for accountability: to Parliament and to the courts.
Accountability to Parliament
The recent High Court decision of Williams v Commonwealth (‘Williams’) 
emphasises the concept of responsible government, with six judges utilising 
responsible government as the basis of their decisions.69 The majority of French 
CJ, Gummow, Bell and Crennan JJ utilised responsible government to hold 
that the Commonwealth needs statutory authority to enter into contracts and 
spend public money, subject to limited exceptions.70 French CJ held that a 
broad conception of the Commonwealth executive’s power to contract would 
undermine parliamentary control of the executive branch and weaken the 
67 Mark Campbell, ‘The Carltona Doctrine’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 261. R (on the application of Chief 
Constable of West Midlands) v Birmingham Justices [2002] EWHC 1087 (Admin) [16].
68 See Mark Campbell, ‘The Carltona Doctrine’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 262.
69 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179-80 [4] French CJ, 239 [161] Gummow and Bell JJ, 
357-8 [542]-[544] (Crennan J).
70 ibid. The exceptions include prerogative powers, ordinary and well-recognised functions of government, 
nationhood power and incidental power. Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156,191 [34] French CJ, 342 [484] Crennan J.
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role of the Senate.71 Crennan J also emphasised the institution of responsible 
government, where the executive’s primary responsibility in its prosecution of 
government is owed to Parliament.72 Crennan J noted that this accountability 
came to be expressed in terms of the need for the executive to enjoy the 
confidence of Parliament in dealing with finance, as the arm of government most 
immediately representing and therefore responsible to the people (the electors).73 
Gummow and Bell JJ held that an unqualified executive power to contract and 
to spend would undermine the basic assumption of legislative predominance 
inherited from the United Kingdom and would distort the relationship between 
Chapter I and Chapter II of the Constitution.74 
In Williams, responsible government is more central to the reasoning process 
of the judges than in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (‘Lange’).75 
According to the High Court in Lange, responsible government could create 
limits on executive power, not just legislative power.76 This concept of 
responsible government being a fetter on executive power was taken further in 
Williams, as the High Court utilised responsible government as a restraint on 
the Commonwealth Executive’s ability to circumvent parliamentary processes. 
This resulted in a substantive limitation, that is, a significant reduction of 
Commonwealth executive power in contracting without statutory authority.
Therefore, Williams may represent a resurgence of responsible government and 
the utilisation of parliamentary accountability as a mechanism for constraining 
the actions of the Commonwealth executive.
Under the doctrine of responsible government, the executive is responsible to 
the legislature. As the High Court stated in Egan v Willis, the contemporary 
position in Australia is that while ‘the primary role of Parliament is to pass 
laws, it also has important functions to question and criticise the government 
on behalf of the people’, and ‘to secure accountability of government activity is 
the very essence of responsible government’.77 According to John Stuart Mill, 
the task of the Legislature is to ‘watch and control the government: to throw the 
light of publicity on its acts’.78 
Sir Samuel Griffith provided an explanation about the main principles of 





75 (1997) 189 CLR 520.
76 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561.
77 Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, [42–3] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
78 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Parker, Son and Bourn, 1861) 104.
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rather follows advice of Ministers.79 Therefore Ministers bear the responsibility 
for the decisions that they make. Ministers are responsible to Parliament and 
can only hold their position with the confidence of the people, reflected by 
the House of Representatives in Parliament.80 The requirement of confidence 
from the House of Representatives is based on the principle that the House of 
Representatives is the people’s house, and represents the interests of the people, 
while the Senate is the State’s house. As Sir John Quick and Sir Robert Garran 
said: ‘The Senate represents the States as political units. The House represents the 
people as individual units.’81 Therefore, the principle of responsible government 
has a democratic element and is linked with the concept of representative 
democracy as it provides that the executive government is accountable, through 
the mechanisms of Parliament, to the people who elected the executive.
In terms of ministerial advisers, I argue that because their salary is appropriated 
from public funds82 and as they may increasingly be exercising executive power, 
the principles of responsible government apply to them. Hence, ministerial 
advisers should be accountable to Parliament by being required to appear 
before parliamentary committees, such as those established for the ‘Children 
Overboard’ incident. 
At the Commonwealth level, parliamentary privileges and immunities are 
governed by the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth). This Act preserves 
the operation of section 49 of the Constitution, that Commonwealth Members of 
Parliament have the powers, privileges and immunities of the United Kingdom 
House of Commons existing on 1 January 1901.83 According to Lange, section 49 
of the Constitution provides the source of coercive authority for each House of 
Parliament to ‘summon witnesses, or to require the production of documents, 
under pain of punishment for contempt’.84 Therefore, at the Commonwealth 
level, the Senate has the power to compel the production of persons and 
documents. This includes the power to compel ministerial advisers to attend, to 
give evidence and produce documents to a Senate Committee. 
79 Samuel Griffith, ‘Notes on Australian Federation: Its Nature and Probable Effects’ (paper presented to the 
Government of Queensland, 1896) 17–8, http://adc.library.usyd.edu.au/data-2/fed0017.pdf.
80 ibid.
81 John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth 
(Angus & Robertson, 1901) 447.
82 There has been a yearly appropriation of ministerial adviser salaries in Parliament since 1980 as part of 
the ‘ordinary services of government’. See for example Appropriation Act (No 1) 1980–81 (Cth), Appropriation 
Act (No 1) 2012–13 (Cth) Schedule 1, Department of Finance and Administration, Outcome 3.
83 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 5.
84 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557–9. See also Parliament of Australia, Orders for Production of Documents 
(2005), http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/guides/briefno11.
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Traditionally ministerial advisers are seen to be accountable to their Minister 
personally, while Ministers are accountable to Parliament.85 It has been argued 
that ministerial advisers are thus not required to appear before parliamentary 
committees. As a result, ministerial advisers have generally tended not to appear 
before parliamentary committees based on the instructions of their Minister. 
However, this argument is weak, as public servants are similarly accountable 
to their Minister, who is then linked by the chain of accountability to 
Parliament. Unlike ministerial advisers, public servants routinely appear before 
parliamentary committees. Their presence is to give an account of their actions 
to Parliament, while responsibility for their actions fall on their Minister, who 
may be censured in Parliament.86 The appearance of ministerial advisers before 
parliamentary committees would be to perform a similar function.
In situations such as the ‘Children Overboard’ incident, the fact that ministerial 
advisers did not appear before the parliamentary committees allowed the 
Ministers to escape accountability by claiming they were not advised of the fact 
that no children had been thrown overboard, while ministerial advisers did not 
present their account as they did not appear before Parliament. This creates an 
accountability gap, where Ministers are able to plead ignorance to controversial 
policies and decisions and escape accountability in Parliament. Therefore, in 
accordance with recommendations of a Senate Committee, ministerial advisers 
should appear before parliamentary committees, particularly where a Minister 
has renounced a ministerial adviser’s action, refused to answer questions 
regarding the conduct of a ministerial adviser, critical information has been 
received from a Minister’s office but is not communicated to a Minister, or critical 
instructions have emanated from a Minister’s office and not the Minister.87 
There is no strong rationale why ministerial advisers do not appear before 
parliamentary committees. The best way for this to happen is with the agreement 
between Parliament and the government for ministerial advisers to appear based 
on negotiated guidelines. This has previously been done for public servants.88 
Otherwise, there will be a perpetual battle of wills between Parliament, with 
their strong powers, and government, with their fondness for political escapism. 
85 H Collins, ‘What Shall We Do With the Westminster Model?’ in R Smith and P Weller (eds), Public Service 
Inquiries in Australia (University of Queensland Press, 1978) 366.
86 Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, ‘Staff Employed Under the Members of 
Parliament (Staff) Act 1984’ (2003) xii.
87 ibid.
88 See Government Guidelines for Official Witnesses before Parliamentary Committees and Related Matters, 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/guidelines/.
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Accountability to the courts
Another potential accountability mechanism is if courts are able to judicially 
review the executive actions of ministerial advisers. To this end, it can be argued 
that ministerial advisers are ‘officers of the Commonwealth’ under section 75(v) 
of the Constitution. Section 75(v) is said to entrench a minimum provision of 
judicial review.89 This means that Parliament is unable to remove the jurisdiction 
of the High Court ‘by any form of words or any device’.90
It is clear that Ministers,91 public servants92 and Minister’s delegates93 are 
‘officers of the Commonwealth’. However, this issue has not been determined 
for ministerial advisers. 
According to case law, an ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ has to have an office 
of some conceivable tenure, be directly appointed by the Commonwealth, 
accept office and salary from the Commonwealth, and be removable by the 
Commonwealth.94 In R v Murray and Cormie; Ex parte Commonwealth, Isaacs 
J stated:
The expression ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ has not a fictional 
meaning. It has a real meaning that the person referred to is individually 
appointed by the Commonwealth; and therefore the Constitution takes 
his Commonwealth official position as in itself a sufficient element to 
attract the original jurisdiction of the High Court.95
In Williams, the fact that Commonwealth funding was used to employ school 
chaplains was not considered enough for the school chaplains to hold an office 
under the Commonwealth under section 116 of the Constitution.96 
Gummow and Bell JJ, with French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ agreeing, held 
that the school chaplains were not ‘offices … under the Commonwealth’ under 
section 116 of the Constitution.97 For these judges, the presence of a contractual 
89 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and 
Hayne JJ).
90 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (1914) 18 
CLR 54, 59.
91 Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 65.
92 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (1914) 18 
CLR 54, 66, 86, Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 66. Queensland Medical Laboratory 
v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 
545, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Epeabaka (2001) 106 CLR 128, 135, Re 
Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 291, 498.
93 Carter v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 383, 393.
94 R v Murray and Cormie; Ex parte Commonwealth (1916) 22 CLR 437, 452–3, R v Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation & Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (1914) 18 CLR 54.
95 R v Murray and Cormie; Ex parte Commonwealth (1916) 22 CLR 437, 452–3.
96 Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23 [109]. See also Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2002] FCAFC 166.
97 ibid (French CJ) [107]–[110] (Gummow and Bell JJ), [476] (Crennan J), [597] Kiefel J.
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relationship with the Commonwealth was material.98 For them, the term 
‘under’ indicates a requirement for a closer connection to the Commonwealth 
than merely being engaged by a private body that receives funding from the 
Commonwealth.99 This can also be said of the term ‘officer of the Commonwealth’.
Heydon J also preferred a narrow reading of ‘an office under the Commonwealth’ 
to prevent radical expansion of the opportunities for litigation under 
section 75(v). He suggested that an ‘officer’ has to have a direct relationship 
with the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth may specify qualifications 
before particular appointments may be made or continued.100 Heydon J held 
that chaplains did not have an office under the Commonwealth due to the lack 
of legal relationship between the chaplains and the Commonwealth, which 
resulted in the inability of the Commonwealth to appoint, control and dismiss 
the chaplains.101
This suggests that a level of control by the Commonwealth is required to satisfy 
the criteria of ‘officer of the Commonwealth’. Thus, Williams may indicate 
that there is a spectrum. On one end are Ministers and public servants with 
a close relationship to the Commonwealth and who are fully controlled by the 
Commonwealth-entities that are clearly covered by section 75(v). On the other 
end of the spectrum are persons or entities without a direct relationship with 
the Commonwealth, that are unable to be controlled by the Commonwealth, 
and who are not covered by section 75(v). The question is where the line is 
drawn for entities that fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, such as 
ministerial advisers.
Ministerial advisers are appointed by Ministers and are engaged under section 13 
of the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth) (‘MOPS Act’).102 Ministerial 
advisers are removable by Ministers. Under section 16(3) of the MOPS Act, a 
Minister may at any time terminate the employment of ministerial advisers.103 
Ministers have full control of the terms and conditions of employment of 
ministerial advisers. Under the MOPS Act, the terms of conditions of employment 
of ministerial advisers are subject to the determination of the employing 
Minister,104 with the Prime Minister being able to vary employment terms and 





102 MOPS Act s 13.
103 ibid s 16 (3). The Prime Minister may override the determination of Ministers to terminate ministerial 
advisers. MOPS Act s 16(5).
104 ibid s 14(1).
105 ibid s 14(3).
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to exercise some powers under the Act.106 Further, the salaries of ministerial 
advisers are appropriated from public funds. Although the Prime Minister is 
able to override the decision of the Minister for their ministerial advisers, the 
Prime Minister is part of the Commonwealth and this employment structure still 
demonstrates complete control by the Commonwealth over ministerial advisers.
Ministerial advisers thus fulfil the criteria in case law as they are appointed and 
removable by Ministers and their salaries are appropriated from public money. 
They are appointed as individuals and not corporations. Ministers and the 
Prime Minister have full control of the terms and conditions of employment of 
ministerial advisers. Hence the relationship between Ministers and ministerial 
advisers demonstrates complete control of the Ministers over their advisers such 
that ministerial advisers would constitute ‘officers of the Commonwealth’. 
In addition, the main purpose of section 75(v) is to ensure judicial supervision 
over the exercise of executive and statutory power.107 This is done by ensuring 
that actions of officers of the Commonwealth are lawful. Griffith CJ has indicated 
that where the meaning of the words of section 75 is ambiguous, ‘the ambiguity 
should be resolved in favour of the power’.108 Barton J also suggested that the 
context gives section 75(v) ‘a very extensive meaning’.109 Barwick CJ said that 
the High Court should itself be ‘jealous to preserve and maintain the scope of 
the power’.110
Therefore, there is a strong argument that ministerial advisers are ‘officers of 
the Commonwealth’. As such, they are subject to judicial review through the 
original jurisdiction of the High Court when they exercise executive power. 
Thus, the remedies of injunction, prohibition and mandamus are available 
against ministerial advisers. 
Conclusion
Ministerial advisers occupy an uncertain position in the operation of the 
executive arm of government as they are employed by Ministers personally and 
report directly to Ministers. It is unclear if their accountabilities extend beyond 
accountability to Ministers as part of a normal employment contract. 
106 Enterprise Agreement 2012-2015, http://maps.finance.gov.au/enterprise_agreement/index.html.
107 Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Thomson 
Reuters, 4th ed, 2009) 40.
108 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; ex parte Whybrow & Co (1910) 11 CLR 1, 22.
109 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (1914) 18 
CLR 54, 66.
110 R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; ex parte the Western Australian National Football League 
(Incorporated) (1979) 143 CLR 190, 201.
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The traditional actors within the executive of the Queen, Governor-General, 
Ministers and public servants are no longer the only actors who engage in public 
functions. The scope of governmental activity has increased over the years. Some 
traditional functions of government have been outsourced to private entities. 
Governing has become more complex and demanding following the 24/7 news 
cycle such that Ministers are unable to cope with the workload themselves and 
employ ministerial advisers to assist them. Ministerial advisers clearly perform 
public functions affecting the governing of the nation. Nevertheless, they are 
external to the public service, with a separate employment framework.111 
The idea of partisan advisers for Ministers was denigrated by the framers of the 
Constitution as being corrupt and undesirable.112 The ideal of the impartial public 
service continues to this day in spirit, as seen in the statement of Australian 
Public Service Values.113 However, the reality may not completely reflect this, 
given that the senior public servants of departments are now on fixed-term 
contracts and can be removed easily by the Ministers if they fall out of favour.114 
This means that public servants are less likely to be ‘frank and fearless’ and 
impartial in their advice than if their positions were permanent. Further, 
ministerial advisers have slowly and steadily grown as an institutionalised 
source of advice — a phenomenon that would have been considered very 
undesirable at federation. There has been a distinct shift in attitude towards 
partisan ministerial advisers being a formalised part of government, with their 
position officially recognised through statute.115 
The issue of accountability is challenging for ministerial advisers. Although 
their salary is appropriated from public funds and they are close to the political 
and policy workings of the government and Parliament, they do not officially 
sit in the Houses of Parliament. This means that they are not directly subject 
to political accountability through Parliament. Further, ministerial advisers are 
not located within departments and statutory authorities, suggesting they are 
outside the traditional administrative law framework. 
Although ministerial advisers are personally employed by Ministers in their 
private offices, they perform many public functions, including advising on public 
policy, media, political, parliamentary management and party management 
matters.116 Increasingly, ministerial advisers also exercise executive power.
111 Public servants are appointed under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth), while ministerial advisers are 
appointed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth).
112 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 19 April 1897, 916–7.
113 Australian Public Service Values, http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/aps-
values-and-code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct/aps-values.
114 Barratt v Howard (2000) 96 FCR 428, 451–452; Patrick Weller, Australia’s Mandarins: The Frank and the 
Fearless? (Allen & Unwin, 2001) 33.
115 MOPS Act.
116 The Herald and Weekly Times Pty Limited v The Office of the Premier (General) [2012] VCAT 967 [22].
5 . Ministerial Advisers
83
Given that ministerial advisers have become an integral part of the executive 
and may exercise executive power in some instances, I argue that ministerial 
advisers should be subject to appropriate public law accountability mechanisms. 
For instance, ministerial advisers should be accountable to Parliament through 
being made to appear before parliamentary committees. There can also be 
accountability through courts, utilising the mechanism of judicial review for the 
executive decisions of ministerial advisers. Other actors within the executive, 
such as Ministers and public servants, are subject to a plethora of accountability 
mechanisms, such as through Parliament, the courts and administrative law 
mechanisms, such as tribunals, ombudsmen, the Auditor-General and freedom 
of information legislation. However, current public law mechanisms have not 
yet been applied to ministerial advisers due to their relatively new status as 
independent and significant actors within the contemporary executive.
In conclusion, ministerial advisers are significant new institutional actors in 
the executive. Due to their increasing roles within the executive, I argue that 
ministerial advisers should be subject to public law accountability mechanisms. 
As ministerial advisers are now part of the operation of the executive, so too 
should their accountabilities increase.
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6. Applied Law Schemes and 




An ‘applied law scheme’ is a type of cooperative legislative scheme in which one 
jurisdiction enacts a model law which is then ‘picked up’ or ‘applied’ by another 
jurisdiction or group of jurisdictions. In the 1990s, applied law schemes were the 
‘next big thing’ in Australian federalism; a way of achieving that hallowed goal, 
uniformity of regulation across the nation, in circumstances where there was no 
political will, or constitutional power, for the enactment of a Commonwealth 
law. But then, in R v Hughes,1 the High Court raised serious questions about 
the constitutional validity of the most significant applied law scheme, the 
Corporations Law scheme, and it seemed as though applied law schemes were, 
if not consigned to the dustbin of history, then at least of considerably less 
utility than we had thought. If regulatory uniformity was to be achieved, we 
were going to have to opt for a cooperative legislative scheme that was either 
significantly ‘tighter’ or significantly ‘looser’ than an applied law scheme.
At the ‘tighter’ end of the spectrum are what we call ‘reference schemes’, where 
the States refer a ‘matter’ to the Commonwealth Parliament under s 51(xxxvii) 
of the Constitution, and the Parliament then enacts a law with respect to that 
matter. This, of course, is how we ended up with the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), which superseded the Corporations Law scheme; and there have been 
other references of matters in the past decade, in areas such as personal property 
securities, consumer credit, business names, de facto financial matters and 
terrorism. However, it hardly need be said that reference schemes are treated 
with caution by the States, for the simple reason that they achieve regulatory 
uniformity by the transferral of legislative power to the centre. They are thus 
not a means of achieving regulatory uniformity except in those relatively rare 
cases where the need for uniformity, or the speed with which it must be attained, 
is (perceived to be) especially great.2
1 (2000) 202 CLR 535 (‘Hughes’).
2 See, on this point, G Williams, ‘Cooperative Federalism and the Revival of the Corporations Law: Wakim 
and Beyond’ (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 160, 168.
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At the ‘looser’ end of the spectrum are what we call ‘mirror law schemes’, 
which involve the Commonwealth and the States and Territories (or simply the 
States and Territories) enacting legislation in relation to an area in the same, or 
substantially the same, terms. Examples of the mirror law schemes include the 
uniform defamation Acts, the uniform evidence Acts, the succession or wills Acts 
and the new work health and safety Acts. However, while mirror law schemes 
(generally) do not raise the same constitutional issues which, after Hughes, were 
thought to beset applied law schemes, nor present the same challenge to State 
‘independence’ or ‘autonomy’ as presented by reference schemes, they also 
(generally) fail to achieve the kind of regulatory uniformity to which our policy 
makers aspire. As Chief Justice Robert French has put it, mirror law schemes 
create not ‘one law covering the whole country’, but ‘a mosaic of similar laws’.3
However, despite the dismay that greeted the collapse of the Corporations Law 
scheme — despite the sense in many quarters that reference schemes or mirror 
law schemes were the way things were going to have to be — applied law schemes 
never really went away. While the Commonwealth and the States scrambled 
to organise the State references upon which the Corporations Act is based, the 
applied law schemes regulating less high profile areas — like agricultural and 
veterinary chemicals, electricity and therapeutic goods and poisons — hummed 
along quietly in the background.
Moreover, in the past five years or so, applied law schemes have proliferated 
faster than any other type of cooperative legislative scheme. Indeed, it would 
not be too much of an exaggeration to say that they have become the default 
way that the Commonwealth and the States and Territories seek to achieve 
regulatory uniformity.
Some of the new applied law schemes involve legislation enacted by the 
Commonwealth and the States and Territories. These include, for example, the 
applied law schemes regulating:
• consumer protection;
• gas;
• energy retail; and
• commercial shipping.
Others, however, involve legislation enacted only by the States and Territories 
(although the Commonwealth has often been a party to the intergovernmental 
agreement underpinning the scheme, and has played an important role in 
funding). Examples of these schemes include those for the regulation of:
3 See Justice R S French, ‘Horizontal Arrangements: Competition Law and Cooperative Federalism’ (2008) 15 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 255, 261, referring to the Uniform Companies Scheme, which operated 
in Australia between 1961 and 1981.
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• health practitioners;





The schemes just mentioned are only those that are already operational, or at 
a relatively advanced stage of development. But there are others in the works, 
not least of which is the proposed applied law scheme for the regulation of the 
legal profession.
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it will offer a primer on just what 
an applied law scheme is and the way in which one works. Secondly, it will 
explore some of the challenges posed by applied law schemes to the system 
of responsible government established by, and underpinning, the Constitution. 
In other words, it asks the question: does the use of an applied law scheme to 
achieve regulatory uniformity result in us all paying too high an accountability 
price?
What is an applied law scheme?
The starting point: An intergovernmental agreement
The starting point for most applied law schemes, particularly in recent times, 
has been an intergovernmental agreement in which the various interested 
jurisdictions — either the Commonwealth and the States and Territories, or just 
the States and Territories — agree that a particular area requires regulatory 
uniformity. The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has often been 
the forum at which these agreements are made, but this is not necessarily the 
case. The Standing Council on Law and Justice (SCLJ) (formerly the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG)) has also been responsible for the 
implementation of several high profile cooperative legislative schemes (although 
it has tended to favour mirror law schemes — such as the uniform defamation 
Acts and the uniform evidence Acts — rather than applied law schemes).
An intergovernmental agreement may, of course, deal with any matter to which 
the parties turn their minds. However, in the ordinary course of things, it will 
deal with the following issues:
• the general content of the scheme (that is, the matters that it will regulate 
and the manner in which it will do so);
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• governance of the scheme (including, in many cases, the establishment of a 
Ministerial Council constituting the responsible Ministers of the relevant 
jurisdictions);
• division of costs between the jurisdictions (both during the transition phase 
and subsequently);
• timelines for the establishment of the scheme;
• reporting and accountability; 
• dispute resolution; and
• withdrawal from the scheme.
Once an intergovernmental agreement has been made, it will then be up to the 
bureaucracies of the Commonwealth and States and Territories — policy officers, 
government lawyers and drafters — to make the necessary arrangements for the 
implementation of the applied law scheme.
Basic operation of an applied law scheme
Put simply, an applied law scheme works as follows:
• one jurisdiction (usually called the ‘host jurisdiction’) enacts a model law in 
its jurisdiction (usually as a Schedule to an Act of Parliament and, in recent 
times, usually called a ‘National Law’); and then
• each other jurisdiction (usually called a ‘participating jurisdiction’) enacts an 
Act (an ‘application Act’) which applies the National Law in its jurisdiction 
(and, more particularly, in the ‘gap’ in the ‘reach’ or ‘coverage’ achieved by 
the exercise of legislative power of the host jurisdiction).
When the Commonwealth is the host jurisdiction (which is not always the 
case), it will obviously be limited to making a law which is supported by a 
head of legislative power.4 So, for example, the Commonwealth could rely on 
the Territories power in s 122 of the Constitution to make a law applying only 
in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The States and the Northern Territory 
(NT) could then apply the law in the ‘gap’ left by the Commonwealth’s exercise 
of legislative power — that is, outside the ACT — thus ensuring a nationwide 
regulatory scheme. This was how the old Corporations Law scheme worked. 
And it remains the way in which agricultural and veterinary chemicals are 
regulated.5
4 The Commonwealth Parliament may, of course, make laws only with respect to certain, discrete subject 
matters, such as interstate and overseas trade and commerce (s 51(i) of the Constitution), taxation (s 51(ii)), 
foreign, trading and financial corporations (constitutional corporations) (s  51(xx)) and external affairs 
(s 51(xxix)). These subject matters of legislative power are often called ‘heads of power’.
5 See, in particular, the Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Code Act 1994 (Cth), to which the Agricultural 
and Veterinary Chemicals (Agvet) Code is a Schedule.
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When the Commonwealth is the host jurisdiction, it does not necessarily rely 
on the Territories power. In fact, it is Commonwealth policy to treat the self-
governing Territories essentially as if they were States. So, the Commonwealth 
might rely on its power to legislate with respect to constitutional corporations 
and interstate and overseas trade and commerce, and then seek the agreement 
of the States and Territories to apply the Commonwealth law in the ‘gap’ left by 
the law; that is, to non-constitutional corporations (such as natural persons and 
unincorporated associations) engaged in intrastate (or intraterritory) trade and 
commerce. This is essentially the approach used in relation to the regulation of 
therapeutic goods and poisons.6 It is also the approach used in the context of 
one of the most significant applied law schemes — the Australian Consumer 
Law — which substantially superseded the Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth) and 
the State and Territory fair trading Acts in 2010.7
Another, more recent, example involves the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial 
Vessel) National Law Act 2012 (Cth), which is part of a package of Acts enacted 
by the Commonwealth in 2012 to ensure the registration and safe operation of 
all commercial vessels. The Commonwealth Act applies essentially to vessels 
engaged in interstate trade and commerce, vessels owned by constitutional 
corporations, vessels covered by the implementation of international agreements, 
vessels that are external to Australia and vessels owned by the Commonwealth. 
It is proposed that the States and the NT will apply the National Law in the 
relatively small ‘gap’ left by the Commonwealth Act (essentially, in the waters 
within the limits of the States or the NT).
As already mentioned, the Commonwealth is not always the host jurisdiction. 
Sometimes it is simply a participating jurisdiction, as in the case of the three 
applied law schemes regulating the energy sector. Each of these applied law 
schemes features South Australia (SA) as the host jurisdiction.8
In other cases, the Commonwealth enacts no legislation at all. A number of 
recent applied law schemes involve one State as host jurisdiction and each 
other State and the Territories applying the law of the host jurisdiction in their 
jurisdictions. In this case, the ‘gap’ which is being ‘filled’ by the laws of the 
participating jurisdictions is not a result of the fact that the host jurisdiction is 
empowered to legislate only with respect to particular subject matters. After all, 
unlike the Commonwealth, the States (and the Territories) are able to legislate 
6 See, in particular, the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth).
7 See, in particular, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), to which the Australian Consumer Law 
is a Schedule.
8 See, in particular, the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996 (SA), to which the National Electricity 
Law is a Schedule; the National Gas (South Australia) Act 2008 (SA), to which the National Gas Law is a 
Schedule; and the National Energy Retail Law (South Australia) Act 2011 (SA), to which the National Energy 
Retail Law is a Schedule.
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with respect to essentially any subject matter.9 Rather, the ‘gap’ is a result of the 
fact that the host jurisdiction’s power to legislate extraterritorially (that is, with 
respect to persons, acts, omissions, events, matters, things, etc outside the host 
jurisdiction) is limited.10 The applied law schemes for the regulation of early 
childhood education and care,11 health practitioners,12 occupational licensing,13 
railway safety,14 co-operatives15 and heavy vehicles16 are purely State- and 
Territory-based applied law schemes. The still-stalled applied law scheme for 
the regulation of the legal profession is also in this category.
Applied law schemes and responsible 
government: Some issues
Introduction: The concept of responsible government
With the above overview of applied law schemes in mind, it is necessary now 
to return to the core question: do applied law schemes undermine responsible 
government? This is obviously a rather large question. So, the ensuing discussion 
seeks to address it by focusing on only four issues:
• First, ‘application methods’; that is, the various ways in which a participating 
jurisdiction might apply a National Law in its jurisdiction.
9 A caveat to this is that s  52 of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth Parliament exclusive power 
with respect to a limited range of subjects. See also s 90 in relation to duties of custom and excise. Further, 
while the States may legislate with respect to a very wide variety of subject matters, State legislation which 
is inconsistent with Commonwealth legislation will, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid: see 
s 109. Territory legislation is also apt to be invalidated by Commonwealth legislation (in circumstances of 
‘repugnancy’).
10 The States and Territories are able to enact laws with extraterritorial effect. However, there must be a 
‘sufficient connection’ between the enacting State or Territory and the extraterritorial persons, acts, omissions, 
events, matters, things, etc in relation to which the State or Territory law operates. This requirement flows 
from the State Constitutions and the self-government Acts of the Territories, which relevantly mandate that 
State or Territory laws must be for the ‘peace, order and good government’ of the State or Territory concerned. 
See generally Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507, 517–8; Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King 
(1988) 166 CLR 1, 14; and Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen’s Association Inc v South Australia (1989) 
CLR 340, 372.
11 Victoria is the host jurisdiction for this scheme. See, in particular, the Education and Care Services 
National Law Act 2010 (Vic), to which the Education and Care Services National Law is a Schedule.
12 Queensland is the host jurisdiction for this scheme. See, in particular, the Health Practitioner Regulation 
National Law Act 2009 (Qld), to which the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law is a Schedule.
13 Victoria is again the host jurisdiction for this scheme. See, in particular, the Occupational Licensing 
National Law Act 2010 (Vic), to which the Occupational Licensing National Law is a Schedule.
14 SA is the host jurisdiction for this scheme. See, in particular, the Rail Safety National Law (South 
Australia) Act 2012 (SA), to which the Rail Safety National Law is a Schedule.
15 New South Wales (NSW) is the host jurisdiction for this scheme. See, in particular, the Co-operatives 
(Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 (NSW), to which the Co-operatives National Law is a Schedule.
16 Queensland is again the host jurisdiction for this scheme. See, in particular, the Heavy Vehicle National 
Law Act 2012 (Qld), to which the Heavy Vehicle National Law is a Schedule.
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• Secondly, the interpretation of a National Law.
• Thirdly, the establishment of a so-called ‘single national regulator’ to 
administer and enforce a National Law.
• Finally, the treatment of a participating jurisdiction’s suite of administrative 
laws upon the enactment of a National Law
Before turning to those issues, however, it is necessary to offer a working 
definition of ‘responsible government’. The concept is, of course, a famously 
slippery one. However, in the recent case of Williams v Commonwealth, Kiefel J 
distilled its essence neatly:
The relationship [responsible government] establishes between the 
Parliament and the Executive may be described as one where the former 
is superior to the latter.17
In other words, according to Kiefel J, responsible government is fundamentally 
about parliamentary supremacy.
Professor Cheryl Saunders has seconded Kiefel J’s emphasis on parliamentary 
supremacy. However, she has also identified additional features. According to 
Saunders, responsible government assumes
that governments are responsible to parliaments and, through 
parliaments, to voters; [that] the parliament makes or authorises the 
making of rules that create or change law; that most of the information 
necessary for the voters to make their electoral judgment is in the public 
domain; and that courts review the legality of the exercise of public 
power within a system of somewhat delicate checks, balances and 
conventional practices.18
In Saunders’ view, then, responsible government involves more than just 
parliamentary supremacy. It also involves members of the public knowing what 
they need to know and, when aggrieved by a decision, having reasonable access 
to avenues of review.19
17 (2012) 248 CLR 156, [579].
18 See C Saunders, ‘Collaborative Federalism’ (2002) 61 Australian Journal of Public Administration 69, 73. 
See also C Saunders, ‘A New Direction for Intergovernmental Arrangements’ (2001) 12 Public Law Review 274, 
276, where Saunders writes: ‘Stripped to its bare essentials, parliamentary responsible government is a system 
in which Parliaments are directly elected by voters and governments hold office with the support of a majority 
in the most popular House. Between elections, the Parliament holds the government and administration 
accountable. Its ability to do so is reinforced by the requirements of parliamentary approval for taxing and 
spending. New and altered laws require the approval of Parliament. Regularly, every three or four years, 
voters have the opportunity to change the government by changing the parliamentary majority. To this end, 
voters need the capacity to evaluate the government’s record.’
19 Saunders speaks of judicial review, but arguably, in the context of the modern regulatory state, 
administrative (merits) review is also an aspect of responsible government. Other avenues of review — 
such as the making of freedom of information (FOI) requests, the making of applications for review by the 
Ombudsman, and so forth — may also be thought to be included.
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With these definitions in mind, it is necessary now to turn to the first issue 
mentioned above: application methods.
Application methods
As discussed above, under an applied law scheme:
• the host jurisdiction enacts a National Law; and
• each participating jurisdiction enacts an application Act which applies the 
National Law.
It is important to understand, however, that this description disguises 
considerable complexity, because participating jurisdictions may ‘apply’ a 
National Law in one of a number of ways.
In what may be described as a ‘true’ applied law scheme, a participating 
jurisdiction applies the National Law as in force in the host jurisdiction 
from time to time. An example of this approach may be seen in the Health 
Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (Vic), which applies, 
as a law of Victoria, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law enacted 
by Queensland. Section 4, which is the critical provision, provides as follows:
4 Application of Health Practitioner Regulation National Law
The Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, as in force from time 
to time, set out in the Schedule to the Health Practitioner Regulation 
National Law Act 2009 of Queensland 
(a) applies as a law of Victoria; and
(b) as so applying may be referred to as the Health Practitioner Regulation 
National Law (Victoria); and
(c) so applies as if it were part of this Act.
When a participating jurisdiction applies a National Law as in force in the 
host jurisdiction from time to time, this means that, each time the host 
jurisdiction amends the National Law, the amendments apply automatically 
in the participating jurisdiction. There is no need for the Parliament of the 
participating jurisdiction itself to enact an amending Act. Nor is there any 
need for the amendments to be tabled or laid before the Parliament of the 
participating jurisdiction. In fact, parliamentarians in the participating 
jurisdiction may not even be aware that the National Law, as it applies in that 
jurisdiction, has changed.
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This feature of applied law schemes — which ensures the easy maintenance of 
regulatory uniformity — is probably their foremost advantage. It is also what 
really distinguishes them from mirror law schemes. In a mirror law scheme, 
participating jurisdictions might agree to amend their legislation simultaneously. 
But often they do not. Governments change. The priority accorded to the 
particular amendments varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. And, before 
you know it, the legislation in, say, Queensland may be quite different to the 
legislation in SA.20 However, this feature is also a controversial one, largely 
because it is seen as having the potential both to erode each participating 
jurisdiction’s ‘independence’ or ‘autonomy’ (its ‘sovereignty’, if you will), and 
to undermine the role, and more importantly the supremacy, of its Parliament. 
As a result of these concerns, some jurisdictions have adopted alternative 
methods of applying a National Law.
The first alternative method is as follows:
• the participating jurisdiction enacts an application Act which applies a 
National Law as in force in the host jurisdiction from time to time; but
• the participating jurisdiction also includes in its application Act a provision 
requiring any amendments made to the National Law by the host jurisdiction 
to be tabled in the Parliament of the participating jurisdiction.
An example of this method may be seen in the Education and Care Services 
National Law (Application) Act 2011 (Tas), which applies, as a law of Tasmania, 
the Education and Care Services National Law as in force in Victoria from time 
to time, but which also provides:
16 Tabling of amendments to Education and Care Services National Law 
(Tasmania) 
(1) The Minister is to cause any amendment to the Education and Care 
Services National Law (Tasmania) to be tabled in each House of Parliament 
within 10 sitting-days from the date on which the amendment receives 
the Royal Assent in Victoria. 
(2) Nothing in this section affects the operation of that amendment.
It is important to note, however, that while amendments to the National Law 
must be tabled in the Parliament, the Parliament is given no express power to 
amend the amendments, or to ‘disapply’ them altogether. (The process may 
thus be contrasted to the process, familiar in most jurisdictions, by which 
subordinate legislation is laid before the Parliament and may be disallowed by 
20 See generally Justice R S French, ‘Cooperative Federalism: A Constitutional Reality or a Political Slogan’ 
(paper presented at the ‘Western Australia 2029: A Shared Journey’ conference, Perth, 2004) 15.
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either House.21) As a result, the amendments still come into effect automatically. 
However, this strategy does ensure that parliamentarians in the participating 
jurisdiction are aware of the ongoing evolution of the National Law as applied 
in that jurisdiction.
The second alternative method is similar to the first, in that the participating 
jurisdiction enacts an application Act which applies the National Law as in force 
in the host jurisdiction from time to time. However, the application Act then 
provides that any amendments made to the National Law by the host jurisdiction 
may be disapplied or proclaimed to have no effect. An example of this method 
may be seen in the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), which applies, as a law of 
NSW, the Australian Consumer Law as in force in the Commonwealth from time 
to time, but which also provides:
29 Future modifications of Australian Consumer Law text
(1) A modification made by a Commonwealth law to the Australian 
Consumer Law text after the commencement of this section does not 
apply under section 28 [which is the section that applies the Australian 
Consumer Law in NSW] if the modification is declared by a proclamation 
to be excluded from the operation of that section.
It is worth noting, however, that this method invariably involves disapplication 
by the executive — usually by the Governor acting on the advice of the Minister 
or the Executive Council — rather than by the Parliament. So, while this method 
might go some way to ensuring the maintenance of a participating jurisdiction’s 
sovereignty, it does not necessarily answer the concern of those worried about 
the relative power of the executive vis-à-vis the Parliament.
The third alternative method is quite different from the first two. It involves a 
participating jurisdiction enacting an application Act that applies the National 
Law as in force in the host jurisdiction at a particular time — usually the time 
that the participating jurisdiction’s application Act commences — rather than 
from time to time.22 This means, of course, that when the host jurisdiction 
amends the National Law, the amendments do not apply automatically in the 
participating jurisdiction. However, to ensure that regulatory uniformity is 
easily maintained, the application Act of the participating jurisdiction goes 
21 See, for example, the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) pt 5.
22 In circumstances where a participating jurisdiction applies the National Law as in force in the host 
jurisdiction at a particular time, one may question whether the participating jurisdiction has ‘applied’ the 
National Law in any real sense. Arguably, what it has done is enact an Act which mirrors the National Law. 
As between the host jurisdiction and the participating jurisdiction, the resulting scheme is then best thought 
of as a mirror law scheme, rather than an applied law scheme. On this issue, the views of Roger Jacobs, a 
drafter at the Parliamentary Counsel’s Office of Western Australia, would seem to be correct. See R Jacobs, 
‘National Applied Laws Schemes: A WA Perspective’ (paper presented at the Australasian Drafting Conference, 
Adelaide, 2011) 26.
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on to provide that, when the host jurisdiction amends the National Law, the 
executive of the participating jurisdiction may make regulations which amend 
the National Law as it applies in the participating jurisdiction. In other words, 
the application Act provides for ‘executive amendment’ or ‘updating’ of the 
National Law. Provisions of this sort are rather evocatively called ‘Henry VIII 
clauses’. An example of such a clause may be seen in the Occupational Licensing 
National Law (South Australia) Act 2011 (SA), which applies, as a law of SA, the 
Occupational Licensing National Law as in force in Victoria at a particular time, 
but which also provides:
5 Amendments to Schedule to maintain national consistency
(1) If –
(a) the Parliament of Victoria enacts an amendment to the Occupational 
Licensing National Law set out in the Schedule to the Occupational 
Licensing National Law Act 2010 of Victoria; and
(b) the Governor is satisfied that an amendment that corresponds, or 
substantially corresponds, to the amendment made by the Parliament 
of Victoria should be made to the Occupational Licensing National Law 
(South Australia), the Governor may, by regulation, amend the South 
Australian Occupational Licensing National Law text.
This method, like the second method, preserves jurisdictional sovereignty 
better than it does parliamentary supremacy.
The fourth alternative method is like the third, in that it involves a participating 
jurisdiction enacting an application Act that applies the National Law as in 
force in the host jurisdiction at a particular time, rather than from time to time. 
However, it differs in that the application Act does not provide for ‘executive 
amendment’ or ‘updating’ of the National Law. Consequently, when the host 
jurisdiction amends the National Law, the only way that the participating 
jurisdiction can ‘keep up’ is if its Parliament amends the National Law as it 
applies in the participating jurisdiction.
The fifth and final alternative method is the least like a ‘true’ application of a 
National Law. It involves a participating jurisdiction enacting an application 
Act that applies the National Law — either from time to time or at a particular 
time, although more typically the latter — and then modifies that National Law 
in some way in and for the participating jurisdiction. When a participating 
jurisdiction adopts this method, the resulting applied law scheme is necessarily 
non-uniform as between the host jurisdiction and the participating jurisdiction. 
An example of this strategy may be seen in the Health Practitioner Regulation 
(Adoption of National Law) Act 2009 (NSW), which applies, as a law of NSW, 
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the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law as in force in Queensland from 
time to time, but which also modifies that National Law. Section 4 of the NSW 
Act, which is the critical provision, provides as follows:
4 Adoption of Health Practitioner Regulation National Law
The Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, as in force from time 
to time, set out in the Schedule to the Health Practitioner Regulation 
National Law Act 2009 of Queensland: 
(a) applies as a law of this jurisdiction, with the modifications set out in 
Schedule 1, and
(b) as so applying may be referred to as the Health Practitioner Regulation 
National Law (NSW), and
(c) so applies as if it were a part of this Act.
Schedule  1 then disapplies the provisions of the National Law which relate 
to the health, performance and conduct of health practitioners, and creates a 
NSW-specific regime to deal with those matters.
The fact that there are a range of ways in which participating jurisdictions 
may ‘apply’ a National Law — with different strategies favoured by different 
jurisdictions — means that applied law schemes will often be extremely 
complicated. This complexity, by itself, might be thought to raise responsible 
government concerns. After all, as discussed above, the concept of responsible 
government connotes both the ready availability of information (for the purpose 
of assisting members of the public to make their electoral judgment, among 
other purposes) and the ready accessibility of avenues of review. Arguably, the 
greater the complexity of the law, the less likely it is that members of the public 
will be able either to understand the information relevant to their judgment or 
(without significant time and cost) to access their review rights.23
Ultimately, however, what is clear from the above discussion of application 
methods is that there is a tension at the heart of any applied law scheme. The 
legal mechanisms necessary to ensure the attainment, and maintenance, of 
regulatory uniformity may be seen as undermining jurisdictional sovereignty 
and Parliamentary supremacy; while the mechanisms necessary to maintain 
jurisdictional sovereignty and Parliamentary supremacy will invariably 
undermine the goal of regulatory uniformity.
23 It is worth noting here that the complexity of the Corporations Law scheme attracted considerable 
negative comment in Hughes. See, for example, 551, 573.
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Interpretation of an applied law scheme
Imagine a situation — one which, it must be said, rarely occurs in practice — 
where all participating jurisdictions apply the National Law as in force in the 
host jurisdiction from time to time, and without making any jurisdiction-specific 
modifications. Imagine also that a single national regulator is created to oversee 
the National Law, thus ensuring uniform administration and enforcement. (The 
creation of a regulator is addressed in further detail below.) Even in such a 
situation, ongoing regulatory uniformity could not be guaranteed. This is 
because the National Law as applied in each participating jurisdiction would 
be interpreted — by lawyers, the regulator and the courts — by reference to 
different interpretation Acts. The Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) in NSW, the 
Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) in Victoria, the Legislation Act 2001 
(ACT) in the ACT, and so forth. Over time, subtle — but potentially significant 
— differences could emerge, even if the text of the National Law remained 
identical nationwide.
Government lawyers and drafters have been alive to this potential problem since 
the days of the first applied law schemes, and have sought to combat it in two 
main ways:
Approach 1: each participating jurisdiction disapplies its interpretation Act 
(insofar as the National Law is concerned) and the National Law itself includes 
rules for the Law’s interpretation. This approach has been adopted in the 
context of the applied law schemes regulating electricity, gas, energy retail, 
early childhood education and care, health practitioners, occupational licensing, 
railway safety and co-operatives, among others.
Approach 2: each participating jurisdiction disapplies its interpretation Act 
(insofar as the National Law is concerned) and instead applies the interpretation 
Act of another jurisdiction. This approach has been adopted in the context of 
the Australian Consumer Law and the Agvet scheme.
Do either of these approaches raise any responsible government concerns? 
Arguably not. After all, each approach involves only the disapplication of a 
‘mere’ interpretation Act, and that interpretation Act is being disapplied only 
insofar as one piece of legislation (the National Law) is concerned. However, if 
one considers the purpose interpretation Acts are intended to serve, the answer 
might be different. An interpretation Act is supposed to be the place — the 
one place, the common law aside — where the people living in a particular 
jurisdiction may look to make sense of the rest of the laws that govern them. 
That is, an interpretation Act plays a critical role in the ‘knowability’ and 
‘accessibility’ of the law. Seen in this light, the problem with its disapplication 
reveals itself. The more applied law schemes a particular jurisdiction participates 
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in, the more times its interpretation Act is disapplied. Over time, a jurisdiction’s 
interpretation Act might go from being an important means of promoting 
community understanding of the law to a key that fits only every third or fourth 
lock.
Besides, even for those disinclined to think that the disapplication of an 
interpretation Act raises any real responsible government concerns, it is worth 
noting that two jurisdictions — Victoria and the ACT — have not just a ‘standard’ 
interpretation Act, but also an Act which requires the jurisdiction’s legislation 
to be interpreted compatibly with human rights.24 These Acts obviously reflect 
a very significant policy choice made by the jurisdictions which have adopted 
them. They are not Acts to be disapplied lightly.
It is true that, at least to date, neither Victoria nor the ACT has expressly 
disapplied its human rights Act. But there is a serious question whether each 
jurisdiction’s human rights Act has any scope to operate in the context of an 
applied law scheme.25 After all, each jurisdiction’s human rights Act requires 
legislation to be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights ‘so 
far as it is possible to do so consistently with its purpose’.26 What is the purpose 
of a National Law as it applies in either Victoria or the ACT? Well, clearly a 
purpose — if not the primary purpose — of a National Law is to achieve a 
uniform nationwide scheme. So will the Victorian and ACT courts consider 
it ‘possible’ to interpret a National Law as it applies in either jurisdiction 
compatibly with human rights, even if such an interpretation might undermine 
the goal of nationwide regulatory uniformity? Or will they think it impossible? 
And, if the latter, could it not be said that the very significant decisions made by 
the legislatures of Victoria and the ACT — in enacting Acts designed to accord 
substantial priority to human rights issues — have been quietly undermined?
The courts do not appear to have wrestled with the issue so far. But this may 
simply reflect the fact that many of the existing applied law schemes entail 
regulation which is basically ‘economic’ in nature; human rights issues are 
thus less apt to arise. As the applied law schemes penetrate into other areas — 
early childhood education and care, for example, or the regulation of health 
practitioners — this situation may well change. It is, if nothing else, an issue to 
watch.
24 See the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Human Rights Charter’) 
and the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (‘ACT Human Rights Act’).
25 See, on this question, Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee, Protocol on Drafting National Uniform 
Legislation (2008) 10. See more broadly cases such as Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold 
Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485, 492, where the High Court stressed the importance of ‘uniformity of decision 
in the interpretation of uniform national legislation’.
26 See the Victorian Human Rights Charter s 32 and the ACT Human Rights Act s 30.
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Creating a single national regulator to administer and 
enforce an applied law scheme
Attaining and maintaining uniformity in the text of a National Law, as applied 
in participating jurisdictions, is obviously critical to ensuring the existence 
of a truly nationwide regulatory scheme. However, it is only one part of the 
equation. Uniformity in administration and enforcement is also vital.27 After 
all, a person’s ‘experience’ of the law is likely to be shaped as much, if not 
more, by how that law is translated into practice by regulators as it is by the 
words on the face of the statute book.28 It is for this reason that it is generally 
seen as desirable for there to be a single national regulator for all participating 
jurisdictions, rather than a separate jurisdiction-specific regulator for each 
participating jurisdiction.
The creation of a single national regulator is legally complicated. However, 
generally speaking, there are two main approaches.
• Approach 1: the provisions establishing the regulator are not set out in the 
National Law, but in a separate Act of one of the participating jurisdictions 
(usually, but not invariably, the host jurisdiction). They are thus not applied 
by all participating jurisdictions. By contrast, the provisions conferring the 
regulator’s functions and powers are set out in the National Law, and are thus 
applied by all participating jurisdictions.
• Approach 2: both the provisions establishing the regulator and the provisions 
conferring its functions and powers are set out in the National Law itself, 
and are thus applied by all participating jurisdictions.
The first approach is the ‘traditional’ approach — in the sense that it was used 
in many of the earlier applied law schemes, including the Corporations Law 
scheme — and remains the approach used in all of the applied law schemes in 
which the Commonwealth is a participating jurisdiction. The second approach 
has become the more common approach in recent years, and is the approach used 
in essentially all of the purely State and Territory-based applied law schemes. As 
will be discussed below, it is also the approach which arguably raises the more 
serious responsible government concerns.
The first approach was subject to detailed consideration in Hughes. As noted 
above, Hughes concerned the Corporations Law scheme, which involved a 
regulator established under a Commonwealth law purporting to perform 
27 C Saunders, ‘A New Direction for Intergovernmental Arrangements’ (2001) 12 Public Law Review 276. 
28 The issue of the interpretation, administration and enforcement of the law by regulators has received 
comparatively greater attention in the United States than in Australia. See, for example, R D Moss, ‘Executive 
Branch Legal Interpretation’ (2000) 52 Administrative Law Review 1303, 1304, where Moss observes that ‘the 
executive branch is perpetually involved in giving the law meaning … In the vast majority of cases, moreover, 
executive branch interpretation is not subjected to judicial review.’
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functions under State laws (namely, the State laws which applied the National 
Law that the Commonwealth had enacted for the ACT). Put simply, the question 
for the High Court was whether the Commonwealth regulator was able to 
perform the functions conferred under the State laws. The resulting decision 
is complex, or, to borrow the words of Saunders again, ‘somewhat unclear’.29 
However, the case appears to stand for a number of propositions:30
• First, while a State may confer a function on a Commonwealth regulator, 
a Commonwealth law must ‘authorise’ or ‘permit’ that conferral; that is, it 
must authorise or permit the Commonwealth regulator to perform the State 
function. This is necessary to ensure that there is no inconsistency for the 
purposes of s 109 of the Constitution between the State conferral and any 
Commonwealth legislation (in particular, the Commonwealth legislation 
establishing the relevant regulator). It may also be necessary to ‘waive’ any 
constitutional immunity that Commonwealth bodies or officers have from 
State laws that purport to apply to them.
• Secondly, and more significantly, it is necessary to consider whether the 
Commonwealth regulator is under a duty to perform the State function:31
• If there is not a duty: it seems that the Commonwealth regulator 
may perform the State function, whether or not there is a connection 
between this function and a head of Commonwealth legislative power.
• If there is a duty: the Commonwealth law authorising or permitting 
the Commonwealth regulator to perform the State function will only 
be valid if there is a connection between the State function and a head 
of Commonwealth legislative power. (This is likely to be especially so 
in circumstances where the performance of the function is ‘coercive’ 
in some way; that is, capable of affecting the rights of individuals.)
Both of these propositions are capable of presenting problems in practice. The 
first proposition, for instance, makes it necessary to consider when, as a matter 
of statutory construction, the Commonwealth has authorised or permitted 
the conferral of State functions on a Commonwealth regulator. An interesting 
29 C Saunders, ‘A New Direction for Intergovernmental Arrangements’ (2001) 12 Public Law Review 274.
30 See, in particular, the helpful analysis in G Hill, ‘R v Hughes and the Future of Cooperative Legislative 
Schemes’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 478, 490–1, upon which this chapter relies. See also D 
Rose and G Lindell, ‘A Constitutional Perspective on Hughes and the Referral of Powers’ (paper presented 
at the Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference, 3 November 2000); D Rose, ‘The Hughes Case: The 
Reasoning, Uncertainties and Solutions’ (2000) 29 University of Western Australia Law Review 180; I Govey 
and H Manson, ‘Measures to Address Wakim and Hughes: How the Reference of Powers Will Work’ (2001) 
12 Public Law Review 1; M J Whincop, ‘The National Scheme for Corporations and the Referral of Powers: A 
Sceptical View’ (2001) 12 Public Law Review 263; B M Selway, ‘Hughes Case and the Referral of Powers’ (2001) 
12 Public Law Review 288; G Hill, ‘Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: The Distinct Demands of Federalism’ (2002) 
13 Public Law Review 205; D Rose, ‘Commonwealth-State Cooperative Schemes After Hughes: What Should be 
Done Now?’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 631; G Williams, ‘Cooperative Federalism and the Revival of the 
Corporations Law: Wakim and Beyond’ (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal.
31 There is some suggestion that this might be a ‘constitutional imperative’. See Hughes 553–4.
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example of this involves s 44AI of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), 
which authorises or permits the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), which 
has important responsibilities under the three applied law schemes regulating 
the energy sector, to perform certain State functions. Section 44AI relevantly 
provides:
44AI Commonwealth consent to conferral of functions etc on AER
(1) A State/Territory energy law may confer functions or powers, or 
impose duties, on the AER for the purposes of that law.
…
(3) The AER cannot perform a duty or function, or exercise a power, 
under a State/Territory energy law unless the conferral of the function 
or power, or the imposition of the duty, is in accordance with the 
Australian Energy Market Agreement, or any other relevant agreement 
between the Commonwealth and the State or Territory concerned.
As a result of s 44AI(3), the question whether the AER is relevantly authorised 
or permitted to perform a State function shifts from being a question of 
interpreting the relevant Commonwealth Act to a question of construing the 
relevant State Act: does it ‘confer functions or powers, or impose duties, on the 
AER’? It then shifts again to become a question of interpreting the Australian 
Energy Market Agreement (AEMA)32 or any other relevant intergovernmental 
agreement. The latter task is not always easy. In large part, this is because the 
AEMA, and the other relevant intergovernmental agreements, are not drafted 
with the precision of legislation or of ordinary contracts. Indeed, they could 
even be said to exhibit a certain ‘wooliness’ of language.33 The upshot is that, in 
individual cases, it can be a complex and time-consuming process to determine 
whether a State conferral is ‘in accordance with’ the AEMA or any other 
relevant intergovernmental agreement, and thus, whether the Commonwealth 
has authorised or permitted the AER to perform the relevant State function.
The second proposition enunciated by the High Court in Hughes — namely, that 
where a Commonwealth regulator is under a duty to perform a State function, 
the Commonwealth law authorising or permitting this will be valid only if 
32 The AEMA is the intergovernmental agreement which underpins the three applied law schemes regulating 
the energy sector.
33 The lack of precision evident in many intergovernmental agreements reflects the fact that, generally 
speaking, they are not intended to create, and do not create, binding legal relations. See N Seddon, Government 
Contracts: Federal, State and Local (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2013) 118–20. See further South Australia v 
Commonwealth (1961) 108 CLR 130, 154.
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there is a connection between the State function and a head of Commonwealth 
legislative power — is also problematic. As Associate Professor Andrew Lynch 
and Professor George Williams explain:
In requiring a legislative source of power to support the Commonwealth’s 
imposition upon its [regulators] of ‘powers coupled with duties …’, 
Hughes substantially curtailed the usefulness of cooperation in many 
instances. If the Commonwealth must have the legislative authority to 
support those powers conferred by the States operating as [duties] upon 
its [regulators], and a suitable power can be found, then, ironically, 
the Commonwealth may already have the means to legislate to this end 
without any need for State cooperation. If, conversely, no Commonwealth 
power can be sourced, then no agreement with the States can make good 
the deficiency.34
The Commonwealth has responded to Hughes by inserting into relevant 
Commonwealth legislation35 clauses (Hughes clauses) which do a number of 
things:
• First, they explain when a State law will purport to impose a duty on a 
Commonwealth regulator.
• Secondly, they provide that, if a State purports to impose a duty on the 
Commonwealth regulator, the duty is taken to be imposed under State law 
to the extent to which this is within the legislative power of the State and 
consistent with relevant constitutional doctrines.
• Thirdly, they provide that, if the duty is not taken to be imposed on the 
Commonwealth regulator under State law (because of an absence of State 
legislative power or the operation of relevant constitutional doctrines), the 
duty is instead taken to be imposed by Commonwealth law (to the extent 
to which this is within the legislative power of the Commonwealth and 
consistent with relevant constitutional doctrines).36
• Fourthly, they provide that, if the imposition of the duty on the 
Commonwealth regulator exceeds both State and Commonwealth legislative 
34 See A Lynch and G Williams, ‘Beyond a Federal Structure: Is a Constitutional Commitment to a Federal 
Relationship Possible?’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 395, 419.
35 See, for one example, the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) ss 6AAA–6AAC.
36 Hughes clauses ordinarily provide that if the relevant duty is taken to be imposed by Commonwealth 
law, then it is the intention of the Parliament ‘to rely on all powers available to it under the Constitution to 
support the imposition of the duty’. One question that arises in this context is: will a court go looking for 
possible heads of power, or do they need to be spelled out in the legislation? See, on this point, M Farnan, 
‘Commonwealth-State Cooperative Schemes: Issues for Drafters’ (paper presented at the Australasian Drafting 
Conference, Sydney, 2005) 15. The conventional view is that, notwithstanding s 15A of the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1901 (Cth) (‘AI Act’), the courts will not go looking for possible heads of power. See generally The King 
v Poole; Ex parte Henry (No 2) (1939) 61 CLR 634, 652; Pidoto v Victoria (1943) 68 CLR 87, 108–10; Bank of 
NSW v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 371; Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468, 493; 
Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 339; Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 501–3.
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power or contravenes relevant constitutional doctrines, the regulator is taken 
to have a discretionary power (to perform the relevant function), rather than 
a duty.
Hughes clauses are designed to preserve the constitutional validity of applied law 
schemes, and to ensure that Commonwealth regulators are at least empowered 
(if not obliged) to administer and enforce them. However, they have not yet 
been tested in the High Court. The question whether the Court would regard 
them as fully coming to terms with the requirements identified in Hughes thus 
remains open.
Hughes issues arise only where the single national regulator is a Commonwealth 
officer or body. However, even where administration occurs at the State and 
Territory level, it is possible that constitutional issues may still arise. There is a 
doctrine of constitutional law — known as the Melbourne Corporation doctrine 
— which prohibits the Commonwealth from enacting laws which, in their 
‘substance and operation’, constitute ‘in a significant manner a curtailment or 
interference with the exercise of State constitutional power’.37 Relevantly, the 
effect of the doctrine would appear to be as follows:
• The Commonwealth may confer discretionary functions and powers on a 
State regulator — that is, it may authorise a State regulator to do something 
— irrespective of whether or not the relevant State consents (assuming, of 
course, that the Commonwealth possesses the power to legislate in the first 
place).
• However, the Commonwealth may not impose obligations or duties on a State 
regulator — that is, it may not require a State regulator to do something — 
in the absence of the relevant State’s consent.
The issue of what would constitute State ‘consent’ for the purposes of the 
Melbourne Corporation doctrine is the subject of some uncertainty. Clearly, a 
State could consent by enacting appropriate legislation. One would ordinarily 
expect this to occur in the context of an applied law scheme (although careful 
attention would need to be paid to drafting issues). Alternatively, it is possible 
that a Commonwealth–State executive agreement (that is, an intergovernmental 
agreement) would suffice. Chief Justice Gleeson explored this issue in O’Donoghue 
v Ireland.38 His Honour considered that, provided there is no State legislative 
impediment to the conferral of the obligation on the relevant State regulator (that 
is, no State legislation which operates, expressly or impliedly, so that the State 
regulator cannot perform the relevant function), there is no apparent reason 
why an executive agreement between the Commonwealth and the State should 
37 See Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185, 245–6. More generally, see Melbourne v Commonwealth 
(1947) 74 CLR 31 (the ‘Melbourne Corporation case’).
38 (2008) 234 CLR 599 (‘O’Donoghue’).
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not be a sufficient manifestation of the State’s consent. The High Court has not 
considered the issue again since O’Donoghue. It is unclear, therefore, whether a 
majority of the Court would be prepared to adopt Gleeson CJ’s approach.
It is perhaps because of the complexities discussed above that attention has 
turned to alternative approaches to establishing, and conferring functions and 
powers on, the regulators of applied law schemes. However the second approach 
mentioned above — under which both the provisions establishing the regulator 
and the provisions conferring its functions and powers are set out in the National 
Law itself, and are thus applied by all participating jurisdictions — raises issues 
of its own (and arguably does nothing to address the issues raised in Hughes).
When the second approach is used, the National Law will include a provision 
along the following lines:39
National Regulator
(1) The National Regulator is established.
(2) The National Regulator—
(a) is a body corporate with perpetual succession; and
(b) has a common seal; and
(c) may sue and be sued in its corporate name.
(3) The National Regulator represents the [jurisdiction/State/Territory].
Based on a plain reading of this provision, it would appear that, each time it 
is applied by a participating jurisdiction — that is, each time a participating 
jurisdiction enacts an application Act which applies the National Law — a 
separate body corporate (having the features described in sub-ss (2) and (3)) is 
created in and for that participating jurisdiction.
However, the National Law will also contain a separate provision as follows:40
Single national entity
(1) It is the intention of the Parliament of this jurisdiction that the 
National Law as applied by an Act of this jurisdiction, together with 
the National Law as applied by Acts of other participating jurisdictions, 
39 See, for example, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 23; the Education and Care Services 
National Law s 224; the Occupational Licensing National Law s 97; the Rail Safety National Law s 12; and the 
Heavy Vehicle National Law, ss 597–8.
40 See, for example, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 7; the Education and Care Services 
National Law s 7; the Occupational Licensing National Law s 6; the Rail Safety National Law s 9; and the Heavy 
Vehicle National Law s 597.
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has the effect that an entity established by the National Law is one single 
national entity, with functions conferred by this Law as so applied 
[emphasis added].
It is not easy to read the first provision together with the second. One possibility 
(seemingly the more legally defensible one) is that, whatever the intention of 
the Parliaments of the participating jurisdictions, the provisions of the National 
Law are simply not effective to create a ‘single national entity’. So, while the 
National Regulator might, as a practical matter, operate as a ‘single national 
entity’, there is, as a legal matter, a separate body corporate, bearing the name of 
the National Regulator, in each participating jurisdiction. The other possibility, 
of course, is that the provisions of the National Law succeed in creating a ‘single 
national entity’, which is clearly their intention.41
However, leaving this issue aside, the real question for present purposes is this: 
to which executive, and thus which Parliament, is a regulator established under 
the second approach accountable? To the executive, and thus the Parliament, 
of the host jurisdiction? To the executive, and thus the Parliament, of the 
participating jurisdiction in which the regulator is based (if that is not the host 
jurisdiction)? To the executives, and the Parliaments, of all of the participating 
jurisdictions (perhaps via the Ministerial Council which, in the context of many 
applied law schemes, has overall responsibility for the scheme)? And if the 
latter, is there a risk that the regulator, by being accountable to everyone, might 
be accountable to no one? What if the regulator makes a controversial decision? 
What if it makes a mistake? Which Minister is going to answer for it, and in 
which Parliament?
41 There is High Court authority for the proposition that one jurisdiction may, jointly with another 
jurisdiction, establish a single body which derives its existence, functions and powers from the legislation of 
both jurisdictions. See, in particular, R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Proprietary Ltd (1983) 
158 CLR 535 (‘Duncan’) and Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 
117 (‘Cram’). In these cases — which concerned an attempt by the Commonwealth to create a body jointly 
with NSW — the Court placed great emphasis on how it thought the Commonwealth and NSW intended 
the relevant cooperative legislative scheme to operate. (It is, needless to say, a basic principle of statutory 
construction that, in interpreting the provisions of an Act, the interpretation that would best achieve the 
purpose or object of the Act is to be preferred over each other interpretation. See, for example, the AI Act 
s 15A.) However, even if the current Court were to regard the provisions of the National Laws in question 
as equivalent to the provisions at issue in Duncan and Cram (which is doubtful), it is by no means clear that 
it would be anywhere near as sympathetic as the Duncan and Cram courts were to appeals to the ‘intention 
of Parliament’ (or, more broadly, to appeals to the value of ‘cooperation’). And even if it were prepared to 
be so, interesting questions would remain. For instance: would the ‘single national entity’ itself be a body 
corporate? That is, would the individual corporations established in the participating jurisdictions somehow 
become, by the force of parliamentary intention, a single corporation? Or would the ‘single national entity’ be 
some other kind of legal entity, its roots the individual corporations created by the participating jurisdictions? 
After all, as Deane J put it in Duncan: ‘It is competent for the legislature to constitute … an entity of a type 
unknown to the common law’: at 587. But if this were found to have occurred, what would be the nature of 
this new legal entity? And would it have the powers of the individual corporations which begat it, like the 
power to contract or to acquire real or personal property?
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These and other questions might tend to suggest that the first approach 
mentioned above is the better one. Because this approach is careful to avoid 
any ambiguity about which participating jurisdiction is responsible for 
establishing, and has in fact established, the regulator, political accountability 
is easier to locate. After all, on this approach, it is clear that the regulator will 
be accountable — ultimately — to the executive, and thus the Parliament, of the 
jurisdiction which established it. To quote Chief Justice Robert French again:
It is reasonably arguable that accountability is optimised under a 
cooperative scheme when one government and one Minister has to be 
responsible for its administration.42
Hughes (and other) issues notwithstanding, it would therefore seem desirable 
to pursue the first, traditional approach, rather than the second, presently 
ascendant approach.43
Administrative law issues
The interpretation Acts of participating jurisdictions are not the only laws 
which are capable of operating ‘in relation to’ a National Law as applied in 
each participating jurisdiction in such a way as to produce different outcomes 
in different participating jurisdictions. A range of other laws may also have 
this effect.44 Notable in this respect are what might be described broadly as 
‘administrative laws’.
It is necessary here to distinguish between:
• laws relating to merits and (in particular) judicial review; and
• laws relating to: 
42 Chief Justice R S French, ‘The Incredible Shrinking Federation: Voyage to a Singular State’ in G Appleby, 
N Aroney and T John (eds), The Future of Australian Federalism: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 63.
43 This is not to say, of course, that the first approach raises no responsible government concerns. For 
instance, in the context of an applied law scheme involving, say, a regulator established under SA law 
which performs functions and exercises powers under the laws of all other States and Territories, will the 
executive and the Parliament of SA — the institutions to which the regulator is ostensibly accountable — 
be as ‘interested’ in a controversial decision made by the regulator in NSW or Victoria as they would be if 
the same decision were made in SA? Will a person affected by a decision in NSW or Victoria have the same 
capacity to complain, or seek redress, as a person affected by a decision in SA? Graeme Hill has suggested that 
the High Court’s decision in Bond v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 213 — which was a precursor to Hughes and 
also concerned the Corporations Law scheme — ‘exhibits some concern that lines of political accountability 
are still unclear’ even on the first approach. See G Hill, ‘Reviewing Decisions by Commonwealth Bodies Made 
Under State or Territory Legislation’ (2006) 17 Public Law Review 112, 130.
44 Some commentators have described these laws as ‘adjectival’ or ‘ancillary’ laws. See, for instance, C Saunders, 
‘A New Direction for Intergovernmental Arrangements’ (2001) 276; C Saunders, ‘Cooperative Arrangements 
in Comparative Perspective’ in G Appleby, N Aroney and T John (eds), The Future of Australian Federalism: 
Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 419.
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• review by the Ombudsman;
• privacy;
• FOI;
• financial management and accountability (including the auditing of 
regulators);
• public records or archives; and
• public service, administration and management.
Turning first to merits and judicial review,45 most of the recent applied law 
schemes have followed a fairly standard approach46 under which:
• the National Law includes basic provisions about review (concerning, for 
example, which decisions are reviewable, the review process, etc); and
• each participating jurisdiction’s application Act includes provisions 
prescribing which State tribunal or court is responsible for carrying out the 
review.47
This approach ensures the continuing ready accessibility of avenues of review 
(and thus raises no particular responsible government concerns). However, 
its disadvantages in terms of ongoing regulatory uniformity are manifest. 
Depending on the approach of each participating jurisdiction’s tribunals and 
courts, it is possible that a person aggrieved by an administrative decision in, 
say, Queensland might achieve a distinctly different result to a person aggrieved 
by the same (or a similar) decision in Victoria. Moreover, distinctly different 
interpretations of the National Law might spring up in different participating 
jurisdictions (notwithstanding common interpretative rules). Needless to 
say, this approach is also not ideal from the perspective of a single national 
regulator, which must contend with an array of different tribunals and courts, 
with varying rules and procedures (most of which will remain untouched by 
the National Law), in respect of the same decisions.48 Nor does this approach 
help to build expertise within a particular tribunal or court.
45 For a useful analysis of this issue, see G Hill, ‘Reviewing Decisions by Commonwealth Bodies Made 
Under State or Territory Legislation’ (2006) 17 Public Law Review. See also C Saunders, ‘Administrative Law 
and Relations Between Governments: Australia and Europe Compared’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 263, 
269–70.
46 The adoption of this standard approach may reflect a concern not to transgress relevant constitutional 
limitations, in particular, the entrenched supervisory jurisdictions of the High Court and State Supreme 
Courts. See generally Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; and Kirk v Industrial Court of 
NSW (2010) 239 CLR 531.
47 Further review or appeal will then generally occur within the hierarchy of tribunals and courts existing 
in the participating jurisdiction concerned.
48 This is something that applied law schemes are supposed to avoid. See K Graham, ‘The Commonwealth’s 
Response to Re Wakim: The Jurisdiction of Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2000’ (2000) 26 AIAL Forum 
33, 34. See also D O’Brien, ‘Administrative Review Under the Corporations Law and the Australian Securities 
Commission Law’ (1991) 9 Company and Securities Law Journal 235.
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Some applied law schemes have sought to address these problems by providing 
for the establishment of a specialist merits review body to review all decisions 
made under the scheme, with judicial review by the courts of only one 
jurisdiction. For example, in the context of the three applied law schemes 
regulating the energy sector, the Australian Competition Tribunal, established 
by a Commonwealth Act, conducts merits review,49 while judicial review is 
carried out by the federal courts under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’).50
In relation to the broader package of administrative laws, the position is more 
complicated and (arguably) more problematic from a responsible government 
perspective. The standard approach in this context is one of ‘disapplication and 
replacement’. That is, each participating jurisdiction disapplies its administrative 
laws (insofar as the National Law is concerned) and replaces those laws by:
• applying mutually agreed replacement rules insofar as some matters are 
concerned (usually financial management and accountability, auditing and 
the like); and
• applying the administrative laws of another jurisdiction (with necessary 
modifications) insofar as other matters are concerned (usually review by the 
Ombudsman, privacy and FOI).
This disapplication and replacement approach raises a number of responsible 
government concerns. For one thing, there is a question whether the functions 
served by the disapplied laws (functions which include ensuring the ready 
availability of information and the ready accessibility of avenues of review) will 
be properly served by whatever replaces them (assuming something does). In 
other words, will the mutually-agreed replacement rules, or the administrative 
laws of the other jurisdiction, be the equal of what they have supplanted? 
Even if they are, it is undeniable that the disapplication and replacement of 
a participating jurisdiction’s administrative laws adds significant complexity 
to the law.51 Even for a trained lawyer, it can be difficult to discern precisely 
49 This procedure — merits review by the Australian Competition Tribunal with judicial review by the 
federal courts — is applicable only in relation to certain bodies with functions and powers under the relevant 
National Laws (in particular, the AER). Other bodies with functions and powers under the National Laws 
(such as the Australian Energy Market Commission and the Australian Energy Market Operator) are subject to 
the standard approach under which their decisions are reviewed by the (prescribed) tribunals and courts of 
each participating jurisdiction. As of August 2013, the Standing Council on Energy and Resources — which 
is the Ministerial Council overseeing the applied law schemes regulating the energy sector — was conducting 
a review of the so-called ‘limited merits review’ process established under the schemes. The current proposal 
envisions the continuation of (altered) merits review by the Australian Competition Tribunal and judicial 
review by the federal courts.
50 The ADJR Act sch 3 prescribes the State and Territory Acts that apply the National Electricity Law, 
the National Gas Law and the National Energy Retail Law as ‘enactments’ for the purposes of the ADJR Act.
51 This complexity is most evident in circumstances where one participating jurisdiction disapplies its 
administrative laws and applies those of another jurisdiction. For example, when the States and Territories 
disapply their administrative laws and apply those of the Commonwealth — which occurs frequently, even 
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what options are available for, say, making an application for review by the 
Ombudsman or making an FOI request. The barriers to entry (both in terms of 
time and cost) are considerable.
Other issues
The issues discussed above are not an exhaustive list of the challenges that 
applied law schemes pose (or potentially pose) to responsible government. Some 
further issues (although by no means all of them) are discussed below.
First, there is the issue of regulations. We have long since become used to 
the fact that the Parliament delegates significant legislative power to the 
executive. As a result of this practice, much of the real detail of any particular 
scheme is determined by the executive, via regulations or other subordinate 
legislation, rather than by the Parliament, via primary legislation. However, 
the understanding behind this practice is that the Parliament will scrutinise 
any regulations promulgated by the executive, and may easily disallow them. 
This is not necessarily the case in the context of applied law schemes. Most 
National Laws, like most ordinary Acts, contain broad regulation-making 
powers, with authority to make the regulations generally bestowed on either 
the relevant Ministerial Council52 or one executive (with the unanimous consent 
or ‘recommendation’ of the others).53 The National Laws also usually provide for 
the tabling of any regulations in the Parliament of each participating jurisdiction. 
However, the relevant disallowance provision often reflects an approach that 
is best described as ‘majority rules’. The following provision, taken from the 
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, offers an illustration:54
in the context of purely State and Territory-based applied law schemes, because the Commonwealth’s laws 
are seen as ‘neutral ground’ — the Commonwealth’s laws, as applied, must be modified so that, whenever 
they refer to a Commonwealth officer or body (such as the Australian Information Commissioner or the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman), the references are taken to be references to a State or Territory officer (or 
officers) or body (or bodies). This is necessary because, as discussed above, the States and Territories cannot 
unilaterally (that is, without Commonwealth consent) confer a function or power on a Commonwealth officer 
or body. A purported conferral of this sort would be invalid by virtue of s 109 of the Constitution and/or 
the Commonwealth’s implied intergovernmental immunity. This is generally not the only modification that is 
necessary. Accordingly, it is common for National Laws to have broad regulation-making provisions which 
permit the regulations to modify the applied Commonwealth laws or to provide that the applied Commonwealth 
laws apply as if specific provisions were omitted or specific amendments to the Commonwealth laws (by the 
Commonwealth Parliament) had not taken effect.
52 See, for example, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law s 245; the Education and Care Services 
National Law s 301; and the Occupational Licensing National Law s 160.
53 See, for example, the Rail Safety National Law s 264; the Co-operatives National Law s 612; and the Heavy 
Vehicle National Law s 669.
54 It is worth noting that, under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, Victoria is responsible 
for the preparation and printing of regulations made by the Ministerial Council, notwithstanding that 
Queensland is the host jurisdiction: see s 245 of the National Law. This is but one of the many oddities that 
one may expect to find when looking at an applied law scheme in any detail.
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246 Parliamentary scrutiny of national regulations
(1) A regulation made under this Law may be disallowed in a participating 
jurisdiction by a House of the Parliament of that jurisdiction —
(a) in the same way that a regulation made under an Act of that 
jurisdiction may be disallowed; and
(b) as if the regulation had been tabled in the House on the first sitting 
day after the regulation was published by the Victorian Government 
Printer.
(2) A regulation disallowed under subsection (1) does not cease to 
have effect in the participating jurisdiction, or any other participating 
jurisdiction, unless the regulation is disallowed in a majority of the 
participating jurisdictions.
The effect of a provision like this is clear: the Parliaments of, say, SA and 
Tasmania, could find themselves ‘out-voted’ by those of the bigger States. And 
while the ‘minority’ Parliaments could presumably take extraordinary measures 
to disallow the regulations — up to and including ‘withdrawing’ from the 
applied law scheme altogether — it is likely that they would find themselves 
under considerable political pressure not to buck the horse.
Another issue concerns those jurisdictions which enact an application Act that 
applies the National Law but also modifies that National Law in some way in and 
for the participating jurisdiction. It is relatively common for these jurisdictions 
not to provide a ‘consolidated’ version of the National Law as modified by the 
application Act (NSW is an honourable exception to this trend). This leaves 
readers of the National Law with the unenviable task of trying to piece together 
their own ‘consolidation’, the National Law in one hand, the application Act 
in the other. This is hardly acceptable if, as discussed above, one regards 
responsible government as being at least in part about the ‘knowability’ and 
‘accessibility’ of the law.55
A final issue concerns those jurisdictions, currently Victoria and the ACT, which 
have a human rights Act. The impact of applied law schemes on the ‘interpretative 
duty’ imposed by human rights Acts has already been mentioned. But it is also 
worth recalling that another key feature of human rights Acts is that they require 
the preparation of statements which accompany a Bill when it is introduced 
55 The failure to provide suitable consolidations may also be seen in circumstances where participating 
jurisdictions apply the administrative laws of another jurisdiction (with modifications). In these circumstances, 
readers of the administrative laws, as applied, must have a copy of the original administrative laws, the 
National Law (which will usually modify the applied administrative laws to some extent) and the National 
Regulations (which will usually modify the applied administrative laws to a greater extent).
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into the Parliament which attest to the Bill’s compatibility with human rights.56 
While Victoria and the ACT have prepared statements of compatibility when 
they have applied a National Law for the first time, the statements have not 
necessarily been prepared for subsequent amendments to the Law. This is 
because, in circumstances where Victoria and the ACT apply a National Law 
as in force in the host jurisdiction from time to time (as they generally do), any 
amendment to the Law made by the host jurisdiction will apply automatically 
in Victoria and the ACT. The obligation to prepare a statement of compatibility, 
which arises only when a Bill is introduced to the Parliament, simply does not 
apply in these circumstances.57 It is possible, then, that applied law schemes 
have the capacity to undermine quite seriously the intended effect of human 
rights Acts, detracting not only from the interpretative duty they impose, but 
also from their potential, via the statement of compatibility process, to get 
parliamentarians thinking about human rights.58
Conclusion
There are those who hope that policy makers will begin to interrogate more 
closely ‘the value of national uniformity’, and ultimately come to ‘reflect on 
the advantages of diversity and innovation that federalism potentially offers 
Australia’.59 Such people are likely to be waiting a long time. The consensus — 
be it unthinking or otherwise — that there is a strong economic and ‘equality’ 
case for regulatory uniformity seems strong and, if anything, growing stronger. 
56 See the Victorian Human Rights Charter s 28 and the ACT Human Rights Act s 37. These statements are 
generally called ‘statements of compatibility’.
57 This issue has attracted criticism in Victoria: see the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, 
Parliament of Victoria, Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (2011) 95–6. In 
its response to this review, the Victorian Government stated that it ‘does not intend to require statements of 
compatibility … for amendments to national uniform schemes that entail the application of laws of another 
jurisdiction in Victoria. The initial legislation that implements a national applied law uniform scheme in Victoria 
is accompanied by a statement of compatibility and is subject to scrutiny by the Victorian Parliament and [the 
Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee]. At that time, Parliament agrees to the content of the initial 
legislation, including the process for making amendments and regulations.’ See Government of Victoria, Review 
of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006: Victorian Government Response (2012) 13–4.
58 The other main way that human rights Acts aim to promote human rights is to impose on ‘public 
authorities’ a duty to act compatibly with, and give proper consideration to, human rights. See the Victorian 
Human Rights Charter s 38 and the ACT Human Rights Act s 40B. Applied law schemes arguably have the 
potential to disrupt this obligation as well. Whether or not this is so may depend not only on the definition 
of ‘public authority’ adopted in each human rights Act, but also on the issues discussed above in relation 
to the establishment of a single national regulator. For example, when the second approach discussed above 
is utilised — that is, the approach under which both the provisions establishing the regulator and the 
provisions conferring its functions and powers are set out in the National Law itself, and are thus applied by 
all participating jurisdictions — is a separate body corporate, bearing the name of the regulator, established 
in each participating jurisdiction?
59 C Saunders, ‘Cooperative Arrangements in Comparative Perspective’ in G Appleby, N Aroney and T 
John (eds), The Future of Australian Federalism: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 414, 430.
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A more realistic hope is that attempts to achieve regulatory uniformity might 
occur in a way that is more in keeping with our underlying constitutional 
system. This does not necessarily mean that applied law schemes should be 
jettisoned in favour of ‘tighter’ (reference schemes) or ‘looser’ (mirror law 
schemes) cooperative legislative schemes.60 But it does mean that, if applied law 
schemes are to be implemented, greater attention should be paid to what the 
concept of responsible government requires and implies. When a jurisdiction 
decides to participate in an applied law scheme, the most careful attention 
should be given to the method which is to be utilised to apply the law of 
the host jurisdiction: what role does that method give to the Parliament vis-
à-vis the executive? And if that method inverts the usual power relationship 
between the Parliament and the executive, has the necessity of that inversion 
been both properly considered and properly explained to the voting public? 
Secondly, the relationship between the legislation necessary to enter into an 
applied law scheme and the balance of a jurisdiction’s law — everything from 
its interpretation Act to its FOI Act to its public records or archives Act — must 
be considered. In particular, it must be recognised that the disapplication or 
modification of laws that are well-understood and, moreover, understood to be 
generally applicable, will not be consequence-free. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
critically, the regulators established to administer and enforce an applied law 
scheme must be accountable — preferably to a particular executive, and thus, a 
particular Parliament, and also via the courts and other scrutiny actors. Finally, 
at every stage, the overall complexity of the applied law scheme must not be 
forgotten, bearing in mind that the ‘knowability’ and ‘accessibility’ of the law 
are, ultimately, aspects of the rule of the law.61 Addressing these issues may 
come at a price in terms of the uniformity of the resulting applied law scheme. 
But is the price we pay for ignoring them any lower?
60 Note that Saunders, in particular, has argued that reference schemes, as opposed to other kinds of 
cooperative legislative schemes, represent a ‘mechanism for collaboration that is compatible with the rest 
of the constitutional system’. C Saunders, ‘Collaborative Federalism’ (2002) 61 Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 75.
61 See generally Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591, 
638 (Diplock LJ): ‘The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before 
committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal consequences 
that will flow from it’ (emphasis added).
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7. Ritual in the Law of Electoral 
Democracy
Graeme Orr1
Theorising the law of democracy
For all its concern with power, prestige and politics, public law can be an earnest 
and colourless topic. The corner of public law I inhabit is the law of politics, 
especially electoral democracy. It is particularly dominated by a concern with 
process. On top of that, it is not well theorised. In part, this is because it is 
an emerging sub-discipline. It has been jointly sired by constitutional and 
administrative law, and by that branch of political science concerned with 
electoral systems and behaviour. But the law of politics is also under-theorised 
because it is seen as an essentially pragmatic venture in which even symbolism 
and rhetoric are sublimated. The High Court’s occasional venture (or adventure) 
aside,2 whether it is made ad hoc by judges or, as is more typical, explicitly by 
Acts of Parliament or even inferentially by electoral administrators, electoral 
law is proudly pragmatic.
This essay is an attempt to rectify that under-theorising of the law of electoral 
politics. By theorising, I mean asking the ‘why’ or ‘what for’ questions. By 
the law of electoral politics, I mean the rules lain down, and institutions and 
systems set up, to govern democracy through the process of renewing elective 
offices and other forms of popular voting, such as referendums. Here, I want to 
stake a claim for the importance of the concept of ritual in how we understand 
this field, particularly in considering what elections are ‘for’.
Ritual is a concept familiar to anthropologists and political historians,3 but much 
less so to contemporary legal or political theorists. Yet ritual naturally emerges 
from and illuminates the experience of democratic culture. That illumination 
can reflect light upon — and hence aid our understanding of — the law’s role in 
1 g.orr@law.uq.edu.au.
2 ACTV v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, uncovering an implied freedom of political communication, is 
the best known example. The twin franchise cases of Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 and 
Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1 are more recent instances. Mild in their effect, the cases have 
still been savaged by champions of the originalist intention to leave the field to Parliament alone. For example, 
James Allan, ‘The Three Rs of Recent Australian Judicial Activism: Roach, Rowe and (No) ‘Riginalism’ (2012) 
36 Melbourne University Law Review 743.
3 For example, James Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (Macmillan, 1963); Mark W 
Brewin, Celebrating Democracy: The Mass-Mediated Ritual of Election Day (Peter Lang, 2008).
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democracy. Whilst the ritual dimension may often be overlooked in rationalist 
accounts of law-making, it is inescapable. The laws and institutions we adopt 
will necessarily shape and constrain the ritual experience. Without appreciating 
this, we cannot fully understand the social power and place of elections and the 
laws and institutions that underlie them. 
I will shortly offer definitions of the concept, then attempt some positive 
demonstration of my claims about the importance of a ritual understanding. But 
first, it is useful to take a quick stock of the dominant theoretical approaches and 
presumptions that have been applied to the law of electoral politics. Broadly put, 
those approaches are the realist, and the liberal. They are fairly hard-headed, in 
the sense that they are usually invoked to drive law reform or judicial review in 
the area. My desire is not to supplant the realist and liberal approaches with an 
approach drawing on ritual, but to augment them.
Take first the self-styled realist approach. Popular here and abroad, this strand 
of thought is economistic, and essentially pragmatic to the point of cynicism. 
In this view, electoral politics is seen as a Schumpeterian competition amongst 
political elites.4 The law of electoral politics must be calibrated to minimise 
negative effects of gaming by self-interested incumbent MPs and parties, and 
to maximise positive effects such as accountability.5 Electoral democracy in this 
approach is depicted as having no ends in itself; it is seen as just an institutional 
method to soften or compromise the elite rule of representative government. In 
Schumpeter’s declaration: ‘Democracy is a political method [i.e.] a certain type 
of institutional arrangement for arriving at [governmental] decisions and hence 
incapable of being an end in itself’.6
The law’s role within all this is as a boundary-rider, trying to limit undemocratic 
harms that may arise if democracy becomes the discretionary plaything of 
self-interested and passing legislators and administrations. Richard Posner 
epitomises this approach, in his explicitly anti-trust model for regulating 
electoral democracy.7 From this understanding we derive things such as the 
independence of electoral authorities that run elections, and the tendency for 
courts, worldwide, to place limits around Parliament’s power to make electoral 
legislation.8
4 Joseph Schumpeter, in three seminal chapters in Socialism, Capitalism and Democracy (Routledge, new ed, 
1994) chs 21–23, laid out his critique of classical liberal democracy.
5 Electoral accountability is crude, but without it other forms of accountability (for example, parliamentary and 
media oversight of government, or the reflexive attention of leaders to public opinion) would be much weaker.
6 Joseph Schumpeter, Socialism, Capitalism and Democracy (Routledge, new ed, 1994) 242. Posner explicitly 
embraces Schumpeter, though he paints his approach as pragmatic rather than elite democracy. See Richard A 
Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2003) chs 4–6.
7 Richard A Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2003) chs 4–6. See Richard 
Pildes, ‘Competitive, Deliberative and Rights-Oriented Democracy’ (2004) 3 Election Law Journal 685.
8 Even absent an explicit bill of rights. See ACTV v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, Roach v Electoral 
Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 and Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1. Such cases manifest 
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In the other, liberal approach, the law plays a more normatively constructive, 
rather than a merely boundary-riding role. The law is depicted as part of a quest 
for deeper values or loftier purposes, derived from liberal political philosophy. 
These purposes are political liberty, equality and deliberation. That is, the 
law can aim to encourage participation and political freedoms, it can seek to 
advance political equality in an otherwise unequal society and it can seek to 
foster informed and reflective public deliberation (although this last role is often 
overlooked or sublimated).9 Now there is obviously room for tension amongst 
these goals, especially between liberty and equality. (For example, how far can 
we restrain money in politics in the interests of egalitarianism, and is it right 
to compel people to the polls to create a more inclusive electoral system?) But 
together, these three values provide a benchmark of liberal democratic values 
to help craft the substance of the law. Straddling the realist and liberal camps, 
James Gardner succinctly explained recently that ‘election law bridges the gap 
between our aspirations for, and the frequently messy reality of, our political 
lives’.10
What I wish to argue in this chapter is that there is another, less instrumental,11 
yet no less ‘real’ or even pragmatic way of thinking about the law of electoral 
politics. And that is to examine the ritual dimension of it all.12 No-one would 
deny that the traditions of the opening of Parliament, for example, form 
obvious, public law rituals. But I want to make a much broader and, I hope, 
more interesting claim that there is an element of ritual all the way down. 
Ritual concerns the repeated patterns of everyday life, in this case of recurrent 
electoral activity. Law, whether it knows it or not, plays a role in opening 
up space for, constraining or guiding that ritual element. We should not be 
surprised, therefore, to find ritual manifest by and, in some cases embedded in, 
not just democratic practice, but throughout public law.
As a working definition, I borrow Murray Edelman’s definition of ritual as any 
‘activity that involves its participants symbolically in a common enterprise, 
calling their attention to their relatedness and joint interests in a compelling 
way’.13 To this we must add, however, the need for a ritual to be something 
the idea that the electoral self-interest of parliamentary majorities requires supervision. John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980).
9 Compare Richard Pildes, ‘Competitive, Deliberative and Rights-Oriented Democracy’ (2004) 3 Election 
Law Journal, and Andrew Geddis, ‘Three Conceptions of the Electoral Moment’ (2003) 28 Australian Journal 
of Legal Philosophy 53. Of these, the liberty and equality ‘visions’ are most developed, albeit in tension. Some 
doubt that electoral campaigns, however well-regulated, can be deliberative. James A Gardner, What are 
Campaigns For?: The Role of Persuasion in Electoral Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2009).
10 James A Gardner, ‘Election Law as Applied Democratic Theory’ (2012) 56 St Louis University Law Journal 689.
11 Less instrumental in that ritual considers things such as elections as events in themselves, and not merely 
unavoidable steps in some broader governmental process.
12 I first sketched this in ‘The Ritual and Aesthetic in Electoral Law’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 425. The 
present essay is part of a larger book on ‘Ritual and Rhythm in Electoral Systems’ (Ashgate, 2015).
13 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press, 5th ed, 1985) 16.
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patterned, repeated or rhythmic. Ritual, so understood, is intimately connected 
to common experiences (albeit ones that different people may respond to, 
intellectually and emotionally, in different ways). Rituals carry meanings, but 
they are not limited to occasions exhibiting grand themes like the sacred or the 
constitutive, which we find in ceremonial and liminal moments of creation or 
loss. Elections in a settled democracy are, simultaneously, both significant (re)
constitutive moments and relatively routine acts of public participation and 
administration. 
Rituals and rhythms—and their relationship 
with myths, symbols and aesthetics
As regularised events, elections have an inescapably ritual dimension. Elections 
are nothing if not public events, experienced by citizens and political actors alike. 
Ritual has classically been understood in semi-religious terms, particularly 
through notions such as rite and myth in the sense of legend. More secular 
understandings of ritual emphasise theatre and myth in terms of the symbolism 
of public life. Elements such as rite and theatre can certainly be identified in 
moments of solemn or high political behaviour, whether they be the formal 
dissolution of Parliament and issuing of electoral writs, or the gatherings at 
tally rooms and concession speeches that dominate election night. But ritual 
is not exhausted by these moments of political behaviour. The ritual that most 
intrigues me is a much more quotidian beast, such as the experiences at the 
polling station. But before we get to those everyday experiences, it is worth 
contrasting ritual with some key related concepts of myth, symbolics and 
aesthetics.
The religious or transcendent connotations of rite and ritual have been explored 
in both traditional anthropological literature and, more recently, in the notion 
of civil religion.14 The original insight of civil religion was to reveal how 
public and political order can be imbued with transcendent meaning: politics 
as religion. A more recent focus, most obviously in the US, has been on the 
public aspect of religion and how its cleavages are written into political order: 
religion as politics.15 Both the traditional anthropological approach, and the 
civil and public religion viewpoints draw our attention to a broader baggage 
often transported by ritual: the notion of myth.
14 With roots in Robert Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’ (1967) 96(1) Dædalus 1.
15 Compare Robert Withnow, The Restructuring of American Religion (Princeton University Press, 1988) ch 
10, identifying a conservative and liberal civil religions and theologies.
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Myth is carried by and replicated not just through explicit stories, but also in 
the more implicit practices we transmit across generations. Democracy revels 
in myth as much as any other system of government. (Indeed, to Claude Lévi-
Strauss, the political ideology of contemporary liberal societies is of an order 
with the myth and religion of older societies).16 There are stories of forgetting, 
especially in foundational myths. Australians are proud of their relatively rapid 
and egalitarian expansion of the vote in the 19th century. That expansion took 
late 19th century Australia, in a handful of decades, from a property-based 
franchise which countenanced multiple voting, through the evolution of one-
man, one-vote, and onto adult suffrage with the enfranchisement of women 
around the time of federation. But that pride requires sublimation of the fact 
that most Indigenous Australians waited up to 60 years longer to gain this first 
order liberal right.17 Similarly, does the average British or North American 
person today remember that women were denied the vote by law until 1918–20, 
barely one lifetime ago?18 
Most democracies espouse their own particular, inflected legends of democracy, 
whether of loss, change or renewal. These legends extend beyond simple tales 
of movements demanding popular and local sovereignty, to include the role of 
the media and foreign affairs. Many Americans, for instance, believe that the 
broadcaster Walter Cronkite declared the Vietnam War unwinnable, channelling 
the fears of the zeitgeist, and thereby sealed the fate of the conflict. This is 
pure myth.19 Australians, depending on whether they are social democrats or 
conservatives, invest the short-lived Whitlam government with either the status 
of Camelot made real, or as a warning of the limits of politics and governmental 
ambition. Each of those positions on the Whitlam government makes sense 
in itself, but is overstated relative to the administration’s short-life (1972–75). 
Nonetheless, the government’s dramatic undoing — it was controversially 
dismissed by the Queen’s representative in Australia — fuses these conflicting 
narratives, of Camelot-lost and a failed government, into an even larger legend.
Myth generates meaning through the use of bold colours and big canvasses, by 
lionising or demonising particular key characters or major events. A ritual such 
as a presidential inauguration, or a leader claiming victory on election night, 
may recall these wider stories and histories. But whilst myth can colour the way 
we read and experience rituals, rituals are not the agents of myth. Rather, rituals 
tend to carry embedded meanings: meanings they emblemise or symbolise. An 
16 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (Claire Jacobson trans, Basic Books, 1963) 306.
17 Adrian Brooks, ‘“A Paragon of Democratic Virtues?”: The Development of the Commonwealth Franchise’ 
(1993) 12 University of Tasmania Law Review 208.
18 Even then, British women did not enjoy equal suffrage with men until the Representation of the People 
(Equal Franchise) Act 1928 (UK).
19 W Joseph Campbell, Getting It Wrong: Ten of the Greatest Misreported Stories in American Journalism 
(University of California Press, 2010) ch 5.
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example of this is the way that polling routinely takes place in schools, whose 
significance we will examine shortly. The symbolic meanings inherent in rituals 
differ from myth, because ritual is less singular, and typically more routine. 
Ritual is the fabric of everyday life; myth is often cartoonish and perpetuated 
by a kind of history-for-beginners. The power of ritual lies both in its intimacy 
(of the lived experience of campaigns and voting) or in its repetition (the cycle 
of an election summonsed, its results declared, a new government or president 
commissioned). 
There is another related concept, the aesthetic, which also requires a little 
explanation and exploration. Aesthetics is an ancient branch of thinking; 
traditionally it was a source of virtue. Legal aesthetics is a vibrant and broad 
ranging body of thought, which can cover everything from the relatively 
concrete — such as the architecture and design of Parliaments and court 
buildings — through to reflections on how different notions of time and space 
are inescapably embedded in understandings of, say, religious freedom.20 
Discussions of legal aesthetics, whether in public or private law, however, can 
be fraught. They can risk collapsing into formalism, in the sense of fetishising 
the formal neatness of legal structures or logic. They can even dissolve into a 
striving for a kind of beauty informed by poetic but mystical, even totalitarian, 
impulses.21 
But we cannot think about ritual without a notion of the aesthetic in the sense 
of fit or harmony. This encapsulates both a concrete or sensory experience of fit, 
and also fit in the sense of proportionality. Sensory examples are not difficult 
to find, once one digs a little into the law. In election campaigns, for instance, 
we find concrete regulation in everything from local government strictures 
on the size and location of ‘vote for me’ posters, through to bans on displays, 
demonstrations and hubbub near polling booths. In the more abstract sense 
of proportionality, we find different political aesthetics implicit in different 
approaches to regulating election finance and preferred (or frowned upon) 
forms of campaigning. Compare, for instance, the American laissez-faire model 
of expenditure, with the British law banning all paid political broadcasts but 
granting airtime instead for substantial ‘party political broadcasts’.22 
Now, of course, these examples all inter-relate with the other theories for 
conceiving of electoral rules. Sometimes judges frown on limitations on the size 
20 Benjamin L Berger, ‘The Aesthetics of Religious Freedom’ in Winifred Sullivan and Lori Beaman (eds), 
Varieties of Religious Establishment (Ashgate, 2013).
21 Consider D’Annunzio’s constitution for the province of Carnaro, in which music was a core principle of 
the state. Of ten corporations (or sectors) one was reserved as a ‘votive offering to the genius of the unknown’ 
and represented by a public flame to the ideal of Fatica senza Fatica (‘Work without Toil’).
22 The UK is not alone: Israel and New Zealand have similar regimes. The UK goes further in erecting a year round 
limitation on paid political — nor merely electoral — broadcasts. Australia briefly borrowed the electorally puritan 
model before the High Court struck it down. See ACTV v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
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or number of electoral posters on private property, by reasoning that liberty 
interests prevail over amenity.23 The ‘cordon sanitaire’, established by the 
rule against campaigning near or inside polling booths,24 creates an aesthetic 
experience of quiet order, a sense of deliberativeness as well as a potential repose 
for deliberation for any electors yet to decide how to direct their preferences. The 
valorising of the liberty of money in the US, as opposed to the more egalitarian 
British approach to political finance, overshadows aesthetic considerations such 
as the ideal forms of political speech. My point is not that aesthetic concerns 
are overt drivers of regulation, but that an aesthetic is involved in each issue 
and approach, even if only as a by-product. We cannot think about the ritual 
or experience of a campaign with streets festooned with election placards (or 
not), of voting in a hubbub (or in a quite ballot booth) or of campaigns flush 
with television advertisements (or starved of them), without considering the 
aesthetic element.
The rituals of election day and polling
Armed with an understanding of ritual as patterned actions and shared 
experiences, we can now turn to more practical questions. What of the actions 
that constitute elections, especially the central acts of casting and counting 
votes? How does law — broadly understood to include institutional practice 
and custom, as well as black-letter rules — set up the ground for ritual in 
electoral politics?
Let us take the act of voting, which we have come to take for granted. Les Murray 
finished his poem My Ancestress and the Secret Ballot, 1848 and 1851 with the 
metaphor of the ballot booth becoming ‘a closet of prayer’.25 Not so much a 
command to the gods who govern us, but a hope sent forth in good conscience. 
Yet, 150 years after the emergence of the secret ballot, in his book Voting Rites, 
Ron Hirschbein lamented that voter turnout in the US had dwindled, relative 
to headier days. He blamed this only in part because voting ‘no longer offers 
the illusion that it is instrumental (politically efficacious)’. The deeper problem, 
Hirschbein claims, is that ‘electoral politics is bereft of expressive value: Casting 
a ballot no longer provides ritualistic gratification and hardy entertainment.’26 
Voting, Hirschbein lamented, had lost too much of its affective, as well as its 
23 Liberal Party of Australia (Western Australian Division) Inc v City of Armadale [2013] WASC 27. Yet 
the national law forbids such activity as chalking electoral arguments on roads, or projecting slogans on 
buildings. Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 334.
24 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) ss 335, 340–1. See also s 328.
25 Les Murray, Subhuman Redneck Poems (Duffy & Snellgrove, 1996). A copy of the poem also opens Mark 
McKenna’s revisionist account of the ballot, ‘Building a “Closet of Prayer” in the New World: The Story of 
the “Australian Ballot”’ in Marian Sawer (ed), Elections: Full, Free and Fair (The Federation Press, 2001) 45.
26 Ron Hirschbein, Voting Rites: The Devolution of American Politics (Praeger, 1999) 2 (emphasis altered).
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effective, dimensions. It had lost ‘its former liturgical fullness [and] carnival 
spirit’.27 Chronicling the history of election day in Philadelphia, Mark Brewin 
similarly highlights a loss of the ‘public celebration’ as the physical element is 
transformed into a ritual mediated by electronic communication systems.28 
Jon Lawrence, another political historian, but in this case writing from a 
UK perspective, warns against simplistic or romantic historical comparisons, 
whilst admitting that it is easy to read 19th century UK hustings ‘at one level 
… as ritualised celebrations of Britain’s unequal, hierarchical society’.29 The 
historian’s insight seems to be that everything has changed: legally, with the 
advent of the mass franchise, and technologically, with the bureaucratisation of 
modern life. Yet elections remain a time when the governing class — albeit now 
a professional political class rather than a class defined by inherited privilege30 
— temporarily faces a public humbling. The largesse of vote-buying is now 
done through public promises rather than private bribery,31 and the heckling 
from the crowd is replaced by talk-back radio or television interviewers. But 
elections remain a demotic ritual. 
Without any stretching or romanticism, we can still see election day as a 
unique communal event. Traditionalists might yearn for some transcendent 
‘liturgical fullness’, but election day is not bereft without it. Some Australians 
are habituated into participating, less by intrinsic desire and more by legal 
compulsion — corralled into participating not, as Athenians were, by a cord 
dyed red, but by the vague threat of a $20 fine. Yet a communal ritual remains, 
even if some experience it as a political confessional whilst others feel it to 
be a public duty or chore.32 The ritual is primarily built up in the patterned 
behaviour — what transpires in the internal reflections of different individuals 
is another matter. In this more everyday understanding of ritual, we only need 
to describe the scene of polling day in Australia to see its ritual dimensions. The 
local scouts and charities set up their sausage sizzles and cake stalls; the party 
activists wrap bunting along the school gates;33 the elector quickens her pace 
as she dodges (or politely accepts) offers of ‘how-to-vote cards’, before entering 
27 ibid 130.
28 Mark W Brewin, Celebrating Democracy: The Mass-Mediated Ritual of Election Day (Peter Lang, 2008) ch 9.
29 Jon Lawrence, Electing our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 6.
30 One might say a political class ‘mostly not defined by inherited privilege’: the present UK Prime Minister 
and Deputy Prime Minister are Old Etonians; in the US, dynasties such as the Kennedys are superseded by the 
Bushes. But they are exceptions, not rules.
31 Graeme Orr, ‘Dealing in Votes: Regulating Electoral Bribery’ in Graeme Orr et al. (eds), Realising 
Democracy: Electoral Law in Australia (The Federation Press, 2003) 130.
32 Just as, to extend the religious metaphor, some Christians take communion as a sacrament, others out of 
unreflective habit.
33 But not too close. Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 40 forbids such colour within six metres of 
the entrance to the sanctity of the polling booth. In two jurisdictions, Tasmania and the ACT, the aesthetic of 
repose extends wider, to a 100-metre cordon sanitaire around polling stations.
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the calm of the polling station to retire to a booth and place pencil marks on the 
official ballot papers. All this, to varying degrees, is a product of law, whether 
black-letter or institutional policy choices.
Citizens thus gather — or rather they are summonsed by the law of compulsory 
participation that we call compulsory voting — on the one day every three 
or so years that our secular society comes together. This periodicity is laid 
down constitutionally: three years nationally, four years for most States and 
Territories.34 They wait in line after running the gauntlet of how-to-vote 
cards, which are themselves a product of preferential voting laws.35 They find 
themselves milling in the quiet of the polling booth itself, a place whose repose 
is protected by law.36 Finally, they have their names marked off the roll, ballots 
completed by trusty pencil and consigned with a wish or curse to a secure 
ballot box. All of this, down to the pencil, is safeguarded by legal regulation.37
Certainly, it might be objected that what scouts and party volunteers do is not 
legally determined in any strong sense. But in a profound sense it is shaped and 
enabled by law. Imagine a society that moved to internet voting, as some have 
advocated for noble reasons relating to maximising formal participation. There 
would be no physical event, presumably no ‘election day’ as such, just a final 
time limit to lodge one’s electoral choices electronically. Elections would become 
an even more private and transactionalised activity.38 Something significant of 
a communal nature would be lost. Paradoxically, the more secular and market-
oriented Western nations become, the more polling day stands out as the one-
day when a society comes together.
Rituals and beliefs, of course, bubble up or are inherited from many sources. 
Those sources may co-mingle; they may also clash. The secular ‘civil religion’ 
of electoral democracy aims to bring citizens together for at least one occasion 
every several years. Yet its demands are sometimes incompatible with other belief 
systems and practices. Most obviously, Jehovah’s Witnesses do not partake of 
the electoral ritual, because they honour only their God and not secular political 
institutions. Compulsory voting in Australia accommodates such conscientious 
objections, but only if they stem from a shared creed and not an idiosyncratic 
belief, however sincerely held.39 
34 For example Australian Constitution ss 28, 32 (three-year cycle for national elections).
35 Except in Tasmanian elections, where they are banned. Electoral Act 2004 (Tas) s 198.
36 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) ss 335, 340–1.
37 Of course the ritual differs if one votes by post, at home. It is more private and the nesting of envelopes 
within envelopes reflects a bureaucratic promise as to one’s anonymity. The ritual differs in its ease and 
inflection, but it is still, palpably, a ritual.
38 Compare Heather Lardy, ‘Modernising Elections: The Silent Premises of the Electoral Pilot Schemes’ 
(2003) 1 Public Law 6 (critiquing moves to extend postal balloting).
39 Douglas v Ninnes (1976) 14 SASR 377 at 382–3.
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Praises are often sung for the fact that Australian law has long mandated that 
election day be a Saturday. In comparison, general elections are held on a 
Thursday in the UK and a Tuesday in the US. Saturday elections expressed an 
egalitarian value, as working hours had been reduced to a half-day and, for 
most permanent employees, Saturday became a work-free day altogether. Voting 
in Australia is thus a more leisurely affair than in countries where workers have 
to duck into polling stations on their way to or from work. Voting on working 
days also leads, as we see in the US, to irresistible pressure to offer early voting 
to everyone, which detracts from the ritualistic purpose of having a polling day 
at all. 
Yet weekend voting presents drawbacks, as many religions reserve Saturdays 
or Sundays for worship. The September date chosen for the 2013 Australian 
election coincided with Yom Kippur, the most sacred day in the Judaic calendar. 
Religious observance entitles electors to an early or postal vote, but the result 
was that Jewish Australians could participate in their religious ritual and the 
formal franchise, yet they could not partake fully in the democratic ritual. In 
contrast, the law (where terms are fixed) and leaders of all stripes (where election 
dates are open), avoid elections overlapping with the finals of the two major 
football codes.40 The Prime Minister offered this half-apology: ‘I do understand 
the significance of the day in question for the Jewish community. But there 
would be many of my Melbourne Jewish friends who would also understand 
the significance of AFL grand final day.’41 So it is that two great mainstream 
competitive rituals, sporting finals and electoral politics, are accorded separate 
spotlights, but other cultural practices can be neglected.
And just where do we vote? Admittedly Australian law has little explicitly 
to say on the point — other than frowning on ‘licensed premises’.42 But what 
the law does not do is notable. It does not say, as it well might if it cared 
most for administrative ease, that electors are to front at electoral offices or 
other government buildings. If it did so, it would reinforce a statist element 
to the ritual of voting. Instead, it leaves the matter in the discretion of the 
electoral commissions. In the US the matter is dispersed, like much electoral 
administration, across county and even city levels. Underfunded officials 
compete to rent suitable spaces. One official in California told me of resorting to 
using a motorcycle dealership. A condition of hiring was that sales were to cease 
that day: to mingle the rituals of commerce and politics would be too much. 
40 Australian Rules (AFL) and Rugby League.
41 Julia Gillard, quoted in Ben Packham, ‘Julia Gillard sets September 14 Election Date’, The Australian 
(online), 30 January 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/gillard-sets-september-14-
election-date/story-fn59niix-1226565039127.
42 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 205. In rural towns, the pub may be the only ‘public’ building. 
The issue was a particular concern a century ago, because alcohol was linked to vote-buying through ‘treating’ 
and because it was seen as unseemly for newly enfranchised women to have to vote in such a male domain.
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But the proprietor also insisted that one voting compartment be set up close 
to a fancy bike, so that electors could enjoy using the voting machine whilst 
straddling a road machine!
In Australia, electoral commissions overwhelmingly choose public halls — and 
school halls more than religious halls, for reasons that are both obvious (church/
state and inter-religious sensitivities) and less obvious but still profound. 
What else, besides compulsory voting, symbolises equal citizenship more than 
compulsory education? Just as we all wandered to school every day as children, 
so as adults we wander back to school halls every three years to vote.43 A similar 
aesthetic, or sense of proportion between the civic nature of the ballot and the 
status of school halls, is explicitly written into New Zealand law.44
The secrecy of the ballot is another obviously important legal form, of 
significance not just to poets dreaming of ‘a closet of prayer’. The secret ballot 
laws are echoed in the action of every elector who accepts all — or none —
of the how-to-vote cards on offer, thereby disguising her voting intentions.45 
Those cards, distinctly Australian artefacts of last minute campaigning, have 
survived laws putting party labels on ballots.46 This survival is partly because 
the law about casting a formal ballot under preferential voting in Australia is 
more complex than either the first-past-the-post or the party list systems used 
elsewhere. How-to-vote cards also survive because the larger parties believe 
it gives them an advantage, since they can mobilise sufficient supporters and 
money to afford this type of canvassing. Otherwise they could amend the law 
against any partisan material being posted in the polling station, and permit 
every candidate to have their how-to-vote card displayed prominently.
43 More developed in Graeme Orr, ‘The Ritual and Aesthetic in Electoral Law’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 438.
44 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 156.
45 How-to-vote cards are replicas of ballots, adorned with photos of aspiring MPs and their leader, showing 
electors how to direct preferences for that candidate or party.
46 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 214 (ballot labelling) and part XI (registration of parties) date 
to 1983.
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Election night and the count: Rhythms and 
theatre
Consider also the debate about abandoning the tradition of a central ‘tally 
room’. To reduce costs, budgetary minded electoral authorities now favour a 
purely dispersed, electronic method of disseminating election results. Australian 
politicians and journalists, however, have fought to keep the theatre of a tally 
room, as an official or central stage.47 UK electoral administration, by contrast, 
is decentralised. But it generates something even more ritualistic in its local 
ceremonies for the public declaration of constituency results, which take place 
during the early hours of the morning as election night counts unfold. Counting 
to resolve the Westminster Parliament is relatively simple, since the law provides 
for first-past-the-post voting. And UK postal votes have to be received by the 
close of polling on election day.48 As a result, even with hand-counting, votes 
can be conclusively tallied within several hours. 
Candidates for Westminster are invited and expected to attend the public 
declaration of their race, in their community, as the returning officer (often a local 
mayor) intones the votes received. With different supporters mixing together, 
and Ministers rubbing shoulders with joke candidates, a captivating ritual of 
surprise, humiliation and triumph ensues.49 In turn, the smaller constituencies 
vie to become the first in the nation to declare their result, in a kind of race 
within the race.50 This may be done to gain passing notoriety for the district 
on a night of national attention, or simply out of pride in the efficiency of the 
count. The idea of a race to finish the count would make no sense in Australia. 
Here, the laws governing the formality of preferential voting are more complex, 
and any sense of rushing to a declaration would suggest anything but efficiency.
In any event, under Australian law, provisional votes have to be checked, 
and postal ballots can dribble in until 13 days after polling day.51 As a result, 
there is no conclusive public moment; rather, provisional results are released 
and updated, race by race, over election night and cumulative swings are 
calculated by computer-assisted psephologists, as if studying seismological data 
of how much the (political) ground shifted. In very close elections, the fate of a 
47 See, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Certain Aspects 
of the Administration of the Australian Electoral Commission (2007) ch 4.
48 The Electoral Commission (UK), ‘Voting by Post’, http://www.aboutmyvote.co.uk/how_do_i_vote/
voting_by_post.aspx.
49 The cover of Lawrence’s book (Jon Lawrence, Electing our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from 
Hogarth to Blair (Oxford University Press, 2009)) illustrates this, with a photograph of Prime Minister Blair 
attending his Sedgfield electorate declaration in 2005, flanked by anti-Iraq-war candidates. One, a father of a 
dead soldier, is delivering a speech, the other is wearing a hat labelled ‘BLIAR’.
50 Chris Mullin, A View From the Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin (Profile Books, 2009).
51 For example, Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 266.
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government may hang in the balance for many days. In the US, to give a further 
contrast, a plethora of different voting technologies ensure a relatively quick 
count. Indeed, a shift to all electronic voting could in theory lead to election 
results being known instantaneously, at the flick of a switch or key. 
This is what currently happens in Australian Senate elections. To cope with 
the legal complexity of Hare-Clark proportional representation, ballots are 
counted by computer.52 However, computerised ballots are not cast by voters; 
paper ballots are converted to electronic format by data-entry operators after 
polling day. This process is painstaking, so Senate results become something of 
an afterthought. Cynics might say that this leisurely process mimics the Senate 
itself, with its six-year sinecures fixed in the Constitution. It certainly reinforces 
the constitutional position of the Australian Senate as a secondary house of 
review. In contrast, first-past-the-post voting in the US ensures that attention 
to Senate races ranks ahead of the House and second only to the presidential 
race. Yet, through all these different rhythms — dependent in large part on 
the different electoral laws, policies and technologies in place — one ritual is 
common: the election night party of the partisans.53
After the electoral deluge: Rites of inauguration
Earlier I explained that ‘ritual’ should not simply invoke the language of ‘rites’, 
however tempting the analogy may be. A ‘rite’ is a narrower concept associated 
usually with solemn (religious) tradition, typically bearing a clear relationship 
with a point of transition. Frederick Damon, an anthropologist who explored the 
phenomenon from an American electoral perspective, argued that US elections 
were seminal rites of passage, mirroring rites in societies more overtly driven 
by custom. In effect, he portrayed US presidential elections as installation rites 
featuring a particular set of rhythms.54
First, the candidates declare or announce themselves, separating or distinguishing 
themselves and entering a period of ‘masquerade’, which includes the primary 
season. Then comes a period of social abnormality: the general election campaign 
inverts the normal order of politics, which is compromise and give-and-take. This 
generates a form of extreme testing, a winner-takes-all battle, which culminates 
in the election. After the election outcome follows a prolonged period when 
the victor moves to heal wounds, prior to the most formal stage of the entire 
52 Technically, Senate electors do not just select a party list, but rank all candidates. 
53 Captured in Australia in David Williamson’s 1971 play, Don’s Party (which was released as a movie in 1976).
54 Frederick A Damon, ‘What Good are Elections: An Anthropological Analysis of American Elections 
(2003) 1 Taiwan Journal of Anthropology 39, especially at 53–62. Damon, at 62–71, also analogises US two-
party electoral politics to ‘joking relations’ (a custom of the Kaguru people of east Africa, where groups spar 
via mutual insults, to purify or rectify social tensions or problems).
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ritualistic process, the ceremony of inauguration. It may be no coincidence 
that the latent healing period overlaps with the festive season (statute sets US 
elections for early November,55 terms of office are set constitutionally).56 The 
latter two stages — healing then inauguration — are obviously pronounced in 
the US presidential model. Although a partisan elected official, the President is 
also the head of state and hence meant to be a unifying figure for the republic. 
Most famously, the President has to be sworn in and inaugurated in Washington 
DC by noon on the 20th day of January.57 Originally this was 4 March, an 
emblematic date representing the day the US Constitution came into effect.58 Of 
course, the several-month wait between election day and inauguration reflected 
pragmatics more than any deeper design: the electoral college had to formally 
gather, and transportation across a large country was not easy. But all this is to 
say that ritual may spring up irrespective of conscious intention. The extensive 
wait permits not just a rite of healing and transition, but a now elaborately 
planned day that mixes a focus on the meaning of a national union and the 
formation of government, with a touch of to-the-victor-goes-the-spoils. On a less 
exalted note, inauguration renews the beltway culture, as political backers and 
insiders come together to participate in forming the fledgling administration. 
In contrast, in the UK and Australian models, the law keeps election campaigns 
relatively short. With no directly elected executive, and shorn of laws mandating 
primary elections, parliamentary elections are centred less on individual 
candidates and more on party-dominated responsible government. A new Prime 
Minister is moved through the caretaker period onto the swearing in of their 
ministry, before the Queen’s representative, more quickly and quietly than 
would be countenanced in the US system. 
However there are occasions where parliamentary, as opposed to party, 
government reasserts itself. This was obvious after the inconclusive, hung 
elections of 2010 in both Canberra and Westminster. In each case, ad hoc rituals 
of inauguration (some might say marriages of convenience) were played out. 
In the UK it was the fairly mannered announcement, less than a week from 
election day, of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat pact. This was formalised in 
an initial seven-page agreement, ritually adopted with a handshake on the steps 
of Number 10 Downing Street. In Australia, the process was more protracted, 
with a new ministry taking over three weeks to assemble, as both the caretaker 
55 The first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, in even-numbered years (2 USC ss 1, 7 and 3 USC s 1).
56 See United States Constitution, 20th amendment. (Prior to this, they began on 4 March, symbolically the 
date the Constitution first took effect.)
57 ibid. Exceptionally, as happened to Barack Obama in 2013 when 20 January was a Sunday, the president 
may have to be sworn in on a Sunday, then inaugurated the next day. Although inauguration day is not 
a holiday, its separation from the Christian day of rest positions it as a civic celebration distinct from any 
religious connotations.
58 Not to be confused with US Constitution Day in September, marking the 1787 signing of the original document.
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Prime Minister and Opposition Leader sought to woo six cross-benchers. 
Several agreements were concluded in series with different players, before the 
chaotic day of announcements by two-out-of-three rural independents that 
they would support the continuation of a Labor government. These ad hoc rites 
of incorporation worked less well than in the US: the administrations formed 
have lacked the sense of legitimacy that even President Bush Jr assumed, 
despite his election in 2000 lacking a nationwide vote majority and requiring 
an extraordinary court decision to confirm it.
Conclusion: The strands of democracy
All we do is marked by rhythms. From the office worker who takes her daily 
coffee a certain way in the same cafe, through to the act of voting, by pencil on 
secret ballot in a cardboard booth each three years, to the communal singing 
of the national anthem before a sporting contest. These are all rituals, albeit 
rituals of different orders of publicness or privateness, and with different levels 
of inherent meaning. The cafe is a public place and, in her particular choice of 
venue and bean, the coffee drinker may be quietly projecting something about 
herself. But she is essentially enjoying a solitary ritual. The public meanings 
of the quasi-enforced observance of the anthem, weaving nationalism and the 
bombastic glories and hopes of a sporting encounter, hardly need decoding. 
Ritual, defined as shared, patterned behaviour, is everywhere.
This essay has sought to argue for an attention to ritual, alongside related 
concepts such as myth and aesthetics, as central to any rounded understanding 
of electoral democracy as it is contoured by public law. The illustrations we have 
discussed are suggestive rather than comprehensive. The samples given here 
have been drawn from polling day and its aftermath, rather than say the process 
of inception of fresh elections or the campaign itself. The examples we have 
encountered have drawn on several common law systems, both parliamentary 
and executive. 
In discerning differences, both across time and space, we can see that once we 
leave both the meta-narratives of liberal democracy (of liberty, equality and 
deliberation) and the hard-nosed ‘realist’ account of elite democracy, there is 
another world to explore. Exploring it requires tools beyond the rhetoric of 
liberal legal and political philosophy or the modelling of public choice theorists. 
It requires an eye for observation of routines and an ear for the poetry of the 
everyday. That is not meant to sound grandiose; quite the reverse. Electoral 
democracy and its legal and institutional ordering is just one strand of public 




8. Performing Citizenship,  
Embodying Obedience
Anne Macduff1
Many of the great religious and political figures of history have been 
agitators, and human progress owes much to the efforts of these and 
the many who are unknown. As Wilde aptly pointed out in The Soul of 
Man under Socialism, ‘Agitators are a set of interfering, meddling people, 
who come down to some perfectly contented class of the community 
and sow the seeds of discontent amongst them. That is the reason why 
agitators are so absolutely necessary. Without them, in our incomplete 
state, there would be no advance towards civilisation.’2
Introduction
In March 2003, an Australian citizen and a British citizen protested against 
Australia’s invasion of Iraq. The two men painted ‘NO WAR’ in red capital 
letters on the iconic white sails of the Sydney Opera House. A NSW local court 
found both men guilty of malicious damage and ordered them to serve weekend 
detention. The media later reported that immigration officials detained the 
British citizen and considered cancelling his visa.3 
Although protests like this one are controversial, they are an important display 
of active citizenship. Active citizenship is more than political participation 
within the existing framework of laws and institutions,4 and includes critical 
protests that question the founding framework. Although philosophers differ 
about when unlawful acts are justified, even a relatively narrow view accepts 
that there are circumstances when non-violent acts of public civil disobedience 
are warranted.5 The acts of civil disobedience of Mahatma Ghandi, Martin 
1 anne.macduff@anu.edu.au.
2 Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305, 316–7 (Murphy J) quoting Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism (Andrade, unspecified) 6. 
3 ‘Opera House Defaced in War Protest’, The Age (Online), 18 March 2003, http://www.theage.com.au/
articles/2003/03/18/1047749763708.html; ‘No War Scrawl to Cost Doctor’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Online), 26 March 2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/04/16/1050172650756.html.
4 Sue Kenny, ‘Non-Government Organisations and Contesting Active Citizenship’ in Glenn Patmore (ed), The 
Vocal Citizen (Arena, 2004) 70.
5 Kent Greenawalt, ‘Justifying Non-violent Disobedience’ in Hugo Bedau (ed), Civil Disobedience in Focus 
(Routledge, 1991) 170. 
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Luther King Jr and Rosa Parkes enhanced their democracies. Their unlawful 
and public actions strongly criticised laws, government policies and decisions, 
and stimulated social change that led to more inclusive and democratic societies. 
This chapter considers the extent to which active citizenship is currently 
supported by the Australian government. The Australian government has stated 
that it encourages active citizenship.6 However, this chapter argues that the law 
conveys a very different message. In particular, recent changes to the Australian 
Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (the ‘ACA’) have emphasised citizenship as obedience 
to the law. 
The argument in this chapter unfolds in three sections. The first section argues 
that even though there is no definition of citizenship in the ACA, the government 
conveys meanings about Australian citizenship through the regulation of 
associated citizenship practices. The second section argues how recent changes 
to the legislative criteria of the ACA have led to an increasing significance 
being placed on the pledge of commitment. The third section analyses the 
meaning conveyed by the pledge of commitment by exploring its performative 
dimensions. It analyses the pledge as a speech act and a public ritual and argues 
that the citizenship pledge embodies obedience to the existing democratic 
structures. With no Australian Bill of Rights to protect political rights generally, 
this chapter concludes that the meaning of citizenship currently conveyed by 
the government undermines active citizenship and threatens the quality of 
political participation in Australian democracy. 
Conveying the meaning of citizenship through 
law and practice
The meaning of Australian citizenship is conveyed by the practices associated 
with the ACA, rather than the text itself. The ACA does not define citizenship.7 
Nor does the legislation include a statement about the rights and responsibilities 
that must be complied with in order to become an Australian citizen.8 Instead, 
6 Senate Select Committee on Employment, Education and Training, Parliament of Australia, Education for 
Active Citizenship Education in Australian Schools and Youth Organisations (1989); Senate Select Committee 
on Employment, Education and Training, Parliament of Australia, Education for Citizenship Revisited (1991), 
Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People: Civics and Citizenship Education (Commonwealth of Australia, 1994) 
6; Department of Education, Science and Training, Parliament of Australia, Discovering Democracy Program 
‘Civics and Citizenship Education’, http://www1.curriculum.edu.au/ddunits/about/about.htm#about.
7 That is, a definition of citizenship is not included. There is an attempt to describe the meaning of 
citizenship through the preamble, which is discussed below.
8 Sir Ninian Stephen, ‘Australian Citizenship: Past, Present and Future’ (2000) 26(2) Monash University Law 
Review 333, 336; Joint Standing Committee on Migration, Parliament of Australia, Australians All: Enhancing 
Citizenship (1994) 85; Australian Citizenship Council, Australian Citizenship for A New Century (February 
2000).
8 . Performing Citizenship, Embodying Obedience
133
the ACA sets out the statutory basis upon which individuals acquire, lose and 
resume the legal status of citizenship. Scholars have therefore described the 
ACA as ‘mechanical’9 and a piece of ‘legislative machinery’.10 Yet characterising 
Australian citizenship legislation as machinery ignores the many different 
ways legislation conveys meaning about citizenship. Informed by critical legal 
studies, this section explores how official meanings of citizenship are generated 
through citizenship practices. In other words, this section explores the ways 
that the government promotes certain meanings of citizenship through the 
ACA by changing what people do and how they act. Two examples illustrate 
this point: the introduction of the legal status of citizenship in 1948, and the 
introduction of the preamble in 1993. Both these moments generated citizenship 
practices that conveyed a celebratory meaning of Australian citizenship. While 
a celebratory notion of citizenship is not necessarily inconsistent with protest 
and civil disobedience,11 neither does it clearly accommodate them. 
The legal status of citizenship
The legislation that first introduced the legal status of citizenship also generated 
the first Australian citizenship practices. The legal status of citizenship was 
introduced in Australia through the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) 
(the ‘1948 Act’). Prior to 1948, membership in the Australian community was 
recognised through British subject status.12 Although the 1948 Act did not 
include a definition of citizenship, it did convey a meaning of citizenship by 
introducing two new citizenship practices. First, the legislation sought to 
change how a group of people described themselves. Second, it also sought 
to change aspects of the citizenship ceremony. How each of these citizenship 
practices conveyed a celebratory meaning of citizenship is described in more 
depth below.
The 1948 Act gave Australians a new way of describing themselves. In debating 
the bill, parliamentarian Mr Haylen stated that ‘[w]hen this Bill becomes law, 
an Australian may call himself an Australian because he holds Australian 
9 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 November 1993, 2904 (Phillip 
Ruddock).
10 Joint Standing Committee on Migration, Parliament of Australia, Australians All: Enhancing Citizenship 
(September 1994) 89. See also Sir Ninian Stephen, ‘Australian Citizenship: Past, Present and Future’ (2000) 
26(2) Monash University Law Review; Margaret Thornton, ‘The Legocentric Citizen’ (1996) 21 Australian Law 
Journal 72.
11 Tristan Ewins, ‘Citizenship Education in Australia: Beyond Consensus’ in Glenn Patmore (ed), The Vocal 
Citizen (Arena, 2004) 100, 102.
12 Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context (Law Book, 2002) 9.
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citizenship’.13 It was explicitly hoped that this new way of describing oneself 
would create a distinct sense of national identity. In the second reading speech 
of the Bill, the former Minister for Immigration Mr Calwell noted that
[t]o say that one is Australian is, of course, to indicate beyond all doubt 
that one is British; but to claim to be of the British race does not make 
it clear that one is Australian. The time has come for Australia and other 
dominions to recognize officially and legally their maturity as members 
of the British Commonwealth by the passage of separate citizenship 
laws.14 
The 1948 Act changed the way that Australians described themselves in 
order to distinguish themselves from other British subjects. Using the term 
Australian citizen to describe oneself was also intended to evoke positive 
emotions. Mr Calwell stated in parliamentary debate that the 1948 Act would 
‘help him express his pride in citizenship of this great country’.15 Mr Calwell 
further claimed that ‘[t]his Bill is more than a cold, legalistic formula. It is a 
warm, pulsating document that enshrines the love of country of every genuine 
Australian.’16 The novelty of the use of legislation to capture an affective sense of 
Australian identity is highlighted by the parliamentarians who argued against 
the introduction of the 1948 Act. For instance, Mr Gullet asked: ‘Does anyone 
feel any more Australian as the result of establishing an Australian nationality?’17 
Mr Ryan further doubted whether citizenship could be reduced to words at 
all, noting that ‘[t]he ties which bind the Empire cannot be defined in words; 
they are bonds of sympathy, blood and kinship’.18 Yet the 1948 Act was passed 
and from that moment onwards, the term ‘Australian citizen’ has been used to 
describe membership in the Australian community. 
Second, the 1948 Act introduced the requirement that applicants for Australian 
citizenship take a public oath of allegiance.19 While taking an oath had been 
a requirement for naturalisation for some time,20 before 1948 oaths were 
13 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 November 1948, 3248 (Leslie 
Haylen).
14 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 1948, 1060 (Arthur 
Calwell). 
15 ibid.
16 ibid 1066. 
17 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 November 1948, 3281 (Henry 
Gullet).
18 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 November 1948, 3278 (Rupert 
Ryan).
19 Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) s 41.
20 Conal Condren, Argument and Authority in Early Modern England: The Presupposition of Oaths and Offices 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006); Clive Parry Nationality and Citizenship Laws of The Commonwealth and 
of The Republic of Ireland (Stevens & Sons, 1957) 53, 65; Naturalization Act 1870 (Imp) 35 & 36 Vict, c.39 
s 9. For a history of oaths in Australia see Deidre McKeowan, ‘Changes in the Australian Oath of Citizenship’ 
(Parliamentary Research Note No 20, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2002).
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made privately before a justice, judge or magistrate.21 The 1948 Act gave the 
Minister powers to make arrangements that the oath could be made in public 
and ‘accompanied by proceedings designed to impress upon applicants the 
importance of the occasion’. 22 Mr Calwell noted that
[i]t is proposed that the oath be made in open court, where the 
Australian flag shall be prominently displayed and have pride of place 
… The old system, under which a man’s naturalization papers came to 
him through the mail, like his annual licence for his dog or his motor 
car, was inappropriate.23 
Making the pledge in public gave applicants a sense that becoming an Australian 
citizen was a ‘great and joyful decision’24 and more than ‘merely a piece of office 
routine’.25 In 1954, the legislation clarified that the Minister could require that 
the oath be taken in public.26
Although the 1948 Act included no definition of citizenship, it is clear that 
Parliament intended that it was more than a piece of legislative machinery. 
The 1948 Act promoted the meaning of Australian citizenship by introducing 
two new citizenship practices: a new way of describing oneself, and a public 
demonstration of pride in acquiring citizenship. These two practices emphasise 
the meaning of citizenship as a public celebration of a newly created Australian 
national identity. 
The preamble and the pledge
In 1993, the government amended the 1948 Act and generated new citizenship 
practices that altered and reinforced meanings about Australian citizenship. In 
1993, the Keating government added a preamble to the 1948 Act by passing 
the Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1993 (Cth) (the ‘1993 Amendment 
Act’).27 The new preamble led to a change in citizenship practices relating to 
the oath. The oath was reworded to mirror the preamble and was called a pledge 
of commitment. The new pledge of commitment was more than a change in the 
machinery of the 1948 Act. It was a new practice that altered and reinforced a 
celebratory meaning of citizenship. 
21 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 1948, 1064 (Arthur 
Calwell).
22 Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) s 41.
23 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 1948, 1064–5 (Arthur 
Calwell).
24    ibid 1065. 
25 ibid.
26 Nationality and Citizenship Act 1953 (Cth) s 41.
27 Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) preamble, as amended by Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 
1993 (Cth).
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In 1992, amidst public concern about the need to promote a commitment to 
democratic rights and values,28 former Senator Michael Tate commissioned 
well-known Australian poet Les Murray to craft the words of a new preamble 
to Australia’s citizenship legislation.29 The introduction of the preamble was 
designed to raise awareness of the importance of citizenship. In the parliamentary 
debates, Mr O’Keefe said: ‘The act should also contain a preamble defining the 
meaning which the parliament and the people of Australia accord to citizenship. 
This is what the preamble will do.’30 The words of the new preamble were:
The Parliament recognises that Australian citizenship represents formal 
membership of the community of the Commonwealth of Australia, and 
Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, uniting all Australians, while respecting their diversity; and 
persons granted Australian citizenship enjoy these rights and undertake 
to accept these obligations
(a) by pledging loyalty to Australia and its people; and
(b) by sharing their democratic beliefs; and
(c) by respecting their rights and liberties; and
(d) by upholding and obeying the laws of Australia31
The words used in the preamble suggest that the government supported active 
participation in the Australian democracy. However, words such as ‘democracy’, 
‘freedom’ and ‘loyalty’ can have many, varied meanings. During the debate of 
the 1993 amendment, some parliamentarians expressed dissatisfaction with 
the wording of the pledge, describing it as ‘wishy-washy’32 and argued that it 
should be a much stronger statement.33 
Insight into the meaning of citizenship that the government sought to convey 
through the preamble can be gained by considering the words that were not 
included in the preamble. The initial draft of the preamble, written by Les 
Murray went as follows:
Under God, from this time forward
28 Mark McKenna, ‘First Words: A Brief History of Public Debate on a New Preamble to the Australian 
Constitution 1991–99’ (Research Paper No 16, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2000).
29 Les Murray, The Quality of Sprawl (Duffy & Snellgrove, 1999) 16. 
30 ibid 2000.
31 Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) preamble, as amended by Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 
1993 (Cth), preamble.
32 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 November 1993, 2989 (Alan 
Cadman).
33 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 November 1993, 2924 (Warren 
Truss).
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I am part of the Australian people
I share their democracy and their freedom, I obey their laws,
I will never despise their customs or their faith
And I expect Australia to be loyal to me.34 
In the final version, the government did not include the words ‘freedom’ or 
‘customs and faith’. Les Murray later commented that these words referred 
to tolerance of diverse ways of life and religious affiliations.35 Instead, the 
government inserted a new line which referred to ‘respecting rights and 
liberties’. The government also deleted the last line of Les Murray’s draft. Les 
Murray indicated that the last line referred to ‘the voice of the sovereign citizen 
making promises and demands as of right vis-à-vis the nation and its servant 
— the government’.36 This deletion suggests that the government intended to 
convey a meaning of citizenship that was more celebratory of existing structures 
of parliamentary sovereignty, than a meaning that called on citizens to actively 
seek to hold government accountable. 
The impact of the new preamble was clearly symbolic. The meaning of citizenship 
conveyed through the preamble was not designed to alter any citizenship rights 
or obligations. For although preambles are legally part of an act,37 the only 
impact of the preamble is on judges and decision-makers engaged in statutory 
interpretation. That is, where there are competing interpretations of another 
term in the Act, then the preamble might be referred to in order to decide which 
interpretation best achieves the purpose or purposes of the Act.38 
However the preamble did impact on citizenship practices. Alongside the 
introduction of the preamble, the oath was reworded and renamed a ‘pledge of 
commitment’. The words of the new pledge draw explicitly on the words of the 
preamble:
From this time forward [under God]
I pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people
Whose democratic rights and liberties I respect, and
Whose laws I will uphold and obey.39 
34 ibid.
35 Murray, above n 29, 16.
36 ibid 17.
37 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 13(b).
38 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA.
39 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) sch 1.
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The 1993 Amendment Act created a new practice which required candidates 
for citizenship by grant (previously called naturalisation, now called conferral) 
to recite these words aloud before their citizenship took legal effect. The 
significance of the new wording was that the pledge was now made to ‘Australia 
and its people’. Prior to 1993, the citizenship oath had been made to the British 
monarch.40 The parliamentary debate surrounding the new pledge focused 
on whether it was more Australian to make a pledge of loyalty to historical 
English institutions including a foreign monarch, or to make a pledge of 
loyalty to Australia and ‘its own symbols’.41 The successful passage of the 1993 
Amendment Act removed from the pledge any reference to the British monarch.
Although the words used in the pledge affirmed Australian independence from 
Britain, it missed an opportunity to convey active citizenship. Although the 
pledge includes words such as ‘democratic beliefs’, ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’, 
these words of the pledge do not clearly convey active Australian citizenship. 
These characteristics are held by Australians in a passive tense. The future 
citizen-subject merely ‘shares’ their democratic beliefs with others. The 
future citizen-subject promises to ‘respect’ the rights and freedoms of others, 
without mentioning the positive obligation to realise and protect those rights 
and freedoms. The future citizen subject also obeys the law without a hint 
of critical or ethical concern. These words of the pledge might be contrasted 
with a proposed draft of the Australian constitutional preamble, which while 
‘celebrating unity’, also was ‘believing in freedom and equality, and embracing 
democracy’.42 The words of the preamble emphasise the celebration of Australia’s 
democratic institutions and its independence from Britain. 
The introduction of the preamble triggered a change in the practice of the oath. 
The oath, now a pledge of commitment, requires candidates for citizenship to 
recite aloud a shortened form of the words contained in the new preamble. 
Both the preamble and the pledge, sought to convey citizenship as a public 
celebration of a newly created Australian national identity. 
These two examples demonstrate that the ACA is not only a mechanistic set of 
rules about the acquisition, loss and resumption of citizenship status. Rather, 
the government uses citizenship legislation as a vehicle to generate citizenship 
practices which effectively convey particular meanings about Australian 
citizenship. The introduction of the legal status of citizenship in 1948 changed 
40 Deidre McKeowan, ‘Changes in the Australian Oath of Citizenship’ (Parliamentary Research Note No 20, 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2002).
41 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 September 1993, 1433 (Christopher Schacht). See also 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 17 November 1993, 2994 (Alan Cadman).
42 Non-Government Parties Preamble to the Australian Constitutional Referendum by Gareth Evans, 
Natasha Stott-Despoja and Bob Brown on 28th April 1999. Cited in Mark McKenna, Amelia Simpson and 
George Williams, ‘With Hope in God, the Prime Minister and the Poet: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum on 
the Preamble’ (2001) 24 (2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 401, 405.
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the way that people described themselves and made the oath public. These 
practices sought to convey a celebratory notion of Australian citizenship. The 
introduction of the preamble in 1993 changed the wording of the oath. The 
government intended that this new practice more clearly convey a celebratory 
notion of independent Australian citizenship. The rest of this chapter examines 
the most recent reforms to Australian citizenship legislation and considers the 
extent to which these reforms have changed citizenship practices and altered 
the meaning of citizenship. 
The meaning of citizenship and the increasing 
significance of the citizenship pledge
The Australian government has shown a renewed interest in Australian 
citizenship law and policy in the last two decades. There have been numerous 
government inquiries and reports,43 leading to a number of legislative reforms 
to the citizenship eligibility criteria.44 Some of these reforms have been 
controversial,45 while others have passed without much comment.46 This section 
outlines how two changes to the current ACA have led to the government 
placing increasing significance of the pledge of commitment. The two changes 
considered are the introduction of the citizenship test and the legal regulation 
of the citizenship ceremony. 
43 Senate Select Committee on Employment, Education and Training, Parliament of Australia, Education for 
Active Citizenship Education in Australian Schools and Youth Organisations (1989); Senate Select Committee on 
Employment, Education and Training, Parliament of Australia, Education for Citizenship Revisited (1991), Joint 
Standing Committee on Migration, Parliament of Australia, Australians All: Enhancing Australian Citizenship 
(1994); Nick Bolkus, ‘Ties that Bind: A 4-year plan for Australian citizenship’ (Media release, 4 September 
1995); Senate Legal and Constitutional Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, National Well-Being: A 
System of National Citizenship Indicators and Benchmarks (1996); Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People: 
Civics and Citizenship Education (Commonwealth of Australia, 1994); Australian Citizenship Council ‘Australian 
Citizenship for a New Century’ (Report, Commonwealth of Australia, February 2000).
44 Australian Citizenship Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (Cth); Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth); 
Australian Citizenship (Transitionals and Consequentials) 2007 (Cth); Australian Citizenship Amendment 
(Citizenship Testing) Act 2007 (Cth); Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Test Review and Other 
Measures) Act 2009 (Cth); Australian Citizenship Amendment (Defence Families) Act 2012 (Cth); Australian 
Citizenship Amendment (Special Residence Requirements) Act 2013 (Cth).
45 Such as the citizenship testing criteria, and the length of time before a permanent resident can apply for 
citizenship. See Fardia Fozdar and Brian Spittles, ‘The Australian Citizenship Test: Process and Rhetoric’ (2009) 
55(4) Australian Journal of Politics and History 496; John Tate, ‘John Howard’s “Nation” and Citizenship Test: 
Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Identity’ (2009) 55(1) Australian Journal of Politics and History 97. 
46 Julie Szego, ‘I am, you are, we are…’, The Age (online), 26 September 2006, http://www.theage.com.
au/news/in-depth/i-am-you-are-we-are-/2006/09/24/1159036415375.html. Also note that the name of the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was change to the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship in 2007. 
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The pledge and the citizenship test
In October 2007, the Australian federal Parliament introduced testing of all 
candidates for Australian citizenship by conferral. Following a subsequent 
review of the citizenship testing regime, an independent committee 
recommended that citizenship testing be kept, but that the knowledge required 
to pass the test should be more closely aligned with the citizenship pledge.47 
The Rudd government agreed and sought to make the pledge of commitment 
‘the centre-piece of the Australian citizenship testing’.48 A brief explanation of 
the citizenship test and its purpose provides some useful background to explain 
the new significance of the pledge. 
In 2007, Parliament introduced a citizenship testing regime with bi-partisan 
support.49 Passing the citizenship test is now the only way that a candidate for 
citizenship by conferral can satisfy three eligibility criteria,50 unless an exception 
applies.51 The eligibility criteria satisfied by the test are: an understanding of 
the nature of the application, a basic understanding of English, and knowledge 
of Australia and the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship.52 
Previously, officials interviewed candidates to determine whether they satisfied 
these criteria.53 The purpose of the new written test format was to
encourage prospective citizens to obtain the knowledge they need to 
support successful integration into Australian society. The citizenship 
test will provide them with the opportunity to demonstrate in an 
objective way that they have the required knowledge of Australia, 
including the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship, and a basic 
knowledge and comprehension of English.54
The government stated that the test created an incentive for candidates to gain 
the necessary knowledge to support their future participation in Australian 
society, and to provide a mechanism by which they could demonstrate this 
47 Australian Test Review Committee, ‘Moving Forward … Improving Pathways to Citizenship’ (Report, 
August 2008) 3, 4.
48 Australian Government, ‘Moving Forward … Improving Pathways to Citizenship’ (Government Response 
to the Report by the Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee, November 2008) 2.
49 See Fardia Fozdar and Brian Spittles, above n 45. The introduction of citizenship testing in Australia is 
part of a wider international practice of introducing citizenship tests, particularly in Europe. However, other 
forms of integration tests have also been introduced such as requirements for courses, pledges etc. See Sara 
Goodman, ‘Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake?: Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic 
Integration Policies’ (2010) 35(5) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 753.
50 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) as amended by Australian Citizenship (Citizenship Testing) Act 2007 
(Cth) s 23A.
51 ibid s 21(2A).
52 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 21(2)(d)–(f).
53 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Australian 
Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Testing) Bill (2007) 11.
54 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 May 2007, 4 (Kevin Andrews).
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knowledge.55 While the test’s purpose might be simply stated, identifying the 
knowledge that was necessary was more difficult. The government’s solution was 
a pragmatic one. The government developed a citizenship booklet and stated 
that the questions in the citizenship test would be based on that booklet.56 When 
the first edition of the booklet was prepared in 2007 it included topics such as: 
responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship, Australian values, the 
Australian people today, Australia’s name and symbols, a story of Australia, 
government in Australia, the Australian Constitution, levels of government, and 
elected representatives.57
The subsequent independent committee later found that the testing framework 
did ‘not sit well with the legislative requirements’.58 The committee recommended 
that the knowledge required in the citizenship test should be aligned with the 
pledge.59 The Rudd government accepted this recommendation and revised 
the content of the booklet.60 The information in the second edition of the 
citizenship testing booklet was split into ‘testable’ and ‘non-testable’ sections.61 
The testable section was further divided into sections which corresponded 
to different parts of the pledge. The restructure both reduced the volume of 
knowledge required and more clearly identified how the information related 
to the pledge of commitment. However, the content of the knowledge in the 
testable section of the second edition is largely the same as the first. The second 
edition continues to focus on knowledge of the symbols, history, and the basic 
institutions of Australian democracy. This suggests that aligning the citizenship 
test with the pledge was less about modifying the content of the citizenship test, 
and more about finding a more persuasive justification for the citizenship test. 
As a result, the pledge of commitment acquired a new and heightened symbolic 
importance. 
The legal regulation of the pledge
The significance of the pledge was also enhanced by two changes to the legal 
regulation of the pledge. First, the ACA elevated the significance of making the 
pledge as a distinct and essential step towards acquiring citizenship. Second, 
the pledge was increasingly prescribed by law. 
55 Australian Government, ‘Much More Than Just a Ceremony’ (Discussion paper, September 2006) 11–12.
56 Australian Government ‘Becoming an Australian Citizen’ (Booklet, Commonwealth of Australia, 2007).
57 ibid.
58 Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee, above n 47.
59 ibid 16.
60 Australian Government, ‘Moving Forward … Improving Pathways to Citizenship’ above n 48, 2–3.
61 Australian Government, Australian Citizenship: Our Common Bond (Citizenship Booklet, Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2009).
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The Howard government elevated the significance of the pledge in the 
legislative reforms of 2007. Prior to 2007, the requirement to make the pledge 
was located separately from the other eligibility criteria, and was described as 
a condition to be satisfied before the grant of citizenship had legal effect.62 The 
ACA elevated the legal importance of the pledge by making it clear that there 
were two essential steps in acquiring citizenship by conferral: the application 
for citizenship must be approved, and the applicant must take the pledge.63 The 
legal status of citizenship would not be conferred without the applicant making 
the pledge. 
The ACA also clarified that the Minister had powers to make arrangements 
for how the pledge was to be made.64 Although the Minister had this power 
previously, this provision of the ACA was now used to pass regulations which 
explicitly provided that the Minister ‘may notify additional arrangements for 
making a pledge, or conducting a ceremony, that are designed to impress upon 
applicants the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship’.65 Under 
this regulation, a new citizenship ceremonies code (the Code) was published 
in 2008, prescribing certain guidelines concerning how the ceremonies should 
be conducted. The Code included a number of existing practices such as: the 
ceremony itself must be conducted by a duly authorised officer,66 national 
symbols must be displayed during citizenship ceremonies,67 all of the citizenship 
candidates must take the pledge,68 the Presiding Officer must attest that each 
applicant has recited the pledge before the applicants are formally recognised as 
citizens,69 a Minister’s message which must be read aloud,70 and that citizenship 
ceremonies should be promoted by the media.71 
Following the alignment of the pledge with the test, the Rudd government 
updated the Code in 2011. While nearly all of the arrangements for conducting 
citizenship ceremonies under the previous Code were kept, the new Code 
provided additional information about how to publicise the ceremony,72 and 
suggested a stronger emphasis on compliance by stating that some community 
62 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 15.
63 ibid s 20.
64 ibid s 27.
65 Australian Citizenship Regulations 2007 (Cth) reg 8.
66 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 27(3). 
67 ibid s 25.
68 ibid s 20(b).
69 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Citizenship Ceremonies Code (Booklet, 2008) 12.
70 ibid 17, Australian Citizenship Regulations 2007 (Cth) reg 8(b), sch 1.
71 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Citizenship Ceremonies Code (Booklet, 2008) 11.
72 ibid 19. For instance, ABC TV covered the citizenship ceremony on Australia Day 2012 and 2013. See 
Australian Broadcasting Commission, National Flag and Raising and Citizenship Ceremony Australia Day, http://
www.abc.net.au/australiaday/ceremony.htm. Citizenship ceremonies are also publicised on the Australia Day 
website events. See for example Australian Day, Citizenship ‘What’s On’, http://www.australiaday.com.au/
whatson/citizenship.aspx.
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organisations would be required to ‘sign an agreement with the department on 
how ceremonies are to be conducted’.73 Increasing the legal regulation of first 
the pledge, and then the citizenship ceremony, intensified the significance of the 
pledge of commitment.
The emerging significance of the pledge in 2007 suggests that a fresh examination 
of the pledge as a practice is warranted. This chapter now turns to consider to 
what extent the new practice conveys a meaning of active citizenship, including 
the extent to which it values protest, disagreement and even acts of civil 
disobedience. 
Interpreting the citizenship pledge as a 
performance
This section examines the meaning of citizenship conveyed by the current 
practice of the pledge of commitment. This section applies the theoretical 
frameworks of John Austin and David Kertzer to analyse the meaning of 
citizenship conveyed by the pledge of commitment as a performance. First, John 
Austin’s well known theory about speech acts demonstrates the importance of 
focusing on the meaning communicated through the performative dimensions 
of the verbal statements. Second, David Kertzer’s work on political rituals 
identifies the wider social meaning that the performance of the pledge plays 
in national societies. This section concludes by arguing that the performance 
of the pledge is a symbolic act which asks the citizen by conferral to embody 
obedience to the law by submitting to the authority of the government. 
Austin’s theory of speech acts
Analysing the pledge as a speech act helps to understand the pledge as a 
performance, rather than just the words that are used in the statement. This is 
particularly important as although the ACA has been subject to critique, the 
critique typically focuses on the text of the ACA. Examining the performative 
dimension of the pledge offers new insights into the meaning of citizenship 
conveyed by the pledge. 
Philosopher John Austin argues that verbal statements not only describe or 
report facts, they are also ‘performative’. In his lecture series ‘How To Do 
Things With Words’, Austin argues that the statement ‘I name this ship Queen 
Elizabeth — as uttered when smashing a bottle against the stem’,74 is to perform 
73 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Citizenship Ceremonies Code (Booklet, 2008) 7.
74 J.L Austin, How To Do Things With words (Oxford University Press, 1962) 5.
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the naming of the ship.75 Similarly, the statement ‘I do’, means ‘I marry you’.76 
A performative utterance or speech act can be made up of either verbal or non-
verbal cues, or a combination of both. 
For an utterance to amount to a speech act, Austin states that the utterance must 
have certain features. Those features are:
A.1 There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a 
certain conventional effect, that includes the uttering of certain words 
by certain persons in certain circumstances, further
A.2 The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked, and
B.1 The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly 
and,
B.2 Completely, and
C.1 Where if certain feelings are to be communicated or felt, they are 
communicated or so felt
C.2 Must actually conduct themselves subsequently.77 
The convention procedure mentioned in A.1 is the most complex part of the 
speech act, and deserves some further explanation. A convention procedure is the 
context in which the verbal utterance is made. Words can become performative 
when they are recognised by an audience as being part of a particular context. 
Recognition of the context will depend on a number of other factors, including 
the roles that the speaker and audience play, how authority is exercised, as well 
as the presence of other symbols and cultural practices that might accompany 
the performance. 
A citizenship pledge is a speech act when it is made during a citizenship 
ceremony. The citizenship ceremony is recognisable in that it is accompanied by 
legally prescribed symbols, and follows a consistent and recognised order that 
is clearly prescribed by the citizenship ceremonies code. Authorised persons 
must ensure that the pledge is spoken by each candidate. The convention effect, 
if properly followed, is that a person at the end of the ceremony will have the 
formal legal status of Australian citizenship. The appropriate emotion generated 
during the ceremony is of dignified celebration and a sense of unity. If the 
candidates do not take the pledge, then the performance is incomplete and 
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Austin’s theory of speech acts brings into clear focus the importance of 
examining the context in which the pledge is performed. David Kertzer’s theory 
of political ritual provides an analytical framework to interpret the performance 
of the pledge. 
Kertzer and political ritual
David Kertzer’s work offers insights into the meaning and emotional affect 
communicated through the performance of the citizenship pledge. Kertzer 
identifies a number of characteristics of modern rituals: rituals are typically 
formal in the sense that they are ceremonial;78 a ritual will follow standardised 
procedures so that the ceremony is recognisable to the audience;79 and rituals 
use simultaneity in physical space to generate and spread an appropriate 
emotional response.80 The emotional response to the ritual is important as this is 
what contrasts ritual with a habit or custom. Kertzer also notes that to generate 
an appropriate emotional response, rituals avoid specific language.81 Instead, 
rituals use dramatization and symbols to generate a rich ambiguity, or ‘multi-
vocality’.82 Ambiguity avoids the potential for disagreement or dissent between 
the individuals and the group about the content of the ritual, and instead 
permits the participants to focus on the embodied experience of the ritual. 
Kertzer argues that many political organisations, clubs, associations and nations 
use membership rituals.83 These rituals reassert the power and legitimacy of the 
organisation and make the organisation be ‘seen’ in certain ways.84 He argues 
that, during membership rituals in nation states, oaths of allegiance and pledges 
are primarily used to build solidarity,85 particularly when consensus is lacking.86 
Understanding the Australian citizenship pledge as a membership ritual 
highlights how the performance creates an embodied experience for the 
candidate. Unity is enacted through the formal, simultaneous and public 
recitation of certain words. The words of the pledge are vague, and employ 
multi-vocality to enhance the sensation of physical and sonorous unity. In 2000, 
when the Australian Citizenship Council considered whether the wording of the 
pledge of commitment should be amended, it said:
78 David Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (Yale University Press, 1988) 9.
79 ibid. 
80 ibid 40: ‘emotion’; ibid 30: ‘space’. 
81 ibid 30.
82 ibid 11. 
83 ibid 13.
84 ibid 15; ibid 24: making organisations visible in relation to rituals and power.
85 ibid 67.
86 ibid 153.
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The view was put to the Council that because the Preamble is drafted in 
fairly general terms, it may not be as relevant to some Australians (for 
example those born in Australia) as it is to others. Nonetheless, in the 
Council’s view, it is precisely this lack of prescription which allows the 
Preamble to be relevant to all Australian Citizens — whether born in 
Australia or overseas …87
The ritualised pledge creates a unified community through simultaneous 
performance.88 Indeed, the government has explicitly acknowledged that placing 
increasing significance on the pledge enhances national unity. For instance, the 
government has stated that ‘[t]he Pledge joins all Australians in a statement of 
unity’.89 The sense of unity is amplified by the growing public nature of the 
ceremony, its increased promotion and media coverage.90 Not only is the sense 
of unity experienced by the candidates making the pledge, but the experience 
is shared by the general public, who are witnessing the pledge.
However, the physical sensation of unity is not the only embodied experience 
that is reinforced by the performance of the pledge of commitment. The 
performance also embodies obedience and, in particular, obedience as 
submission to government authority. This dimension of the performed pledge of 
commitment potentially undermines active citizenship in Australia. 
Performing citizenship, embodying obedience 
This section explores the ways in which the performance of citizenship pledge 
embodies obedience. It then identifies how this performance is problematic for 
active citizenship and Australian democracy. 
The performance of the pledge is the means through which candidates 
demonstrate with their bodies their willingness to submit to the laws of Australia. 
The way that the pledge must be made is formal and tightly prescribed through 
a matrix of the quasi legislative documents, including the citizenship ceremony 
codes. A candidate must follow the citizenship rules of the performance, 
otherwise the legal status of citizenship will not be conferred. The performance 
of the pledge has little room for individual agency. The only choice is whether or 
not the candidate makes the pledge under God.91 Moreover, there are generally 
87 Australian Citizenship Council, Australian Citizenship for A New Century (Report, February 2000) 81. 
88 ibid 23.
89 Australian Government, above n 48, 2.
90 ibid 19. For instance, ABC TV covered the citizenship ceremony on Australia Day 2012 and 2013. See 
Australian Broadcasting Commission, National Flag and Raising and Citizenship Ceremony Australia Day, http://
www.abc.net.au/australiaday/ceremony.htm. Citizenship ceremonies are also publicised on the Australia Day 
website events. See for example Australian Day, Citizenship ‘What’s On’, http://www.australiaday.com.au/
whatson/citizenship.aspx.
91 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 27(1) sch 1.
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only limited exceptions to the requirement to make the pledge in order to 
become a citizen.92 The migrant’s acceptance into the Australian democratic 
collective is therefore generally contingent on the candidate performing the 
pledge. The candidate must signal with their bodies that they will obey the laws 
by physically submitting the legal requirements for this performance. 
The pledge enacts obedience as a submission to the government as the sovereign 
authority. It is significant that the pledge is taken by an ‘authorised officer’,93 
who is a representative of the state. The candidate is further reminded that it is 
the state that has the authority to accept the pledge, as either the Minister or, in 
his or her absence, the Minister’s speech, is clearly present. The performance of 
the pledge is marked by the symbols of the state, the flag, the anthem, and the 
picture of the Queen. These symbols remind the candidate of the authority of 
the government. So although the text of the pledge expresses loyalty to Australia 
and its people, the context of the ceremony reinforces that it is the state who 
holds ultimate authority. 
It is also significant that only migrants are required to perform the pledge. The 
renewed emphasis on the pledge and its performance has followed a period in 
Australia of increased suspicion towards non-white migrants,94 in particular, a 
suspicion that migrants do not integrate into Australian society and that certain 
cultural beliefs and practices threaten social cohesion and national unity.95 This 
context reinforces the argument that enacting the pledge reasserts the existing 
social and political order. In discussion surrounding the introduction of the 
citizenship test, parliamentarian Alan Cadman hinted that the value of the 
pledge was to reinforce the message to migrant future citizens that they must 
not seek to change Australian society: 
I think the only way in which we can influence those who want to subvert 
or change Australia to their own form of dictatorship or dominance and 
who want to be separate from the bulk of Australians is to have them 
understand that most Australians really do know what this country 
stands for and do want to support it and see it prosper. They want to see 
their families, and the generations who follow, prosper in an open, free 
and democratic society. The only way in which that can be achieved is 
92 Exceptions are set out for those who are under 16, who have a permanent or enduring physical or mental 
incapacity, if they were born to a former Australian citizens, born in Papua, or stateless. Australian Citizenship 
Act 2007 (Cth) s 26(1).
93 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 27(3).
94 Ghassan Hage, White Nation (Routledge, 2000).
95 Robert Holton ‘Immigration, Social Cohesion and National Identity’ (Parliamentary Research Paper, 
Social Policy Group, Research Paper No 1, 1 September 1997). 
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through the Citizenship Act and by having the Citizenship Act as a basis 
of understanding: if somebody who has taken the oath seeks to corrupt 
or ignore [sic], they become answerable to the processes of law.96 
Performing the pledge therefore ensures that the migrant promises that they 
will submit to the existing political system or society, and if they do not, they 
will become traitors and be legitimately punished by the law. Therefore the 
performance of the pledge not only involves obedience, but submission, and 
weakens the understanding of the future migrant citizen as an independent and 
active agent for political change. 
The recent introduction of affirmation ceremonies has not changed the focus on 
the performance of the pledge as an act of submission by migrant future citizens. 
In 2006, the government introduced a new practice in citizenship ceremonies 
that invites the audience to repeat the pledge of commitment. However, this 
new practice does not alter the meaning of the pledge as primarily performed 
by the migrant. Participation in affirmation ceremonies is not compulsory and 
does not have any legal effect. The affirmation ceremony is conducted after the 
pledge of commitment made by the new citizen-migrants. These aspects suggest 
that the affirmation ceremonies draw their meaning from the migrant pledge and 
reinforce it, rather than conveying any new meaning about citizenship.
It should be noted that the rich multi-vocality of political rituals permits 
opportunities for the generation of meanings of citizenship other than those 
determined by officials or the organisation.97 Kertzer identifies that some rituals 
can challenge the official symbolic meaning of membership rituals.98 These 
include rituals of rebellion (disobedience), reversion (inverting the power 
relations for ‘a day’), or revolution. However, state control over the present 
citizenship pledge in the Australian ceremony is tight. Opportunities for 
subversion and challenge within the ceremony itself are limited. Perhaps if 
alternative civic rituals investing citizenship with different meanings become 
more commonplace, alternative ways of expressing Australian citizenship might 
generate new meanings. At present, the opportunities to undermine the official 
meaning of citizenship as obedience and submission are limited. 
The meaning of citizenship generated by the law and conveyed by citizenship 
practices has the potential to influence the degree and scope of critical political 
engagement in Australian democracy. There are at least two implications for 
Australian democracy of a meaning of citizenship that reinforces obedience 
and submission. First, the emphasis on citizenship as obedience may influence 
the interpretation of the ACA, and so may exclude some applications for 
96 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 June 2007, 58 (Alan Cadman).
97 David Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (Yale University Press, 1988) 12.
98 ibid 13.
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Australian citizenship. Second, the emphasis on obedience and submission 
might discourage permanent residents from engaging in active citizenship in 
Australia, both before they become citizens and afterwards. These implications 
diminish the level of critical political engagement in Australian democracy. 
First, the emphasis on citizenship as obedience has the potential to influence 
decisions about which applications are accepted or rejected. At present, ‘good 
character’ is one of the eligibility criteria for citizenship by conferral.99 Criminal 
offences are a key consideration which may indicate that a person is not of good 
character, although mitigating factors are considered. Mitigating factors include 
assessing the seriousness of the offence, age when committed, length of time 
since commission of the offence, and whether or not the offence was a one-off 
occurrence.100 Another factor relevant to character is whether the person has been 
involved in activities which show ‘disregard for the law’.101 With an emphasis 
on citizenship as obedience, this could lead to the rejection of candidates who 
have engaged in political protest and acts of civil disobedience, such as the 
British citizen who painted ‘NO WAR’ on the Opera House. Alternatively, an 
emphasis on obedience may influence the exercise of the Minister’s residual 
discretion.102 The policy guidelines that govern how the Minister may exercise 
his or her residual discretion are vague.103 The explanatory memorandum 
suggests that the discretion could be exercised where ‘a person incites hatred 
or religious intolerance’.104 But the line between political action and religious 
intolerance is difficult to ascertain, and may operate to reinforce discriminatory 
stereotypes. For instance, the protests about the release of the film Innocence of 
Muslims in Sydney in 2012 were framed as acts of religious intolerance, rather 
than political protests.105 Political agitators might therefore be excluded from 
Australian citizenship under the wide scope of the Minister’s residual discretion. 
The performance of the pledge which conveys a meaning of citizenship that 
reinforces obedience and submission has the potential to influence how the ACA 
is applied, and exclude those who are active citizens. 
99 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 21(2)(h).
100 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship Instructions, 1 July 2013, ch 10.5.2 
‘Good Character’. Note that the ‘good character’ guidelines for citizenship are different to the ‘good character’ 
guidelines for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). At the time this chapter went to press, the 
Australian Citizenship and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 was before the Parliament. If passed, it 
will clarify and extend the scope of the character provisions in the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth).’.
101 ibid [10.2].
102 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 24.
103 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship Instructions, 1 July 2013, ch 5.27 
‘Decision Making’.
104 Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Citizenship Bill 2005 (Cth) 30.
105 Yoni Bashan, ‘Arrests Made After Police Officers Injured at Anti-Islamic Film Protest in Sydney CBD’ 
The Daily Telegraph (online), 16 September 2012, http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/police-use-
pepper-spray-on-anti-islamic-film-protesters-in-sydney-at-the-us-consulate/story-fndo317g-1226474744811.
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Second, an emphasis on citizenship as obedience and submission may discourage 
the political engagement of migrants both before they become citizens, as well 
as afterwards. 
Those seeking Australian citizenship might avoid acts of active citizenship 
prior to their application. A citizenship application might be rejected where 
a person has committed a crime, even when this crime was an expression of 
political activity. Engaging in active citizenship is therefore risky. However, 
contributions by non-citizens have been very valuable in shaping Australian 
democracy. For instance, Australian democracy might be entirely different if 
the Italian migrant Raphaello Carboni had been reluctant to participate in the 
events during and after the Eureka Stockade.106
The emphasis on submission to legal authority may also influence the behavior 
of candidates after they become citizens. Certainly, once a migrant-applicant 
becomes a citizen, then they are legally free to engage in Australian democracy 
as they choose and to benefit from the democratic freedoms that other 
Australian citizens have. However, apart from the government rhetoric about 
active citizenship, there is a general absence of critical practices that emphasise 
the importance of critical engagement with Australian democracy. There are 
only minimal protections of participation in politics, and no express federal 
legislative charter of liberal rights or tolerance.107 This political environment 
creates inconsistent messages for new citizens about the extent to which they 
are encouraged to participate as active citizens, and to engage in protest action 
or even civil disobedience. Indeed, research suggests that Australian citizens 
by conferral are less likely to engage in political action than Australian citizens 
by birth.108 While it is difficult to speculate the extent to which the meaning of 
citizenship as communicated through the performance of the pledge contributes 
to this result, it does suggest that any emphasis on citizenship as obedience 
and submission will only further undermine an already low level of political 
engagement. 
Although only applicants for citizenship by conferral need to perform the pledge 
and embody obedience and submission, the practice has a far reaching impact on 
Australian democracy. Citizenship by conferral is a significant means of gaining 
membership in a country of high immigration such as Australia. Government 
statistics estimate that 26.8  per  cent of the Australian population is born 
overseas, and it is likely that a large proportion of those born overseas acquire 
106 Jennifer Lorch, ‘Rafaello Carboni’ Australian Dictionary of Biography (Melbourne University Press, 
1968) http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/carboni-raffaello-3163.
107 Donald Horne, ‘A Constitution of Openness, Accessibility and Shared Discourse?’ (2001) 24(3) University 
of NSW Law Journal 610, 616.
108 Antoine Bilodeau, ‘Immigrants’ Voice Through Protest Politics in Canada and Australia: Assessing the 
Impact of Pre-Migration Political Repression’ (2008) 34 (6) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 975.
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Australian citizenship through citizenship by conferral.109 A performance of 
citizenship that embodies obedience is problematic for Australian democracy 
because it undermines the critical agency of nearly a quarter of the population. 
Furthermore, the public performance of the pledge conveys a submissive 
understanding of citizenship to the wider public through the media and 
high profile events, which influences the understanding of citizenship in the 
Australian community more broadly. 
Conclusion
This chapter argues that even though the rhetoric of the Australian government 
supports active citizenship, the meaning about citizenship conveyed by the law 
suggests otherwise. Through expanding the analysis to include an examination 
of citizenship practices in the ACA, this chapter explores the meaning of 
citizenship conveyed by the government. Although Australian citizenship 
practices have historically conveyed a celebratory meaning of citizenship, 
this chapter reveals how the recent government emphasis on the practice of 
the pledge of commitment has altered the meaning of citizenship. Using the 
theory of speech act and political ritual, it argues that the performance of the 
pledge conveys Australian citizenship as obedience and submission to the law 
and existing democratic structures. Without room made for disagreement and 
contestation, a robust notion of active citizenship is therefore undermined. The 
current Australian practice of making a pledge works against active citizenship 
in Australia, as well as undermining active political engagement in Australian 
democracy. 




9. People You Might Know: Social 
Media in the Conflict Between Law 
and Democracy
Stephen Tully1
Twitter and other blogs, Facebook, emails, SMS messages, LinkedIn, Youtube 
and Flickr are ubiquitous forms of communication within modern society. The 
role of these tools in enabling individuals to express their political opinions, 
as well as whether and how social media should be regulated, have emerged 
as questions of considerable interest. However, the issue of locating social 
media within a possible conflict between regulation and democracy remains 
underexplored. Law is just one of the forces or ‘regulators’ that control and 
define systems such as the internet, the others being markets, architectures and 
norms.2 Civil or political liberties within cyberspace will only be enhanced if 
these forces are democratic in nature.3
This chapter will assess two broad propositions: first, that social media has the 
potential to enhance democratic participation, and secondly, that legal restrictions 
can curtail this opportunity. These topics are significant because the influence 
of social media is frequently overstated and, in debates where democracy is at 
stake, the desirability of regulatory controls is typically overlooked. Part one 
defines social media and explores the premise that social media is conducive to 
enhanced democracy. It also identifies some of the risks and dangers of relying 
on this particular medium as a means of political participation. Part two will 
illustrate sources of and solutions to contests between law and democracy by 
reference to the human right to freedom of expression. Permissible limitations 
and restrictions on the exercise of that right can be identified from the paradigm 
of international human rights law. Those considerations will inform an analysis 
of a posited conflict between law and democracy. Particular attention is given 
to recent developments within the United States, Europe, China, and Australia. 
There is an observable trend towards greater government regulation of social 
media within each of these jurisdictions for national security, law enforcement 
and other reasons. Underlying themes to be addressed include notions of 
individual liberty, conditions of access to and participation in social media, 
the permissibility of restrictions within a democratic society, sound regulatory 
1 srtully@gmail.com.
2 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999).
3 Michael Best and Keegan Wade, ‘Democratic and Anti-Democratic Regulators of the Internet: A Framework’ 
(2006) http://mikeb.inta.gatech.edu/papers/democratic.best.wade.pdf.
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development and ensuring government accountability. I contend that, in 
order to accommodate competing policy priorities, the adoption of regulatory 
measures inevitably but necessarily impairs the enjoyment of human rights and 
constrains the civic potential offered by social media.
Social media as a means of political 
participation
Social media may be defined as a group of internet-based applications which 
build on the ideological and technical foundations of Web 2.0, and allow the 
creation and exchange of user-generated content.4 Social networking sites such 
as Facebook provide an online presence for users to share information, search 
for others and communicate. Blogs such as Twitter enable users to publish 
commentary and broadcast it publicly over the internet. Social media such as 
YouTube enables users to publish and share images, videos and music through 
the internet. Whatever the particular form, social media has several common 
characteristics. First, a capability to attract a wide audience. Second, content is 
created when one user communicates with another.5
Social media is fast becoming the preferred mode for education, employment, 
commerce and personal expression. Indeed, non-access and disconnection from 
the internet has been described as tantamount to ‘non-existence’.6 Social media 
may be employed for a range of purposes. For example, the capacity for social 
media to provide accurate and timely information makes it a useful tool for 
promoting human rights.7 During the Kosovo conflict, for example, NATO states 
targeted Serb media outlets conveying government propaganda but not internet 
service providers. It was considered that ‘[f]ull and open access to the Internet 
can only help the Serbian people know the ugly truth about the atrocities and 
4 Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, ‘Users of the World, Unite!: The Challenges and Opportunities of 
Social Media’ (2010) 53(1) Business Horizons 59, 61.
5 Content is ‘user generated’ if it is available to a select group on a publicly-accessible website or a social 
networking site, entails a minimum amount of creative effort, and is created outside of professional routines 
and practices: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Participative Web and User-Created 
Content: Web 2.0, Wikis and Social Networking (2007) 18.
6 Allen Hammond, ‘The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Codifying the Digital Divide’ (1997) 50 Federal 
Communications Law Journal 179, 185. See generally Jack Balkin, ‘The Future of Free Expression in a Digital 
Age’ (2009) 36 Pepperdine Law Review 427.
7 Jamie Metzl, ‘Information Technology and Human Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 705, 706.
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crimes against humanity being perpetrated in Kosovo by the Milosevic regime’.8 
Human rights non-governmental organisations benefit from the internet with 
respect to information dissemination and ease of communication.9
The internet has also changed the social conditions of speech. The cultural 
and participatory features of the human right to freedom of expression are 
accentuated.10 The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr Frank La 
Rue, has been mandated to provide his views on the advantages and challenges 
of new information and communication technologies, including the internet and 
mobile technologies.11 He believes that the internet is ‘inherently democratic’ 
because it provides the public with access to information and enables individuals 
to actively participate in the process of communication.12 In his view, the internet 
facilitates citizen participation in building democratic societies.13 Marginalised 
or disadvantaged social sectors can also obtain information and participate in 
public debates concerning social, economic and political changes affecting their 
circumstances.14
But the relationship between social media and political participation is not 
so unequivocal. One view is that social media is the catalyst for political 
transformation — information is so widely accessible that individuals can 
formulate and express their own political opinions.15 On this account, social 
media fosters popular participation and greater democratisation within states. 
Through the internet, ‘[i]ndividuals become less passive, and thus more engaged 
observers of social spaces that could potentially become subjects for political 
conversation; they become more engaged participants in the debates about 
their observations’.16 Nevertheless, commentators are divided between those 
considering the internet to be a boon to democracy17 and those believing it is a 
tool of oppression.18
8 James Rubin, US State Department spokesperson, quoted in David Briscoe, ‘Kosovo-Propaganda War’, 
Associated Press, 17 May 1999.
9 Peter Brophy and Edward Halpin, ‘Through the Net to Freedom: Information, the Internet and Human 
Rights’ (1999) 25 Journal of Information Science 351, 354.
10 Jack Balkin, ‘Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society’ (2004) 79(1) New York University Law Review 3, 4.
11 Human Rights Council, Resolution 7/36 (2008) [4(f)].
12 Abid Hussain, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc E/
CN.4/1998/40 (28 January 1998) [45].
13 Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) [2], [19].
14 ibid [62].
15 Clay Shirky, ‘The Political Power of Social Media’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 28, 28–9.
16 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale 
University Press, 2006) 11.
17 Dietram Scheufele and Matthew Nisbet, ‘Being a Citizen Online: New Opportunities and Dead Ends’ 
(2002) 7(3) The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 55.
18 Tyler Boas, ‘The Dictator’s Dilemma?: The Internet and US policy Toward Cuba’ (2000) 23(3) The 
Washington Quarterly.
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It is admittedly true that the internet can prove to be an effective mechanism 
for political activism, particularly when combined with traditional forms of 
communications media.19 Social media facilitates activities as diverse as public 
education, fundraising, forming coalitions across geographical boundaries, 
distributing petitions or action alerts, and planning or coordinating events on 
a national, regional or international level. The internet and email, for example, 
has helped to organise consumer boycotts against multinational corporations 
and assist campaigns such as the adoption of selective purchasing legislation in 
Massachusetts against Myanmar.20
The role of social media during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ has also attracted 
considerable comment.21 In Egypt, for example, various groups used social 
media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter, to spread revolutionary 
messages and coordinate protests. Blogging became a source of information for 
political activists free from censorship or manipulation by the traditional state-
controlled media. The government identified Facebook as a harmful application 
and officials joined Facebook groups to warn individuals not to strike. Mobile 
phones were banned in police stations to prevent the recording of YouTube 
videos.
Then, on 28 January 2011, then President Hosni Mubarak disconnected the 
internet for five days across the entire state. US President Obama indicated 
support for the right of Egyptians to the freedom of speech and to access 
information, observing that ‘we’ve seen the incredible potential for technology 
to empower citizens and the dignity of those who stand up for a better future’.22 
US Secretary of State Clinton urged the Egyptian authorities ‘not to prevent 
peaceful protests or block communications, including on social media sites’.23 
However, encouraging social media use as a means of facilitating human rights 
and a transition to a democratic political system runs up against the international 
19 Dorothy Denning, ‘Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing 
Foreign Policy’ (1999) http://www.nautilus.org/info-policy/workshop/papers/denning.html.
20 Tiffany Danitz and Warren Strobel, ‘Networking Dissent: Cyber Activists use the Internet to Promote 
Democracy in Burma’ (US Institute of Peace, 2000). See generally Joel Reidenberg, ‘Yahoo and Democracy on 
the Internet’ (2002) 42 Jurimetrics 261.
21 Philip Howard et al., ‘Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab 
Spring?’ Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, Working Paper No. 2011(1), http://pitpi.
org/?p= 1051; Zeynep Tufekci and Christopher Wilson, ‘Social Media and the Decision to Participate in 
Political Protest: Observations from Tahrir Square’ (2012) 62 Journal of Communication 363.
22 The White House, ‘Remarks by the President on the Situation in Egypt’ (Press Release, 1 February 2011) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/01/remarks-president-situationegypt.
23 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh after Their Meeting’ (Press 
Release, 26 January 2011) http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/01/155388.htm.
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legal norm prohibiting intervention within the internal affairs of a state.24 
Nevertheless, following 18 days of protest, Mubarak resigned from office and so 
ended 30 years of authoritarian rule.
Social media has had a comparable role in events within other states. In Tunisia, 
for example, video of protests were uploaded to Facebook. In 2001, written 
accounts, photographs, videos and other information from Syrian demonstrators 
were relayed around the world via social media by 20 Syrian exiles. But social 
media can also be used to coordinate destructive mayhem within democratic 
states as much as effect constructive political mobilisation within authoritarian 
ones. Blackberry’s encrypted messenger service, for example, was blamed by 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron for coordinating British riots in August 2011. 
Twitter on the other hand was credited with organising cleanups.
The contrary view is that social media promotes weak political ties and low-risk 
activism (or ‘slacktivism’) because ‘liking’ something on Facebook, or retweeting 
a story, takes little effort but lulls protagonists into believing that they are acting 
meaningfully.25 The vast quantity of information available through the internet 
can readily distract individuals from important political issues.26
It has also been suggested that the level of internet connectivity can predict the 
degree of democratic attainment.27 In other words, the more enhanced the basic 
communications infrastructure of any given country then the more likely this 
will be conducive to the assertion and manifestation of liberties and rights for 
its citizens.28 The important civic value of the internet is that ‘those who have 
computers and internet communications find themselves better trained, better 
informed, and better able to participate in democracy’.29 Internet usage was 
a more accurate predictor of democracy between 2001–2002 than 1992–2002, 
thereby suggesting that the internet has only recently come into its own as a 
positive force for democratisation.30
The experience of web-enabled open government illustrates the nature of 
individual behaviour and the challenges confronting agencies. The internet is 
opening up government agency methodologies to public scrutiny, prompting 
24 But see Chatham House, ‘The Principle of Non-Intervention in Contemporary International Law: Non-
Interference in a State’s Internal Affairs Used to be a Rule of International Law — is it Still?’ (28 February 2007).
25 Malcolm Gladwell, ‘Small Change’, New Yorker, 4 October 2010, 42 http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa-fact-gladwell.
26 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion (Public Affairs, 2011) 81–2.
27 Christopher Kedzie, ‘Communication and Democracy: Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent Dictator’s 
Dilemma’, Rand Document No RGSD-127, 1997, http://www.rand.org/publications/RGSD/RGSD127.
28 Audrey Selian, IT’s in Support of Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2002).
29 Mark Cooper, ‘Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the Digital Divide Deserves All the Attention It 
Gets’ (2002) 20 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 73.
30 Michael Best and Keegan Wade, ‘The Internet and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic Dud?’ 
(2009) 29(4) Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 255.
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greater transparency, making information more accessible and increasing 
public participation in agency decision-making.31 For example, ‘e-rulemaking’ 
allows public comments to be submitted online through social media to 
formulate rules. However, individuals are exhibiting ‘drive-by participation’.32 
Public participation can moreover delay agency action, overwhelm decision-
makers and encourage agendas which meet the wishes of small, but vocal, 
interest groups.33 Thus the law and Web 2.0 become ‘very strange bedfellows. 
Law is authoritarian, hierarchical, and bounded; the Web is fluid, infinitely 
possibilistic, even anarchic.’34
One difficulty with social media is that participation is characterised by 
inequality.35 There is intense participation by a small proportion of users who 
supply a large percentage of content. Ideally, individuals can collect factual 
information, voice their personal perspective, confront other points of view 
and rationally discuss issues.36 However, the internet is also a powerful tool for 
spreading misinformation, propaganda and hateful messages. Drawing the line 
between robust debate which advances knowledge-creation and speech that 
harms civic deliberations is therefore challenging. Can these dangers and risks 
be adequately addressed by regulation?37
The second difficulty is that, while the number of internet users has increased 
exponentially, the internet’s growth and corresponding benefits are unequally 
distributed. Is it satisfactory, then, that the opportunity for political participation 
is left to depend upon such rudimentary issues as technology, infrastructure or 
electricity access? The problem of relying upon the internet as a democratising 
tool is that there is no universal access. The ‘digital divide’ refers to the unequal 
distribution of information and communication technology between and within 
states.38 In contrast to the 71.6 internet users per 100 inhabitants within developed 
states, there are only 21.1 internet users per 100 inhabitants in developing ones 
31 Stephen Johnson, ‘The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionising Public Participation and Access to 
Government Information Through the Internet’ (1998) 50 Administrative Law Review 277, 305–6.
32 Cynthia Farina, Paul Miller, Mary Newhart, Claire Cardie, Dan Cosley, Rebecca Vernon and the Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative, ‘Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in 
Rulemaking’ (2011) 31 Pace Law Review 382, 445.
33 Jim Rossi, ‘Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency 
Decisionmaking’ (1997) 92 Northwestern University Law Review 173, 180.
34 Farina et al., ‘Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in 
Rulemaking’ (2011) 31 Pace Law Review 461.
35 ibid 453.
36 Jon Katz, ‘Birth of a Digital Nation’, Wired, April 1997, http://www.wired.com/wired/5.04/netizen.html.
37 Abid Hussain, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/75 (30 January 2002) [69]–[70].
38 Peter Yu, ‘Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age’ (2002) 20 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 1, 2. See also Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty 
and the Internet Worldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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and only 9.6 users per 100 inhabitants within Africa.39 Digital divides also exist 
within states along wealth, gender, geographical and social lines. Internet access 
tends to be concentrated among socioeconomic elites, whereas individuals in 
rural areas confront obstacles including lack of technological availability, slower 
connection speeds and/or higher costs. Disadvantaged sectors, such as disabled 
persons or minority groups, often face barriers to accessing the internet in a way 
that is meaningful, relevant and useful to their daily lives.
The international community is only beginning to address these challenges. For 
example, the World Summit on the Information Society defined the digital divide 
in access-related statistics.40 However, physical access — namely, possessing 
computers, user numbers, connection speeds and the underlying infrastructure 
— is only one dimension. By focusing upon access or enabling infrastructure, the 
question is posed: ‘how do we increase the speed of connections?’ This question 
should be reframed as how to encourage local communities to meaningfully 
participate.41 Meaningful participation, however, may have to overcome yet 
another hurdle: regulation by governments.
Government regulation of social media as a 
democratic impediment
The leading developed states agree that the internet helps to promote 
democracy and the freedoms of opinion, expression, information, assembly and 
association.42 Arbitrary or indiscriminate censorship or restrictions on internet 
access are said to be inconsistent with a state’s international obligations and 
are unacceptable. They have accordingly committed themselves to encouraging 
internet use as a tool for advancing human rights and democratic participation. 
Importantly, however, implementing these objectives is qualified by respect for 
the rule of law.43 Furthermore, as will be considered below, the promotion of 
social media use by governments has a Janus-like quality which reins in trends 
towards greater democratic participation. 
39 International Telecommunication Union, Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication 
Service Sector, 21 October 2010.
40 World Summit on the Information Society, The Digital Divide at a Glance (International Telecommunications 
Union, 2005) http://www.iru.int/wsis/tunis/newsroom/stats.
41 Amir Ali, ‘The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New Tools for Closing the Global Digital 
Divide and Beyond’ (2010) 24 Harvard Human Rights Journal 185, 198.
42 Group of Eight Declaration, Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, G8 Summit, Deauville, 
26–27 May 2011, [5] http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/renewedcommitment-for-freedom-
and-democracy.1314.html.
43 ibid [11], [13], Section II [10].
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It is clear from the previous discussion that the internet has a growing 
significance for the individual rights to freedom of opinion, expression and 
association as defined under international human rights law.44 The right to 
freedom of expression, for example, can illustrate the conflict between law 
and democracy in the context of social media. This right includes the freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, irrespective of 
frontiers, through any media of an individual’s choosing.45
More particularly, a direct link between freedom of expression through social 
media and political participation can be identified. The free exchange of 
information or ideas on matters relevant to the economic, social or political life 
of a state is crucial to, and inherent in the very nature of, a democratic country.46 
Freedom of expression including political debate is an essential foundation for a 
democratic society and a basic condition for individual self-fulfilment.47 Freedom 
of expression, together with the right to take part in the public affairs of a state, 
‘implies that citizens, in particular through the media, should have wide access 
to information and the opportunity to disseminate information and opinions 
about the activities of elected bodies and their members’.48 The UN Human 
Rights Committee has already made the point that excluding individuals from 
accessing the Press Gallery for reasons of parliamentary privilege, for example, 
violated the right to freedom of expression ‘[i]n view of the importance of access 
to information about the democratic process’, notwithstanding the ability to 
report on proceedings through broadcasting services.49
So, what then is the nature of this conflict between law and democracy? 
The first part of this chapter indicated that the individual interest in free 
political expression does not always coincide — and indeed may clash — with 
governmental agendas. The appeal of an unhindered multimedia communication 
space appears at odds with exercising control in the broader public interest. 
What role if any does law have in either bridging or perpetuating that gulf?
44 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, 
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) arts 19, 20; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened 
for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 19, 22; European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 
221 (entry into force 3 September 1953) arts 10–11; American Convention of Human Rights, opened for 
signature 22 September 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entry into force 18 July 1978) arts 13, 16; African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (entry into force 21 October 
1986) arts 9–10.
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entry into force 23 March 1976) art 19(2).
46 Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22, [148]–[149] (Baroness Hale).
47 Lingens v Austria [1986] 8 EHRR 407, [41]–[42].
48 Human Rights Committee, Decision: Communication No 633/95, UN Doc CCPR/C/ 65/D/633/1995 (5 May 
1999) [13.4] (‘Gauthier v Canada’).
49 ibid [13.5].
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First, the law provides boundaries on the measures which states are permitted 
to adopt. Using the right to freedom of expression to illustrate the point, any 
limitations on this right must satisfy a three-part, cumulative test:50
a) the limitation must be provided by law which is clear and accessible 
to everyone (that is, the principles of predictability and transparency);
b) the limitation must protect the rights or reputations of others, 
national security, public order, public health or morals51 (the principle 
of legitimacy); and
c) the limitation must be necessary and the least restrictive means 
for achieving the purported aim (the principles of necessity and 
proportionality).
In addition, any legislative measure must be applied by a body which is 
independent of any political, commercial or other unwarranted influences in 
a manner that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and having adequate 
safeguards against abuse, including the prospect of challenge and a remedy 
against any abusive application.52
International benchmarks such as these as a guide for national-level regulations 
are all well and good. But states are increasingly censoring online information 
by arbitrarily blocking or filtering content, criminalising legitimate expression, 
imposing intermediary liability,53 disconnecting users from internet access54 (for 
reasons including intellectual property rights protection)55 and inadequately 
protecting data privacy. For example, ‘timed’ blocking prevents users from 
accessing the websites of opposition parties or independent or social media 
at key political moments such as elections, times of social unrest, or political 
50 Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) [24].
51 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entry into force 23 March 1976) art 19(3).
52 Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) [24].
53 ibid [39], [40]. See, for example, Law 5651 on the Prevention of Crime Committed in the Information 
Technology Domain 2007 (Turkey) grants authority to an administrative agency to issue orders to block 
websites for content hosted outside state borders. The Computer Crimes Act 2007 (Thailand) imposes liability 
upon intermediaries which transmit or host third-party content as well as the authors themselves. States have 
instituted ‘notice-and-takedown’ regimes which protect intermediaries from liability provided they promptly 
remove unlawful material upon notification. See, for example, Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
OJ L 178 (17 July 2000), 1–16, art 14; Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) s 512.
54 On a centralised ‘on/off’ control over Internet traffic, see ‘Reaching for the Kill Switch’, The Economist, 
10 February 2011.
55 Legislation may disconnect users from the internet if they violate intellectual property rights, this occuring by 
way of a ‘graduated response’, that is, a series of increasing penalties which ultimately lead to suspending the internet 
service. See, for example, Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision 2009–580, Act furthering the diffusion and protection of 
creation on the Internet, 10 June 2010, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank_mm/
anglais/2009_580dc.pdf. See also Digital Economy Act 2010 (UK) ss 3–16.
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or historically-significant anniversaries. States restrict, control, manipulate 
or censor information disseminated through the internet either absent any 
legal basis, using broad and ambiguous laws without justification or in an 
unnecessary or disproportionate manner for achieving their intended aim. States 
are moreover introducing or modifying laws to increase their ability to monitor 
internet users’ activities as well as the content of communications without 
sufficient guarantees against abuse. Government measures include a real-name 
identification system before users can post comments or upload content (which 
compromises anonymity) and restricting the use of encryption technology.56
Such steps might not at first glance appear conducive to democratic ideals. 
These regulatory measures are introduced for national security, counter-
terrorism or public order reasons such as protecting an individual’s reputation. 
Indeed, international agreements may require states Parties to criminalise 
certain activities committed over the internet.57 Content which may legitimately 
be restricted includes child pornography, hate speech, defamation, direct and 
public incitement to genocide, advocating national, racial or religious hatred 
and incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. These standards provide 
permissible grounds for states to regulate contrary to an individual’s right to 
freedom of expression. States are moreover supporting the growth of information 
and communications technology to further their own specific ends including 
national development objectives.58
Within the international community China is frequently singled out for 
criticism. The government is encouraging expansion of the internet and putting 
more official information online.59 Because political discussion occurs on bulletin 
boards and websites, the government has increased its efforts to monitor and 
control content. Sophisticated and extensive filtering systems block access 
to websites containing key terms such as ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’.60 
Politically-sensitive websites including foreign news services are shut down by 
authorities. Internet cafes are monitored or raided, and website operators are 
jailed for subversion or social crimes. The authorities also monitor and block 
56 Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) [26], [30], [55].
57 Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature 23 November 2001 (2001) ETS No 185 (entry into force 1 
July 2004). The Convention entered into force for Australia on 1 March 2013: [2013] ATS 9.
58 UN GA Res 55/2 on the Millennium Development Goals, UN Doc A/RES/55/2 (18 September 2000) Target 
8f; World Summit on the Information Society, 2003 Plan of Action, WSIS-03/Geneva/DOC/5-E, Geneva, 12 
December 2003, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html.
59 US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices, China (including Hong Kong and Macau), 23 February 2001.
60 Reporters Sans Frontiers, Enemies of the Internet, March 2010, 8–12, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_
enemies.pdf.
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telephone conversations, fax transmissions, email and internet communications. 
An email filtration system for anti-government messages entering China has also 
been established.
These measures of political repression are effected by law. The Measures for 
Managing Internet Content Provision, for example, regulate who can own an 
internet business and what is published online. Internet content providers 
must retain files of posted communications including details of who has read 
it for 60 days. Internet service providers must record the time that users log on 
to the internet as well as telephone and account numbers, internet addresses 
and domain names. State Council Order Number 273 (1999) requires firms with 
encryption technology to register and provide the names, telephone numbers and 
email addresses of all persons using it. These efforts to block content and control 
internet use, however, has only had limited success because sophisticated users 
can bypass such measures, the number of internet sites has grown so rapidly, 
censorship regulations are applied inconsistently and enforcement efforts 
vary. In sum, the contest between government control through regulation and 
democratic participation, like numerous other contexts within China, is being 
played out through the use of social media tools.
But one need not limit scrutiny to China to observe comparable steps taken by 
other states. Indeed, tighter regulatory control over social media is not limited 
to authoritarian states. For example, the European Union has developed more 
effective legislation to counter terrorist websites than the US because the right to 
freedom of speech is upheld with less vigour.61 European states must retain data 
generated or processed following a communication or use of a communication 
service.62 Internet service providers must retain user identification, telephone 
numbers and IP addresses for both the sender and recipient of communications.
Around 45 other states restrict internet access by their citizens, typically by 
forcing individuals to subscribe to state-run internet service providers which 
filter out objectionable material.63 The UN Human Rights Committee has also 
expressed concern that access to local and international sources of political 
commentary is blocked during election periods.64 Government surveillance of 
human rights defenders or political opposition figures communicating via the 
internet and Facebook can occur in an arbitrary or covert manner.
61 Megan Healy, ‘How the Legal Regimes of the European Union and the United States Approach Islamic 
Terrorist Web Sites: A Comparative Analysis’ (2009–2010) 84 Tulane Law Review 165.
62 Council Directive 2006/24 of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L 105/54.
63 Reporters Sans Frontiers, The Twenty Enemies of the Internet, Press Release, 9 August 1999.
64 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34: Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011) [37].
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Non-governmental organisations in the human rights field are concerned that 
the threats to internet freedom are growing and becoming more diverse. In one 
study of 37 states, 15 blocked politically-relevant content.65 Reports of internet 
filtering, content manipulation and imprisoning users have increased in recent 
years. For example, in Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and the 
UK, internet freedom is increasingly undermined by legal harassment, opaque 
censorship laws or expanding surveillance. In Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Jordan 
and Rwanda, politically-motivated internet controls are emerging, typically 
during election periods. Increasing censorship and user arrests occurred 
in Bahrain, Ethiopia and Tunisia following popular protests or contentious 
elections. Following the 2009 elections, Iran established a filtering system which 
can block websites nationwide within several hours. In Vietnam, four activists 
were imprisoned for using the internet to express pro-democratic views.66 As 
is the case in China, however, resourceful citizens within these states continue 
to identify technical means with which to sidestep restrictions and employ 
internet-based platforms with a view to promoting greater participation.
The leading democratic states are by no means exceptional. Indeed, they have 
championed internet freedom for individuals located in other states — and to 
extend their governmental influence extraterritorially — whilst simultaneously 
introducing legislation which increases governmental surveillance and 
undermines the privacy of their own nationals.67 For example, the US promotes 
internet freedom and encourages universal access. In 2010, Secretary of State 
Clinton advocated ‘the freedom to connect — the idea that governments should 
not prevent people from connecting to the internet, to websites, or to each 
other’.68 The State Department supported new tools which enabled citizens 
to exercise their right to freedom of expression by circumventing politically-
motivated censorship.69 It intends to put social media tools ‘in the hands of 
people who will use them to advance democracy and human rights’.70 However, 
the US is establishing links with foreign non-governmental actors with a view 
to furthering its own diplomatic objectives, including enhancing its ability to 
influence developments occurring within other states and skirt the norm of 
non-intervention in domestic affairs.71
65 Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook, ‘New Technologies, Innovative Repression: Growing Threats to Internet 
Freedom’, in Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media (18 
April 2011) http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2011.
66 ibid 2–3.
67 See, for example, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act of 2012 (US); Cybersecurity Act of 2012 
(US); Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act 
of 2012 (US).
68 Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, ‘Remarks on Internet Freedom’, Address at The Newseum 
Washington DC, 21 January 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
71 Compare House of Commons, ‘Transcript of Oral Evidence taken by the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
British Foreign Policy and the “Arab Spring”: The Transition to Democracy’, 18 April 2012, HC 1672-V.
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The International Strategy for Cyberspace for the US notes that many states put 
arbitrary restrictions upon the free flow of information or apply restrictions 
to suppress dissent or opposition activity.72 Individuals are encouraged to 
use digital media to express opinions, share information, monitor elections, 
expose corruption and organise social or political movements, and the US will 
denounce those who harass, unfairly arrest, threaten or commit violent acts 
against individuals who use this technology.73 However, fidelity to the rule of 
law is simultaneously affirmed.74 How this strategy proposes to reconcile these 
sometimes competing objectives is left unsaid.
Furthermore, the proposed Global Online Freedom Act 2012 (US) intends to 
prevent US businesses from cooperating with governments who use the internet 
for censorship and repression.75 ‘Internet-restricting countries’ would be 
designated for those governments who were directly or indirectly responsible 
for a systematic pattern involving ‘substantial restrictions on Internet freedom’. 
By this means the lure of economic assistance displaces the free expression of 
political opinion in favour of the free availability of electronic information 
generally.
Here in Australia, around 69 per cent of the population has access to an internet 
connection at home and around 21 per cent access the internet from their mobile 
phone.76 Access to online content is generally unhindered and Australians 
can openly criticise government policy. Australian law does not currently 
contemplate the mandatory blocking or filtering of websites, blogs, chat 
rooms or file-sharing platforms. However, material deemed by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) to be ‘prohibited content’ may 
be subject to ‘take-down’ notices: the relevant internet service provider is 
notified by the ACMA that it is hosting offending content which must then be 
removed.77 Online content which is categorised as ‘Refused Classification’ by 
the Classification Board is prohibited.78 Australians are not subject to censorship 
provided content does not defame or qualify as a criminal offence (such as hate 
speech or racial vilification).79 However, verified identification information 
must be provided to purchase any prepaid mobile telephone service, personal 
72 US, International Strategy for Cyberspace, Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked World (2011) 21.
73 ibid 23–4.
74 ibid 5.
75 Global Online Freedom Act of 2012 (US). For comment, see David Fidler, ‘The Internet, Human Rights, and 
US Foreign Policy: The Global Online Freedom Act of 2012’ (2012) 16(18) ASIL Insight.
76 Australian Communications and Media Authority, Communications Report 2010–11.
77 Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook, ‘New Technologies, Innovative Repression: Growing Threats to Internet 
Freedom’, in Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media (18 
April 2011) http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2011, 33–5.
78 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth).
79 See, for example, Jones v Toben [2002] FCA 1150; Re Lim, ‘Cronulla Riot: Confiscation of Mobile Phones, 
Invasion of Privacy and the Curbing of Free Speech’, Act Now, 15 March 2006, http://www.actnow.com.au/
Opinion/Cronulla_riot.aspx; Les Kennedy, ‘Man in Court over Cronulla Revenge SMS’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney) 6 December 2006.
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information is stored while the service remains active and this information can 
be accessed by law enforcement and emergency agencies upon presentation of 
a warrant.
As is evident within other states and reflecting global trends, there are emergent 
threats through regulation to online freedom in Australia. A proposed South 
Australian election law would have required any individual posting political 
comments on a blog or online before a local election to use their real name 
and address. The proposal was withdrawn following a public outcry.80 Recent 
amendments to surveillance legislation, accompanied by proposals to implement 
censorship through directives to internet service providers, have raised concerns 
about privacy and freedom of expression. In 2010 draft legislation would have 
required internet service providers to filter illicit content (principally child 
pornography) and retain data on users’ online activities. This proposed filtering 
system triggered a number of concerns, including over-blocking, censoring 
adult materials, ‘scope creep’ and impairing telecommunication access speeds.81
As has been observed in Egypt, the UK, the US and elsewhere, political 
participation can prompt destructive protests which have been organised online 
through social media tools. Twitter and other social media have cooperated 
with UK law enforcement in cases of obvious criminality such as rioting, tax 
avoidance and privacy violations.82 Australian law enforcement agencies are 
currently empowered to search and seize computers, and compel internet service 
providers to intercept and store data from individuals suspected of criminal 
offences.83 Internet service providers cannot ordinarily monitor or disclose the 
content of communications without customer consent.84 However, intercepting 
telecommunications is a powerful and cost-effective tool for law enforcement 
80 Nate Anderson, ‘Internet Uprising Overturns Australian Censorship Law’, Ars Technica, 2 February 2010, 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/02/internet-uprising-overturns-australian-censorship-law.ars; 
‘South Australian Government Gags Internet Debate’, news.com.au, 2 February 2010, http://www.news.com.
au/technology/south-australian-state-government-gags-internet-debate/story-e6frfro0-1225825750956.
81 Alana Maurushat and Renee Watt, ‘Australia’s Internet Filter Proposal in the International Context’ 
(2009) 12(2) Internet Law Bulletin 18–25; David Vaile and Renee Watt, ‘Inspecting the Despicable, Assessing 
the Unacceptable: Prohibited Packets and the Great Firewall of Canberra’ (2009) University of New South Wales 
Law Review Series 35.
82 The Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson, Report of an Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of 
the Press, HC 780-I (29 November 2012) Vol 1 [3.14].
83 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). See also Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) Pt 13.
84 ibid. Pt 2–1, s 7 prohibits disclosure of an interception or communication, and Pt 3–1, s 108 prohibits 
access to stored communications.
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authorities and intelligence agencies to counter national security threats and 
investigate criminal offences.85 The Australian Federal Police considers that it 
has a limited ability to lawfully intercept information.86
Increased resort to social media tools therefore highlights the familiar problem 
of regulatory lag. Australian internet service providers may soon be required to 
monitor, collect and store information pertaining to all users’ communications. 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is considering 
the effectiveness and implications of proposals to ensure that law enforcement, 
intelligence and security agencies can meet the challenges of new and 
emerging technology upon their capabilities.87 Software, ciphers and similar 
methodologies are being used by organised crime to impede detection by law 
enforcement authorities.88 Australia’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
face significant challenges in accessing communications and keeping pace 
with rapid telecommunications changes.89 The legal framework also requires 
updating. For example, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 (Cth) assumes that interception can occur at a convenient point within a 
carrier’s network. However, most contemporary communications networks can 
be accessed via multiple technologies from many locations and through more 
than one service provider. The Australian Parliament will shortly be asked 
how best to balance the protection of individual privacy against the ability 
of government agencies to access the information necessary to protect the 
community.90
Why then is regulation perceived as a threat to the democratic potential offered 
by social media, particularly if there are counterbalancing interests at stake? 
Social media empowers individuals by enabling free expression. Due to its low 
cost, decentralised nature and great reach, the internet is an important outlet 
for circulating independent opinions about state authorities and government 
policies. Many governments have developed an interest in controlling, monitoring 
85 Anthony Blunn, Report of the Review of the Regulation of Access to Communications (2005) http://www.
ag.gov.au/publications/pages/blunnreportofthereviewoftheregulationofaccesstocommunicationsAugust2005.
aspx.
86 Australian Federal Police, Response to the Public Discussion Paper: Connecting with Confidence: Optimising 
Australia’s Digital Future (2012) 4.
87 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Inquiry into Potential Reforms of National 
Security Legislation, 2012, Terms of Reference [2].
88 The Australian Crime Commission, Future of Organised Criminality in Australia 2020 (2009).
89 Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Equipping Australia against Emergent and Evolving Threats: A 
Discussion Paper to Accompany Consideration by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security of a Package of National Security Ideas Comprising Proposals for Telecommunications Interception 
Reform, Telecommunications Sector Security Reform and Australian Intelligence Community Legislation 
Reform’ (2012) 3.
90 ibid 23. The former Opposition Spokesperson for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull, has called for 
‘more freedom [on the internet] rather than more regulation’. ‘Turnbull Supports Freedom of Internet’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney) 8–9 December 2012, 6.
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and if necessary censoring digital media.91 As indicated earlier in this chapter, 
the obvious benefits derived from social media use, including facilitating 
greater participation by individuals, are not without important qualifications. 
The desirability of imposing restrictions with a view to protecting privacy, 
reputations, intellectual property rights, national security or public order 
can readily be conceded. International human rights law provides only broad 
normative guidance to regulatory authorities on how respect for the right to 
freedom of expression is to be ensured and in any event expressly contemplates 
permissible limitations on its exercise. It ultimately appears that controlling 
social media can prove technically or politically difficult. Controlling public 
internet use might require governments to forgo the benefits of connection or 
expend political capital to block websites. The ‘cute cat theory of digital activism’ 
posits that governments cannot block political activity without also depriving 
access to other material, including pictures of cute cats.92 Governments cannot 
shut down Facebook, for example, because doing so alienates individuals and 
might politicise those who lose access.
Social media tools, like other forms of communication, are susceptible to abuse. 
Its potential to enhance democratic participation should not be overstated. 
Caution is accordingly appropriate when promoting social media as an 
instrument for progressive political change.93 The reality of unequal access 
and participation between individuals identified above, not to mention ‘digital 
divides’ between states and the technical challenges confronting government 
institutions, demands attention. More particularly, governments can subvert 
the utility of social media platforms by tracking and profiling dissidents, 
spreading propaganda and establishing false identities in cyberspace (‘sock 
puppets’) which poison popular trust. Social media can underpin repressive 
surveillance because data can provide information about a specific dissident 
and their connections. For example, during 2004 Yahoo provided information 
to China which helped to identify a dissident blogger, leading to his arrest and 
imprisonment arising from the content of his online expression.
Efforts to strike an appropriate balance between competing policy priorities in 
the use of social media, and not simply prioritising political participation, is an 
emergent regulatory development. Intergovernmental organisations composed 
of democratic states such as the Council of Europe have recognised that the 
internet enables people to access information, communicate and participate in 
91 Ambeyi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/7/14 (28 February 2008) [23].
92 Ethan Zuckerman, ‘The Cute Cat Theory Talk at ETech’, My Heart’s in Accra, 8 March 2008, http://www.
ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/03/08/the-cute-cat-theory-talk-at-etech/.
93 Sarah Joseph, ‘Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights’ (2012) 35 Boston College International 
& Comparative Law Review 145.
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political deliberations.94 Internet users should be empowered to exercise their 
fundamental rights and freedoms, make informed decisions and participate 
in the information society, including developing governance mechanisms and 
internet-related public policy.95 However, the Council is also concerned that 
users tend to use a very limited number of dominant search engines whereby 
certain types of content or services may be unduly favoured. Those who are 
responsible for controlling the flow, content and accessibility of information 
over the internet (‘gatekeepers’) can either facilitate or hinder democratic 
deliberation and participation.96 The Council is committed to protecting and 
promoting access, diversity, impartial treatment, security, transparency and 
media literacy.97 Users should also be informed when personal data is used 
for profiling their behaviour.98 One non-governmental organisation suggested 
strengthening the due process protections when blocking and filtering measures 
were requested by public authorities.99
Users of social media have a range of rights and freedoms which are not only 
limited to political participation. Nor is their interest in expressing opinions or 
information through a reliable, secure and safe mode of communication limited 
to social media. The Council of Europe recognises that social media services are 
human rights enablers and catalysts for democracy. Such services can enhance 
the participation of individuals in the political, social and cultural life of the 
state.100 However, freedom of expression, privacy and human dignity can be 
threatened by social networking services which shelter discriminatory practices. 
States should co-operate with the private sector to help users understand the 
default settings of their profiles, inform users of the consequences of open 
access to their communications and ensure that users retain the right to limit 
data access.101
94 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)8 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
the protection and promotion of the universality, integrity and openness of the Internet (21 September 2011) [3].
95 Council of Europe, Internet Governance Principles, Conference entitled ‘Internet Freedom: From Principles 
to Global Treaty Law’, Strasbourg (18–19 April 2011) [4].
96 Emily Laidlaw, ‘A Framework for Identifying Internet Information Gatekeepers’ (2010) 24(3) International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 263.
97 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the 
protection of human rights with regard to search engines (4 April 2012) [6].
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(London, 2011).
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Such solutions accompany proposals for global rules which ensure that the 
internet remains a democratic medium of expression.102 The protections afforded 
to journalists, for example, could be extended to online authors.103 Transparency, 
openness and accountability are the values to be promoted if political debates 
are to be enriched.104 Individuals should be encouraged to participate in the 
ongoing dialogue on how social media tools are best regulated in the pursuit 
of democratic ideals. Ensuring that individuals are free to openly discuss the 
laws governing the conduct of their communities is moreover consistent with 
‘deliberative democracy’.105
Conclusions
Social media can mobilise populations for good or ill. It is conducive to 
democratisation insofar as this medium has the potential to enhance political 
participation by individuals. Social media facilitates enjoyment of the right to 
freedom of expression relatively unhindered by external controls and subject 
primarily to technological issues such as access and capability. The degree of 
political participation cannot be left to depend upon such technical aspects 
given the existence of ‘digital divides’.
Although the utility of social media as a progressive political tool should 
not be overstated, governments can be made more accountable through this 
medium. Whereas social media is encouraging greater democratisation within 
authoritarian states, democratic states including Australia are moving towards 
tighter regulation. In this context what then is the nature of the conflict between 
legal restrictions imposed upon freedom of expression and democracy on the 
one hand, and the appropriate role of social media on the other? Efforts are 
observable within authoritarian and democratic states to regulate social media 
for legitimate purposes, such as addressing offensive content or for national 
security or law enforcement reasons. Governments are also seeking to match 
increasingly sophisticated communications networks with a more comprehensive 
surveillance and monitoring apparatus underpinned by law. Thus law inevitably 
has the potential to necessarily intrude into individual privacy, curtail the 
enjoyment of other human rights and suppress the democratic potential offered 
by social media. Stated at its highest, the use by governments of blocking 
102 Ambeyi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/4/27 (2 January 2007) [38].
103 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media and 
Reporters without Borders, Joint Declaration, 21 June 2005.
104 Ambeyi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/55 (17 December 2004) [79].
105 Robert Lukens, ‘Discoursing on Democracy and the Law: A Deconstructive Analysis’ (1997) 70 Temple 
Law Review 587.
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or filtering technology violates the obligation of states to guarantee freedom 
of expression. This circumstance reflects the truism that the rule of law and 
technological determinism are engaged in a constant struggle for supremacy.106 
It is not a contest that will soon be resolved, if at all, and the context of social 
media presents no exception.
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